PAUL ELMER MORE: A STUDY

G. S. Brett

THE appearance of a volume of *Shelburne Essays* has long been an occasion for rejoicing among the elect. It is equally true that others will be quite unmoved by the event or may even take the opportunity to renew an ancient grudge. For among the younger generation there are some who very frankly assert that they can derive nothing but pain from the writings of Paul Elmer More, and consequently utter nothing but complaints and condemnation. The last work to appear is *The Sceptical Approach to Religion* (1934), and as it is a direct continuation of the comprehensive plan of thought to be discussed hereafter, it will do nothing to turn away the wrath of the antagonists. For the antagonism is not merely a literary feud: it is rooted deeply in a clash of interests and a struggle of ideals. The younger generation will not accept the doctrine which More advocates because to them it seems classical and frigid; it runs counter to the modernism in thought and expression which they consider the essential mark of vitality and the true sign of freedom from antiquated models. More says: "I think, indeed I am very sure, that the general disappearance of belief in the Platonic Ideas, or perhaps it would be better to say the loss of belief in the everlasting truth which Plato dressed up in the doctrine of Ideas, has been the chief cause of the present *débâcle* of morals and art." This is an uncompromising creed which the younger generation refuses to accept, partly because they do not admit that morals and art have suffered any decline and partly because "everlasting truth" is not an ideal which they like any more than they like Platonism.

In the light of this conflict of opinion, a consideration of More's work becomes practically a study of the principal trends in modern thought.

As many people knew before, and the others possibly learned from this QUARTERLY,[1] Paul Elmer More was at one time editor of the *Nation*. The published works to which reference is here made are the collected essays and reviews known as the *Shelburne Essays*, and the series of philosophical studies called collectively *The Greek Tradition*, comprising *The Religion of Plato*, *Hellenistic Philosophies*, *The Christ of the New Testament*, *Christ the Word*, and *The Catholic Faith*.[2] The last of these volumes appeared in 1931, and forms, for the present purpose, the climax of a development which, looked at retrospectively as a whole, seems uniquely consistent and organic. For the essays, though written at various times and originally printed in many different journals, when read consecutively appear to be primarily different opportunities for stating the same thesis in various ways, so much dominated by a central idea that one becomes conscious of a sense of repetition, as if a theme were being played with variations. The unity of thought and the larger movements of the theme are consciously recognized by the author, for the essays grouped in the different volumes are given collective titles, such as *The Drift of Romanticism* and *Studies in Religious Dualism*. Nor are we left in doubt, finally, about this central idea. It is stated explicitly, in the Preface to the eighth series of the *Shelburne Essays* (1913), in the following words: "The question finally raised is thus one of dualism: Is there, or is there not, some element of man's being superior to

[1]Vol. III, no. 2.

[2]The bibliography given in this essay is not intended to be complete. For further details the reader should consult *The Challenge of Humanism* by Louis J. A. Mercier, and for the significance of the opening remarks *The Critique of Humanism* edited by C. H. Grattan.

instinct and reason, some power that acts as a stay on the flowing impulses of nature, without whose authoritative check reason herself must be swept away in the dissolution of the everlasting flux?"

This explicit statement of the problem must be accepted as the clue to the whole gamut of More's work. Before considering it with greater precision, some remarks on the author's treatment may justly be expected. There must be few, if any, among the critics, who can honestly claim to have travelled so widely in the realms of thought. The three great fields of human speculation are Indian, Greek, and modern Western philosophy. The debt of modern thought to its Greek antecedent hardly needs comment. More subtle and more difficult to estimate is the actual significance of the Indian contribution to the sum total of human endeavour. That it represents one of the fundamental attitudes of man toward the universe cannot be disputed: it probably had some effect on early Greek thought; it certainly permeated the later Hellenistic developments; and it emerged again with renewed force as a product of that study of Sanskrit which began in the first years of the nineteenth century and gradually developed into the study of comparative philology. As the philologists continued to reveal the origins of many Greek and Latin words from their primeval roots in Sanskrit, the idea of comparative literature automatically emerged, and the "Wisdom of the East" took form, not only in the great collection of translations known by that name, but also as a type of thought which has appealed to many modern thinkers by virtue of its apparent denial of all that is most characteristic in the Western man's exaltation of aggressive energy and material progress. As a student of the original sources, a lecturer at one time in comparative literature, and author of *A Century of*

Indian Epigrams, More has the unusual advantage of being able to discuss the *Vedanta*, the *Upanishads*, and the *Bhagavad Gita*, with assurance, and of being no less at ease in his exposition of Buddhism. The *Vedanta* and Plato, Buddhism and mediaeval Christianity, are subjects that demand wide learning and catholic interests: if we add to this the philosophical tradition from Thomas Aquinas to William James (or later) and the trends of modern thought from Rousseau to the latest heresies of the Romantics, we must perforce halt for a moment to pay our respects to a most uncommon kind of erudition. But our tribute will not go unchallenged: the younger generation is not convinced that all this learning is an unmixed good; on the contrary it openly declares that this is not the way to reach an understanding of life, that it destroys the very capacity for being modern, and that More, having begun with Indian epigrams and the "forest-philosophies" of the Upanishads, has never really moved any further. This protest can be recorded here to keep the scales of judgment properly weighted: its value remains to be assessed later.

Leaving the historical view of dualism as it appears in the records from Buddha to the present day, we may attempt some direct analysis of the problem itself. Let us consider first the significance of the title of More's article on "The Demon of the Absolute." Though often regarded as the last absurdity of metaphysicians, the absolute is not actually a thing, knowable or unknowable, but a logical conclusion and at the same time a spiritual attitude. In common language we deal with practical distinctions, such as God and the world, soul and body, reason and the senses, good and evil, righteousness and sinfulness. In each case we have two terms, not reducible to one, and this is, therefore, called dualism. If we

attempt to go further and reach a unity beyond this level, we arrive at some kind of absolute, for then we assert something "absolved" from those relations and distinctions by which things are commonly known and defined. The typical Indian idealism says "the All is One," and so reaches the absolute. The materialism which opposes this says all is matter, which is absolutism in other terms. To go, with Nietzsche, "beyond good and evil" is also absolutism. To deny the reality of the individual will because every act is natural and necessary, as in the Indian law of Karma and the equivalent modern doctrine of behaviourism, is also a way of asserting an absolute. In brief, all these errors are due to the demon of the Absolute, and these examples show why More's creed is formulated quite simply as an elaborate exorcism of that demon. Plato was right because he maintained a practical dualism, the opposition of reason and desire. Christianity is still more fundamentally right because it has never given up the final antithesis of the spiritual and the material, the struggle between good and evil, or the claim of conscience to rebuke the sinful desires. So More's thought developed towards its final concentration in his work on the Greek tradition, here understood to be Platonism, and its regeneration in Catholic (but not Roman Catholic) Christianity.

It is generally admitted that one-half of the world does not know how the other half lives, and no amount of social surveys has up to the present changed that opinion. While it can be most easily applied to the arts of making a living, the opinion is even more strikingly true in the world of ideas. Between the personal interests of individuals there are wide gaps, and we are continually puzzled to know how and why our neighbour finds anything that interests him in his chosen occupations. The pursuit of

perfection and the life of the scholar used to be admired even if they were rarely envied or chosen. By common consent, and the aid of statistical reports, we now rate occupations by the degree to which a person is or is not "gainfully employed:" we have been told by a writer who has a large following that all persons below a certain level of income (the amount is unimportant) should be classed as morons; and Bertrand Russell has expressed the view that this standard, if applied to Buddha, Christ, or Milton, would hardly give a satisfactory rating! The vast majority of people on the continent of America alone are probably quite ignorant of More's activities and would be very much surprised if they came in contact with them. If we draw the lines a little closer and consider only the so-called reading public, the same would be true: even if we ventured further and limited our outlook to the academic world, we should perhaps find only a small increase in the percentage. This does not mean that More lacks numerous admirers and readers, nor that critics have failed to describe his work as a "stupendous achievement" or a "magnificent conception." But it seems to urge upon us the question of the vitality and significance of these labours and to call for some interpretation of their meaning. It is not in any sense an accident that Russell chooses Buddha and Christ as his examples: it is with Buddha and Christ that More becomes ever increasingly concerned as his theme develops. The inevitable consequence is a sense of remoteness from the current problems of the day, a suspicion of esoteric calm in cloistered seclusion, and more than a suspicion of that mood which can be so easily damned by being labelled "aristocratic."

The *Shelburne Essays* are a collection of studies which a hasty reader would assign to the field of literary criti-

cism. They are in most cases concerned with books and writers, but they do not follow the common pattern of criticisms which estimate only the quality of the writing or the writer's success in the execution of his plan. The different conceptions of criticism have been stated by More himself and we cannot do better than quote what is a clear distinction and a statement of policy:

> There is a kind of criticism that limits itself to looking at the thing in itself, or at the parts of a thing as they successively strike the mind. This is properly the way of sympathy and those who choose this way are right in saying that it is absurd or merely ill-tempered to dwell on what is ugly in a work of art, or false or incomplete. But there is room also for another kind of criticism, which is not so much directed to the individual thing as to its relation with other things, and to its place as cause or effect in a whole group of tendencies.[3]

This statement of policy, as it really is, comes significantly in the volume which is concerned with the "drift of Romanticism." The "Romantics" are a motley group. First comes William Beckford, an exotic individual, endowed with great wealth, obsessed by curious oriental fantasies, author of *Vathek*, a book once widely read which had for its theme "the insatiable craving for experience and the self-torturing egotism which were beginning to run like wild-fire through the literature of Europe." Next after Beckford comes John Henry Newman! Is there any possible unity between two such topics? More finds it because "in succumbing to an authority which promised to allay the anguish of his intellect he rejected the great mission of faith . . . ; in the agony of his conversion and in his years of poignant dejection there is something of the note of modern romanticism intruding into religion." More considers that Newman was prob-

[3] *Shelburne Essays*, VIII, Preface.

ably "the finest religious nature of the age," but he failed tragically in the crisis because he sought satisfaction "in the limitless expansion of the emotions." After Newman comes Walter Pater, whose besetting sin was that he elevated beauty above truth, distorted facts to preserve aesthetic elegance, and so promoted decadence: "the inevitable follower of Pater was Oscar Wilde." Passing over Fiona Macleod, who hardly seems to deserve so much attention, we come to Nietzsche who, in spite of many faults, saw, "as few other men of our day have seen, the danger that threatens true progress in any system of education and government which makes the advantage of the ordinary rather than the distinguished man its first object." That judgment should not go unnoticed: it reveals a characteristic element in More's attitude to modern America. Also with Nietzsche we change the central theme. Beckford was an undisciplined visionary, the victim of unbridled imaginations: Newman was at heart a mystic, and mystics are the victims of deep cravings which society and the normal world can never satisfy: Pater was pathologically aesthetic and supersensitive. Nietzsche represents the triumph of naturalism, for which the ideal is little more than a sickly sentiment doomed to vanish before the resistless and ruthless affirmation of power. Finally, and paradoxically, we end with Huxley, who represents the myth of scientific explanation, not merely science as method and experimental research but science as a religion and a dogma against which nothing can be allowed to stand. More realizes the magnificent work which Huxley achieved in breaking down the narrow sectarian prejudices which vainly attempted to excommunicate Darwinism. He recognizes also that Huxley was not unwilling to make concessions, as in the Romanes lecture when he asserted

an opposition between physical law and the moral order in the Universe. But at the end More tells the old story of Disraeli's speech and the characteristic smartness of the conclusion: "The question is this: Is man an ape or an angel? I, my lord, am on the side of the angels." And More adds his comment that "these words contain a truth that shall some day break to pieces the new philosophy which Huxley spent his life so devotedly to establish."

The temptation to study in this way the dominant idea as it emerges in all the separate essays is hard to resist; but clearly, in view of the bulk of the work, it could not be done in the present limits. One volume has been selected and used as an example, in the belief that this method would most successfully demonstrate what More has desired to teach. And the subject of this volume introduces us to a major theme in the whole plan of More's written works.

Pausing here for a moment to sum up the argument, we may ask the reader to notice that the works we are considering fall into two groups, one being the collection of essays belonging in some degree to literary criticism, the other a continuous study of religious thought as it developed from Plato to "the Catholic faith." In this more comprehensive grouping, the unity to which we have drawn attention is preserved by the fact that the basis of criticism in the essays is a standard which defines the religious attitude. The major theme, which the criticism of the Romantics brings to light, may be described thus: the nature of man is compounded of reason and the senses; it is possible to exaggerate the claims of either part, and the result will be either extreme intellectualism or unbridled emotionalism. At the present time the latter is the more immediate danger, supported as it is by a

rampant naturalism and materialism which demand the indiscriminate satisfaction of all desires and claim for the individual the right of self-expression in defiance of all rules. This attitude toward life, significantly called by one writer "philosophical modernism," shows itself in literature as the Romantic movement and in religion as a denial of authority. The opponent has to present the counter-claim of authority in both fields. In the field of literature the reaction has taken the form of a "new humanism." The title is unfortunately ambiguous, but for the present purpose it must be taken to mean the recognition of authoritative standards in life and thought which justify the condemnation of excesses into which romantic experiments continually run. It is a matter of plain fact that these excesses exist, in aesthetics and in morals: it is equally a matter of fact that common sense condemns them, that good sense rejects them, and the present generation is calling for some guidance in what seems like unendurable chaos. In the light of these facts, there seems to be a profound justification for the attitude of men like Irving Babbitt, T. S. Eliot, and Paul Elmer More. Their efforts converge toward similar goals, for they all alike aim to set up regulative standards which might bring order out of chaos. Babbitt fulminated unceasingly against Rousseau's naturalism and the modern romanticism which he believed to have been created by that apostle of individual rights and natural passions. More, in his essay on Rousseau, takes a wider view and regards Rousseau as essentially unoriginal, an incident in a development which began centuries before his time. But he agrees with Babbitt when he writes of Rousseau that "in his boastful admission that it was always impossible for him to act contrary to his inclination, in his defiant cry against a Providence that caused

him to be born among men yet made him of a different species from them, in all his itching to exhibit himself, he was the father of romanticism and of the morbid individualism that seeks to hide itself under the cloak of a collective ideal." And Rousseau also is to be blamed for another error: he brought about the "change from theology to sociology," where we see the link between romanticism and religious modernism. "One wonders curiously," says More,"or sadly sometimes, that the preachers who abdicate the fear of God for humanitarianism, and the teachers who surrender the higher discipline for subservience to individual choice, do not see, or, seeing, do not dread, the goal toward which they are facing."

The "higher discipline" is the formula which unites our three protagonists (along with some others not mentioned) in their reaction against what they conceive to be the evils of the present age. Since the evils spring from romanticism, the antidote must be provided by some form of "classicism"—another vague term—which we may take as equivalent to intellectual and moral asceticism. Since, also, romanticism has its roots in a naturalism which asserts the natural goodness of man and, more particularly, the natural goodness of man's instincts and passions, the antidote for this must be found in some form of supernaturalism: we must go back from sociology to theology and we must say to all modern sophists what the Platonic Socrates said, "Not man but God is the measure of all things." Thus logically we pass out of the disputes about literary standards into the more comprehensive field of general moral discipline, which is the essence of the religious view of the world.

We pause again to hear the voice of the unsympathetic critic. With some justification he demands a fuller explanation of this "higher discipline" and a clearer

definition of the "inner check" which is supposed to keep our feet from straying; he insinuates in moments of irritation that the higher discipline is another name for the Harvard tradition and that the inner check is merely the particular set of inhibitions and taboos which the Bostonian calls culture. All this may be debited to original sin, but it remains true that the objection touches on a very real difficulty and one that is certainly left unsolved by our three protagonists. Can we find in aesthetics and morals truly independent and super-personal standards, or must we admit that these are just the other standards adopted by the other people? It is easy to say that these are the standards which rational or cultured people accept; the peculiar problem of to-day arises from the fact that the opponent will persist in thinking that it would be much better for such people if they ceased to be rational or cultured. The true democrat believes that it takes all kinds to make a world, and by the same argument all kinds are equally right: the scientific naturalist does not ignore the creatures which some people call "nasty;" and the scientific sociologist cannot afford to classify opinions as better and worse: they all have rights and some of the worst have a very annoying amount of "survival value." The problem drifts aimlessly into a discussion of values, which it is a good policy to postpone indefinitely. On the other hand, More has the right to say that he can produce examples of what he means, and this is the significance of his contribution to the subject.

The argument has obviously taken a course which must end in some discussion of religion. This is presented in the series of books which begin with Plato and end with "the Catholic tradition." The treatment of these subjects is somewhat eclectic: emphasis is placed on those

parts of the material which will best serve the purpose, and the reader is likely to have a rather distorted perspective if he is unable to supply from his own knowledge what is necessary to make the picture complete. The virtue of Platonism in More's eyes is its essential dualism: this point does not need to be laboured, though it is a fact of some significance in relation to the complaints of Caird and other Hegelians that Plato sinned against the light by not "transcending" this dualism. A detailed examination of More's treatment of the later Greek systems or of the doctrines of Plotinus would be out of place here: criticism must be suppressed in the interests of brevity, in order to leave space for some account of *The Catholic Faith*. This opens with a study of Buddhism and Christianity which shows More at his best: the essential moral and religious teachings of the Buddha are described, and we are almost persuaded to become Buddhists as we read this lucid and persuasive account. But from this result we are saved by the ultimate condemnation of Buddhism as a way which has no end and by the assertion that "something has gone astray with a doctrine that accepts and then so nullifies the force of purpose." Ultimately in Buddhism the dual nature of man is "absolved:" the Saint looks upon the world and his body, and says "This is not I." The negation is magnificent but meaningless. What the Buddha missed was the truth of the Incarnation, the idea of the Word which became flesh, as it were a sanctification of dualism. It is the doctrine of Incarnation which leads More to accept the Christian faith as superior to all others. Whether the orthodox theologian would feel quite comfortable at finding the Incarnation justified because it preserved dualism is open to doubt. More examines the creeds in detail and elaborates the doctrine of the Eucharistic

Sacrament. From each he extracts a rational essence, taking the articles of the creed symbolically and seeing in the Eucharist the commemoration of the "costingness" of religion: it is, he says, "a quieter of many doubts" to hold that, as in Plato "the Ideas are imposed upon the inert stuff of Necessity," so "the Logos may be really present in the bread and wine."

These specimens of More's theology are not introduced here for their intrinsic merit but in order to pave the way for the concluding discussion of "the Church." The subject is discussed in an essay which forms part of the book on the Catholic faith, and it is significant that it opens with the topic in the first series of the *Shelburne Essays*, the Demon of the Absolute. It will be appropriate to quote the first paragraph in this essay on the Church:

> Elsewhere and for another purpose I have written at length on the worth of the Demon of the Absolute in literature and art, showing how, under that baleful influence, the unwary critic is drawn to choose between belief in absolute standards or belief in absolute irresponsibility of taste, whereas truth lies with the mediatorial view of common sense that we have standards vested with a certain amount of authority but never infallible.

The other purpose to which More here refers was literary criticism in which, we now learn, virtue is in the mediatorial view: the present purpose is moral or religious and the principle is retained with only a change of application. The phrase "mediatorial view" seems peculiarly like an ecclesiastical version of the familiar and pagan phrase "the golden mean," which, in the decent obscurity of a foreign language (as Gibbon said of something else), has been called the *via media* of Catholicism. To cut a long story short, More is here finding a middle way between

an absolute revelation and absolute agnosticism. "I do not propose," he says, "to spend many words in demonstrating the imperfect character of the revelation, if revelation there be, in the Bible. . . . It seems to me perfectly unreasonable to claim inerrancy for a book the very text of which has been permitted to come down to us in uncertain form." The "fundamentalists" here alluded to would probably not wait to hear the rest: if they did they might ask what exactly is the importance of the fact that something seems to someone "perfectly unreasonable"? This would not be a trivial question, for More knows that his troubles lie with individualism and individual self-assertion. There is a kind of individualism which says "I believe;" it belongs to what More somewhere calls the absurdities of Luther, and it announces the sectarian Protestantism which to More seems unduly chaotic and atomistic. There is another kind of individualism which says more urbanely, "It seems to me unreasonable." The variety is a little more subtle because, by using the word unreasonable, it suggests that there are at least some eternal and immutable truths which all reasonable people accept: at any rate, if they do not accept them they do not deserve to be called reasonable. This rather large class finally comes to include Roman Catholics who are stubborn, and the general run of religious zealots who exhibit the symptoms of irresponsible individualism. Hear the conclusion: "For our growth and sanity in religion we must have something to supply what the inner light will not afford to the isolated souls of men, something to make us conscious of our citizenship in the communion of saints, to supplement our limited intuition with the accumulated wisdom of the race, and in our moral perplexities to fortify the individual con-

science with the authority of ancient command." So far as it achieves this, the Church is an inspired institution.

A certain reader of Milton's *Paradise Lost* is said to have complained that "it proved nothing." Milton might have replied that the criticism was dark with excess of light. A work of art cannot prove anything except so far as it justifies itself and so becomes convincing. Perhaps the correct estimate of More's writings is that they are essentially works of art. It is evident that he finds satisfaction in the pure joy of thinking and in the fine craftsmanship of writing: no critic overlooks or denies the evidence that More can at will make his language a perfect medium of expression and therefore great in style. One example must suffice: it is taken from the essay on Walter Pater which, I suspect, contains not a few judgments that might be transferred from Pater to More:

> Read the story of Marius at the home of the Christian Cecilia and at the celebration of the mass, and you will feel that here is no picture of a militant faith in preparation for the conquest of the world, of a sect at death-grips with a whole civilization and girding itself for moral regeneration, but the report of a pleasant scene where the eye is charmed and the ear soothed by the same chaste and languid loveliness that seemed to Pater to rule in Sparta and the ideal city of Plato.

That is just criticism expressed in words that flow with the thought through a brief passage suggestive of struggle and turbulence into a calm expanse of still waters and enervating warmth. But More would not feel satisfied to be honoured only as an artist. Indisputably he has undertaken a mission and made inevitable some estimate of his success. It is difficult and perhaps presumptuous to pronounce judgment; but if it is permissible to add one more opinion to the existing stock, the truest view may be

that the effort has succeeded in the way which is usually called failure. The great man, as Carlyle said, is usually the great half-man. Powerful and dramatic leadership, which fires the imagination and inspires devotion, is drastic and one-sided, triumphant in the present but, in the annals of history and "looked at by the silent stars," often pathetically defective. Ideas that are primarily regulative come to us as formulae, bloodless categories, skeletons of historic figures that await their reincarnation. Aristotle knew this and subtly refused to define the good without adding that for practical purposes it needs the good man. The definitions of dualism which More gives us are not much more than an expansion of the formula of the mean, by some called the golden mean, by others contemptible mediocrity. Tradition has sanctified the doctrine and it cannot be wholly wrong. But the right use of the mean is the everlasting adventure, the unforeseen stroke of genius, the astonishing burst of creative energy. That is where the protest of the Romantic makes itself heard and refuses to be silenced. In the beginning was the act: in the end was the law. It is good to be reminded of the law, but it is the act that stirs the emotions. The younger generation, as More knows, do not wish to hear too much about the law, just because it is "the inner check." But they may well have enough patience to do justice to an exposition of the law which is in its own right an artistic creation and a sincere profession of faith.

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

J. S. Woodsworth

IN recent years parliamentary institutions have been greatly discounted. This is probably, in part, a rather vague protest against the existing state of affairs—the depression, the uncertainty of the international situation, the upsurging of new, and (to timorous souls) menacing ideas. Political leaders who have claimed credit for prosperous times—even including bountiful harvests—need not be surprised if during periods of drought and low prices they should receive unmerited blame.

This rather rough shaking of our faith in accepted and lauded institutions cannot, however, be ignored. Confidence is essential to the efficient working of the social machine. In our school-days, while coming to recognize the historical development through which freedom has broadened down from precedent to precedent, we had, strangely enough, the rather naïve idea that we had attained freedom and were already perfect. As adults many of us now resent any suggestion of change and denounce anyone who is foolhardy enough to assert that our parliamentary methods are antiquated or that the institution itself might some day be replaced by one more democratic and efficient. The critic who would lay hands on our cherished institutions must surely be some kind of heathen foreigner—if he isn't satisfied with the established order of things let him go back where he belongs!

In spite of this all-too-common attitude, criticism has persisted. Our thinking has been stimulated—almost forced—by developments in other countries. Russia, Italy, Germany, Austria, the United States with its

New Deal—one is well-nigh bewildered by the quick-moving events of the past few years. Cherished traditions have gone by the board. Hitherto-fixed relationships have undergone kaleidoscopic changes. Ethical and political ideals have passed through a revaluation almost as great as that of our currencies. The "sterling character" of the Victorian period and the pound sterling have alike fallen from their high estate! Efficiency rather than freedom, dictatorship rather than democracy, are the prevailing fashion. In these circumstances it is well that we should ask with special reference to our own country, why are our parliamentary institutions discounted? Is this distrust well founded? What is the alternative? What reforms, if any, can save that which is good in our present arrangements?

As a member of the House of Commons for some twelve years, I must confess that, increasingly, I am almost overcome by the sense of the futility of parliamentary methods—indeed of parliament itself. In the midst of a prolonged depression which has ruined tens of thousands and reduced large sections of our people to hopelessness, we continue to squabble over petty details of procedure. Faced by world-problems of the greatest magnitude, that may easily plunge us into a disastrous war, we spend more time discussing the dismissal of a rural postmaster or the construction of a dock than in the consideration of international affairs or fundamental economic changes. The people—whether too absorbed in personal affairs, or too muddy of brain, or too easily swayed by propaganda and promises, or lacking in imagination—swing from one party to the other only to find things going from bad to worse. One is tempted sometimes to give up in disgust. Yet our people are, on the whole, decent intelligent folk. Surely it is cowardly

to run away and worse than cowardly to concede that intelligence and goodwill must yield to blind passion and brute force.

Let us, then, try to learn how in practice this parliamentary machine works and what forces make the wheels go round.

It is through an election that most of us discharge our political responsibilities. Who are the candidates and how are they selected? Among them are an extraordinarily large number of lawyers. The making of laws is perhaps in line with their specialized training. Then it is certainly not detrimental to the success of a legal firm to have one of its members at Ottawa. Lawyers located in Montreal or Toronto are not seriously inconvenienced by having to spend several days a week at the capital. Further, there is always the possibility that political service may lead to an appointment on the Bench or on a commission. As professional advocates lawyers are considered suitable candidates. Medical men, especially the more elderly, on account of their personal popularity are reckoned probable winners in a campaign. On the other hand, business men who so largely dominate our local community life, are not readily available. A man struggling to obtain a foothold or a man in the midst of a successful enterprise cannot very well break away. If he did, five or six months' absence might prove disastrous. So the business man who will accept a nomination is usually an elderly man, more or less successful, who is almost ready to retire from active life. In recent years, when backed by strong organizations, a number of farmers have been elected. Until the depression this often meant for the well-to-do farmer a considerable personal sacrifice. In any case it involved a complete readjustment of his farm and home arrangements. Also in recent years a few

working men have been "put forward" as candidates. This has meant for them loss of time, frequently loss of their employment, and, failing re-election, great difficulty in again obtaining a foothold in their occupation. Few women candidates have as yet entered the political field. It is difficult to combine a successful public career with the responsibilities of home-life. The irregularity of the life of a member of parliament, the many calls upon him, the publicity and the ordeal of an election campaign, the insecurity of his position—all these may well deter others than the well-to-do from becoming candidates.

Having accepted a nomination, the candidate is expected to fall in with the customary methods. There may be fervent appeals to Liberal or Conservative traditions, but the practical politicians recognize that the more effective appeals are either to prejudices or the desire of gain—sometimes personal gain. A political campaign is a fearsome ordeal. "Barnstorming," whatever that means, is still the order of the day. It is still considered that all is fair in love and war—and politics. Misrepresentation of your opponent's position, and at least indirect bribery—these are condoned if not expected. Formal congratulations on election night to your successful opponent are frequently all that suggests good sportsmanship! If you call a foul you are considered either a Puritan or a bad loser. A "successful" issue is supposed to justify all irregularities.

Our system of elections is far from scientific. Government may be carried on by a party that has obtained only a minority of the votes cast. The provincial elections in British Columbia and Saskatchewan are still fresh in our minds. Conservative representation in these provinces was almost entirely wiped out though there was a considerable Conservative vote cast. In British Columbia

the C.C.F. polled thirty-three per cent. of the vote, yet elected only seven members. If democracy, even of the old-fashioned sort, is to persist, surely some system of proportional representation is essential. How far that is practicable in vast areas with a widely-scattered population, is a question.

Further, one must ask, too, whether the system that divides people into geographical areas is as satisfactory as one that groups them by vocation. In Alberta the coal-miners are scattered through six federal constituencies, in each of which they are swamped by the farmers' vote. It is very improbable that, under the present arrangements, the miners' problems in Alberta will be presented at Ottawa by a miner. Of course we are told that as consumers we all have much in common. That may be. But each group of producers has also distinctive problems. The manufacturers of Toronto would feel much aggrieved if they were represented solely by farmers! There are still members of parliament who blandly assert that they represent all classes in their riding. Lawyers are fairly acrobatic, but even lawyers find it difficult to represent, at one and the same time, steel operators and their employees, or bankers and their hard-pressed debtors. The man who represents everybody is generally found in a pinch to represent himself alone. In a city constituency there are no natural groupings. Districts may be predominantly working-class or high-class residential. To prevent the results of even this rough grouping, parts of the two are thrown into one constituency or an urban area is included in a rural riding. The development of a community of interest is frustrated at every turn.

The growing co-operation between the Dominion and the provinces suggests the advisability of indirect

election. In Canada the electorate is practically the same for provincial and Dominion elections. It is becoming the practice for the Dominion government to call the provincial authorities into consultation. Unemployment was one of the issues at the last federal election. Why should a provincial premier and his colleagues be called into consultation over the heads of the elected federal representatives? Or perhaps rather, why should there be federal representatives who have no close working knowledge of the administration of relief within their province? If the Dominion is to be a loose federation, why should not parliament, or one branch of parliament, consist of representatives from the various provincial assemblies? A Senate so constituted might serve a useful function.

The interest of the ordinary citizen in political affairs is intermittent, flaring up at election times or during some crisis and as quickly subsiding. The party machines, however, must be maintained and kept more or less in repair, so that they can be put into commission when the need arises. Political groups, to be effective, must have some organization. But the party machine is more than an organization of those with a common policy. So long as jobs and contracts are in the gift of the party in power, there is bound to be a horde of camp-followers. In Canada to no small extent it has become the case of the "Ins" and the "Outs;" the "Ins" not only determining policies but enjoying and dispensing "the sweets and emoluments of office."

Party organization so maintained must be financed. Elections are becoming costly affairs. Senator McRae, formerly Conservative organizer, said in the Senate a year ago that it cost each party at least a million dollars to finance a general election—a moderate estimate. The

Honourable C. H. Cahan stated in the House his belief that an election could not be won in any seat in Montreal with less than $40,000 for legitimate expenditure; sometimes it has run to over $100,000.

From what source does this money come? Admittedly largely from wealthy individuals and corporations. According to the press reports Mr. Turnbull, in a speech in Regina, boasted that Mr. Bennett had spent a quarter of a million out of his own pocket on the last election. The evidence given before a parliamentary committee showed that the Beauharnois Corporation had contributed $720,000, chiefly to the treasuries of the Liberal party in Ontario and Quebec. Some years ago the brewers testified before a royal commission that they had contributed largely to both parties.

Undoubtedly he who pays the piper calls the tune. The statute-book of Canada bears eloquent testimony to the truth of the old proverb. An irate industrialist put the situation very succinctly, if ungrammatically, when over the telephone he lectured a member of parliament for not voting the "right" way: "What do you think I gave $50,000 for your election if you won't do what I tell you?" It is not often so crudely put as that. There is to-day little direct bribery; but, as a finance minister once admitted to me when the affairs of a certain corporation were under discussion, "The Government cannot very well afford to antagonize such a powerful group."

The new member may think himself quite free. In time he may learn what Rabindranath Tagore meant when he said that chains are none the less real because they are invisible or golden. The more independent members, like young colts, have to be broken in. Those ambitious for cabinet position tell themselves what great things they will do when once they have become estab-

lished, but they soon learn to put party loyalty first. Others have not the moral courage to make the break or they feel themselves in honour bound to obey the chief. As one younger member in bitterness of soul put it to me, "I took their nomination and their money and now I suppose I'll have to go through with it, but you won't catch me in this jam again!"

> His honour rooted in dishonour stood,
> And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true.

Probably the feeling of the newly-elected member is not so much that of restraint as of bewilderment. A country-town practice, even though extensive and successful, has not brought the ordinary lawyer much knowledge, say, of foreign affairs or social legislation. There are possibly not more than twenty men in the House who could be induced to take part in a debate on our external relationships. Yet our position in the Empire plunged us into a European war—and may plunge us into another. Skill in bringing babies into the world has given the elderly doctor no special knowledge of the freight-rate structure or the foreign exchanges. What knowledge has even the successful business man of the gold standard or of constitutional problems? What can the farmer know of the details of the shipping or copyright acts? Yet these and a score more intricate and far-reaching questions come in one form or another before the House in quick succession. The departmental officials draft the bills, which are modified and approved by the minister or cabinet. When the measure is under discussion, the member with an inquiring mind, or one who takes his work seriously, may read any special memoranda or petitions that are sent to him. He may even ask a few questions on some point that he may have heard dis-

cussed. Many members, however, in the case of a roll-call vote, stroll in from the lobbies asking only, "Which way are we voting?" The fact is that few men are equipped with the specialized knowledge necessary to deal with the many and varied and complex problems that come before the House in even a single session. Further, the party organization and the procedure do not encourage serious study of, and active participation in, much of the business of the House.

A great deal depends, of course, on an efficient civil service. Our standards are confessedly not as high as those in Great Britain, especially in many of the higher positions where political considerations have priority over specialized training and experience. Of the deputy ministers in Ottawa probably not more than half-a-dozen are men of outstanding ability—or at least men whose outstanding ability has impressed itself upon members of the House.

Theoretically, the government is responsible to the House, but in reality what is the situation? Through the efforts of the party organization, financed by interested groups, a party finds itself the largest group in the House. The leader of the party ordinarily becomes prime minister. Automatically he assumes very large powers. He selects his cabinet—subject, of course, to certain unwritten laws. Each province must be represented; the French race and the Irish Catholics must be represented; and so on. Through his ministers the prime minister controls all departments. He is responsible for the appointment of judges and commissioners and lieutenant-governors, and for filling vacancies in the Senate. He appoints representatives to the Imperial Conference and the League of Nations, thus controlling our external policies. Many positions and expenditures still come under the patronage

system. The government only, of course, can introduce money bills and largely assumes responsibility for legislation. It is rarely that a private member introduces a public bill. Indeed, two years ago the prime minister's shouted "No!" prevented even the introduction of an amendment to the Criminal Code. Orders-in-council, so-called administrative legislation, and emergency powers leave the prime minister pretty much monarch of all he surveys. The party caucus may put on the brakes, but, at least in recent years, it is very infrequently that a member opposes his party.

The party system, as we know it in Canada, tends to reduce the government supporters to silence and the opposition members to impotence. Study the proceedings of the House. The "Ins," headed by the prime minister, hold the vast powers enumerated, for five years or so long as they can command the confidence of the House. Especially when the government has a narrow majority it is manifest that rigid discipline must be maintained or all is lost. A private member on the government side may not be in favour of a particular measure, but he fears that if he oppose it he may defeat the government; in any case he would weaken the party's prestige. In voting against his personal judgment, he is not a hypocrite. In general he has confidence in his leader and will not imperil his party for the sake of one issue. The "Outs," on the other hand, that is the opposition, are desirous above all else to obtain power. The only way they can do so is by discounting the actions of the government. With this end in view they cannot very well support any government measure, however good in itself. Thus the party game is played. It must be evident that under such a system measures cannot be discussed or

voted on solely on their merits, but always with an eye to party advantage.

Even the simple reform that an adverse vote should not necessarily be taken as a vote of lack of confidence would go far towards freeing the private members and giving reality to the debates and the votes. As a matter of fact a free vote is rather rare. Last year as a division on the Sweepstakes Bill might have proved embarrassing to the government, the prime minister declared that the whips were off. The sponsor of the bill in introducing it, expressed his gratitude to the prime minister for so generously allowing the members to vote according to their best judgment!

Authorities on the British constitution point out that public opinion exercises a powerful and almost automatic influence on parliament. That may be true in England. It is less so in Canada, where the population is scattered, divided into provinces, and has many diverse interests. In this country public opinion is less fully organized—shall I say less intelligent?—and certainly less likely to be effective. Special interests, on the other hand, are alert, highly organized, and well financed. Small wonder that a member is more influenced by a skilfully-planned lobby at Ottawa than by the scarcely-audible protests of constituents, resident perhaps two thousand miles away, whose opinion he may not need to reckon with until the next election.

Much of our parliamentary procedure is antiquated and cumbersome. It may have been designed to secure full discussion and to prevent hasty legislation. In effect it lends itself to party warfare rather than to effective action. Often it is perfunctory and time-wasting. Each bill must pass through its three readings and committee stage. Very often details are discussed in committee

of the whole. This frequently leads to interminable "debates"—at least so dignified—three times repeated. Witness the long-drawn-out discussion on the Marketing Act. One hesitates to suggest curtailment of discussion, but in the circumstances one might welcome some form of closure. The elaborate procedure is not in reality a safeguard. Take divorce bills: after they have come over from the Senate, they pass regularly through all the stages; but for years it was the practice to pass them *en bloc*—"Bills 1-50 passed," declared the speaker. They had not been discussed at any stage. The evidence probably had not been read by a single member of the House. Yet the mace was regularly placed on the table and removed by the sergeant-at-arms. It was an orderly and tiresome farce!

The consideration of the estimates is carried on in committee of the whole with every idle word seriously recorded in Hansard. Only a few members are interested in any given department. The minister himself cannot know all the details; so the deputy minister or some other official is smuggled into the chamber to whisper to him the answer he is to make. What waste of time and what inefficiency! Why not discuss these estimates in appropriate committees, where officials with special knowledge could be present, where, if necessary, witnesses could be called, and where, if desirable, the press might be excluded.

This last suggestion may seem drastic to those who have rejoiced at the gradual development of a free press, but surely "freedom" should mean some responsibility. Why should the press be permitted to take statements out of their context, to distort them, and broadcast the misrepresentation for partisan purposes? Some years ago, just after a budget speech a member of the press gallery, representing a large city daily, came into my office.

"Rotten speech," he exclaimed, "absolutely misrepresents the financial situation; but you know our paper supports the government, so I've had to play it up—crowded galleries—minister in good form—finances in excellent condition—all that sort of tripe. Of course to-morrow the financial critic of the opposition will tear it all to pieces, but we won't print what he says. We are a bunch of intellectual prostitutes, but what can I do? . . . I am a news-writer—can't do anything else. Then there's my wife and the kiddie. Just the same I hate to have the minister get away with such a speech!"

The leisurely methods of parliament may have been all very well when parliament was required to decide on only one or two issues. To-day we have a score of important issues, and these do not always run parallel. A free vote or a vote on details in committee cuts right across party lines. Yet the formal vote in the House, especially if it is a close vote, follows party lines. In the earlier day a member with general all-round knowledge and a few fixed principles might be able to cast an intelligent vote. To-day, specialized knowledge is needed.

This situation has led to the appointment of royal commissions to study and report on special problems (*e.g.*, the Radio and Banking Commissions) and permanent commissions or boards with large powers and free from day-to-day political interference (*e.g.*, boards administering the Canadian National Railway, the Radio, and the Bank of Canada). This is undoubtedly one of the most fruitful fields for experiment. The administration by independent boards, or indeed departments, of much recent legislation, involves the development of what has been called administrative law. The statutes lay down certain principles, grant certain powers. That is all. The details are left to be worked out and wide powers are

exercised by the board or department. The exact relationship which should exist between parliament and such semi-independent boards is by no means clear. Parliament should remain sovereign: yet the boards should be free.

So far we have been dealing only with the House of Commons. We have another house—the Senate—an appointed body with equal powers. What considerations determine the appointment of senators? A senatorship is usually regarded as a reward for outstanding party service—often of a pecuniary character. In practice the Senate consists largely of elderly men, some of them directors in financial corporations. The Senate may throw out, as frequently as it pleases, any measure passed by the elected chamber, and there is no recognized constitutional method of overcoming its opposition.

Of course public opinion has an influence even on the Senate. When the Old Age Pensions Bill had been rejected by the Senate and re-introduced by a newly-elected government, it was amusing to witness the celerity with which, not altogether gracefully, the impregnable Senate backed away from its carefully-considered position of the year before. In constitutional reforms why should we always follow precedents? Surely a precedent simply means that at some earlier stage someone was bold enough to strike out along original lines. The Senate—at least as at present constituted—simply must go!

Until I entered parliament I was hardly aware of the existence of the British North America Act. Now it seems to me a blank wall against which I run every day. Patriotism may be, as Dr. Johnson said, "the last refuge of a scoundrel:" the B.N.A. Act is the first refuge of any prime minister who does not wish to act. He would be

absolutely at a loss without it. Its division of jurisdiction as between the Dominion and the provinces may have been all very well two generations ago. In the complicated and more highly specialized industrial, commercial, and financial life of to-day, it is hopelessly out of date. It is a bonanza for highly-paid constitutional lawyers, but for the ordinary legislator anxious to get on with his job it is a document that sorely needs revising.

Take the field of social legislation. As a Dominion we may sign a treaty and give our adherence to certain labour conventions, but we also assert that we have not the power to implement them and avoid all responsibility for carrying out our obligations by simply passing on the conventions to the competent authorities, the various provinces. A committee of the House of Commons after two years' study declared that (*a*) the principle of unemployment insurance was sound; (*b*) to be effective an unemployment insurance scheme must be Dominion-wide; (*c*) under the present interpretation of the B.N.A. Act such matters are wholly within provincial jurisdiction!

Of course, when they desire to do so, the authorities can "get around" the B.N.A. Act by enabling legislation, concurrent legislation, and similar devices. But when nine provinces have to be dealt with, the obstacles are almost insuperable. A strong lobby in any one province, a campaign in which an appeal is made to racial, religious, or local fears and prejudices, may prevent the passing of even urgently-needed measures.

Finally, outside and above, and, in my judgment, controlling parliament, is our financial oligarchy. In Japan the military have never fully been brought under the control of parliament; in Canada even the Central Bank legislation has not successfully challenged the sovereignty of finance. As Mr. Grattan O'Leary pointed

out some years ago, it is behind green baize doors in the counting-houses in Montreal and Toronto that the destinies of Canada are determined. I am reminded of a little incident of my early childhood. While out one day with my father I begged to be allowed to drive. He placed me on his knee and gave me the lines. For a few minutes I experienced unalloyed joy. Then when I began experimenting I found the lines did not yield to my pull. I looked around and to my great disappointment found that my father was holding them behind me. Long study, at close range, of the operations of parliament has convinced me that the financiers pull the strings. A prime minister may protest that he is free, but then a man is not likely to become prime minister unless he is willing to travel more or less in the "right" direction.

The demand for a new form of government comes from two directions. Business men urge a business administration with its supposed economy and efficiency. Undoubtedly, parliament has piled up an unbearable load of public debt and it is not equal to its present-day tasks. But who has been running parliament? Surely the selfsame business men who are now most vociferous in their criticism and are putting themselves forward as reformers. It is business men who have obtained control of our natural resources, who have secured railway franchises, incorporations of all kinds, bank charters, tariff privileges, grants, bonuses, subsidies, specialized departments of government, and protection for trade routes. It is the representatives of business men who sit in parliament and it is business men who stream through the lobbies of the Château Laurier. Now, when the results of their policies begin to bear heavily even upon themselves, what do they urge? More business in government and less government in business! It would not require many

steps to establish a business dictatorship in Canada. The ancient rights and privileges of parliament are disappearing before our very eyes. More serious from our point of view, new rights have not yet been recognized. The appalling revelations of the Stevens' Commission are surely sufficient to convince people of the need of a new Bill of Rights. Yet no action has been taken. The tobacco-growers have voluntarily granted a higher price to the growers. One departmental store graciously raised wages while the commission was sitting and later lowered them again. The investigation goes on. In time the commission will report. Then probably the B.N.A. Act will be regretfully produced. Are our people no longer capable of moral indignation?

A business dictatorship would doubtless rid us of inconvenient parliamentary inquiries, but would a business dictatorship relieve us of our debts? Are not business men themselves the bondholders? Would a business dictatorship be able to take up the slack of unemployment, to raise agricultural prices, and increase the purchasing-power of the masses? How can this be done and at the same time costs of production be kept down and dividends paid? A business dictatorship in control of the law-making machinery, the courts, the police, and the military, might reduce our farming population to peasantry and maintain the proletariat at a subsistence level. Not an achievement to be contemplated with equanimity!

From the dispossessed there also comes a demand for a new form of government. What has parliament to offer the tens of thousands of families now for years on relief? Second-hand clothes, crowded insanitary rooms, inadequate medical attention, education curtailed, little beauty in life—is this all? What has parliament to offer

the farmers who have seen their reserves steadily depleted, their equipment depreciating, their farms hopelessly mortgaged—the farmers who in the dried-out areas in the West face a new start under conditions which inevitably mean failure?

Is it any wonder that in desperation men's thoughts turn to direct action? Russia overthrew the czar; why cannot we, by similar means, overthrow our exploiters? Continued low wages may produce serious and widespread strikes. The dissatisfied unemployed may riot and riots may get out of hand. But the more intimately I learn to know the psychology of our people and the situation across Canada, the more I am convinced that a planned resort to violence is nothing less than madness. It will get us nowhere. It will lead only to repressive measures and strengthen the forces of reaction. Parliamentary action may sometimes seem almost hopeless: it is not so hopeless as the attempt at an armed uprising.

So in spite of difficulties we look to political democracy as a means not only of securing reforms but of furthering the establishment of a new social order. I have dwelt on the obstacles to progress presented by our parliamentary system. They are not insuperable. I must not fail to point out that the system has also its advantages. Parliament is a high-powered broadcasting station. I know of no more effective agency for propaganda. Discussions in the House, reported by Hansard and by the press, have untold educational value. An unfriendly newspaper complained that one of my motions had given me a million dollars' worth of free advertising. Even a small minority group can force discussion. Through their speeches and votes members of the old parties must declare themselves. Backed by favourable sentiment outside, the minority can force the pace of the majority.

On occasion even the party-system may be turned to advantage. In 1925 when the two parties were almost evenly balanced, the Independents were able to secure considerable advanced legislation. Had it not been for the presence of the two Labour men in the House it is doubtful whether the Old Age Pensions Act, inadequate as it is, would yet be on the statute-book.

A government pledged to socialism might not have plain sailing, but with an intelligent and determined electorate would surely win through. When we refer to political democracy we think perhaps too much in terms of elections and parliamentary proceedings. We should think rather in terms of a socially conscious and politically trained body of citizens. A heavy task lies ahead but not an impossible one. The driving-force and intelligence which in a few brief years built up on this continent a remarkable system of production, if it were really applied to our economic and social problems, would in an even shorter period transform society.

PARLIAMENT AND ECONOMIC CONTROL

WILLIAM HENRY MOORE

FOR some years we have been told that the democratic institutions which we have called parliament were breaking down; and we have received the news with considerable equanimity. Our great-grandfathers (the men of '37) would have been deeply perturbed at the possibility of disaster overtaking representative and responsible government, but kidnappers and wrestlers had not then crowded politicians off the front page. Moreover, private life, with its office-routine, golf, bridge, *etc.*, has become a strenuous affair, and if you were to tell people that parliament was on the skids, nearly everyone would say: "Well! I daresay something will turn up; it usually does." The old party spirit has lost its fervour; new forces are struggling for the possession of parliament; and I hasten to add that they are economic forces.

Parliament is a coercive law-making body. Other institutions make laws: but, if you were to violate the laws of the golf club, about the worst that could happen would be the necessity of playing golf on other greens; if you were detected breaking the laws of parliament, however, you would probably be rushed off to prison. Parliament's laws alone are enforceable by imprisonment and death. Economic interests, therefore, seek to gain possession of parliament for the power which it has over people in the business of life.

In the earlier chapters, individuals held power over other individuals: they could send them by terror into the fields or market-place or even to the shrine. Furthermore, various institutions, including the church, possessed

coercive powers over individuals; and good men forced bad men to prepare for heaven. But history shows that external coercion rarely worked well in either economic or religious life. Forced labour was never prolific, and forced religion was never pious. Besides, men resented external coercion and were forever resorting to counter-coercion. So it came about that the "rights" to coerce people were gradually cut down and eventually became vested in the state. The process was a slow one, and its significance was not always understood. When the keys of prison-cells and the custody of stocks and gibbets had been handed over to the state the state at first did not abandon the fields over which coercion had been exercised. The parliament of Anne was constantly dividing on the use of the surplice; the parliament of Louis XVI put producers and traders in the vice of industrial control and *ordered* the economic life of the country.

Opinion is far from unanimous as to the balance of loss and gain when authority was transferred from municipal to state-control. Certainly the parliament of Anne did not make men more pious, the parliament of Louis XVI did not make men more prosperous, and I shall contend that the parliament of George V has even less chance of *moulding* men into economic happiness. That is the issue to-day: the attempt of parliaments to administer an economic state. Political industry has again come into vogue (while political religion is in the offing). The parliament of George V will fail; it has already failed, and (partially) because it is representative of the people and responsible to them.

It is impossible here to trace the growth, and describe the nature, of democratic institutions. It appears, however, to be almost forgotten that the main-spring was a craving for individual freedom. Our forefathers in

homespun worked the day long, to study, under candlelight, the doctrine of the freedoms; and when they had gained the right of making a constitution for self-government, they jealously provided that statesmen should have power over them *only for determined periods.* Then the power had to be handed back. *That provision rendered impossible the extensive planning of industry by parliament.* You cannot have a group of men building industry in one way for four or five years and then take a chance on what will happen if another group of men re-build it in another way. Were you to argue that the electors would not be so foolish as to upset plans, you would be forgetting that while most industry is a cold, technical matter, most elections are conducted in the heated atmosphere of collectivism.

For further security against the misuse of power, our ancestors provided that members of parliament should be "local." Political parties came into being to represent certain doctrines, but the idea was extended to include the representation of what was in the minds of local communities. My desk-mate, Sam Jacobs, is a Liberal and an outstanding figure in parliament, but it is doubtful whether Mr. Jacobs would be regarded as an ideal candidate for the Liberal seat of Northumberland. Frankly, I cannot tell you the qualifications of the ideal candidate for Northumberland, but it is not without reason that W. A. Fraser holds the seat, and I suspect that Mr. Fraser might not "represent" the Cartier Division of Montreal. For good reasons, Edouard Lacroix represents Beauce; Humphrey Mitchell holds Hamilton East; W. G. Weir sits for Macdonald, and Olaf Hanson for Skeena. Were the experts in psychology to take a cross-section of Canadian life, they could probably match it fairly well with a cross-section of the House of Commons. But the

psychologists would have to go on to the provinces; for Canadians were so intent on being represented that they insisted on having nine other parliaments distributed around the country, with a number of little parliaments in counties and townships. In fact, our ancestors were so very keen about freedom that, when they made a constitution, they took endless precaution to diffuse power.

There are Lutherans, dentists, medical men, Jews, lawyers, labour-organizers, Orangemen, lumbermen, farmers, Knights of Columbus, teachers, miners, and editors, in the federal House of Commons. Parliament is representative. But relatively few members engage in active business; and necessarily so: while the member has a part-time job, his public duties are sufficiently exacting to preclude the management of strenuous modern business. I mention the matter not to cast reflection upon the "wisdom" of parliament, for I hold with Seneca against Posidonius. You will recall how Posidonius would have it that they were "wise men" who invented machines and produced goods—while Seneca argued, "on that basis one might maintain that those were wise who taught the arts

> Of setting traps for game and liming twigs
> For birds, and girdling mighty woods with dogs."

It was man's *ingenuity*, not his *wisdom*, that discovered all these devices. "And I also differ from Posidonius," said Seneca, "when he says that wise men discovered our mines of iron and copper, 'when earth, scorched by forest fires, melted the veins of ore which lay near the surface and caused the metal to gush forth.' Nay, the sort of men who discovered such things are the sort of men who are busied with them." Applying Seneca's criterion to the parliament of Canada, we find that parliament is doubly lacking; for it has not the "wisdom" to observe

that it lacks "ingenuity." And the plain truth is that we have fallen into depression because the good doctors, lawyers, clergymen, and others who constitute parliament have been doing badly that which they were not equipped to do well. Some business functions they had to perform. For instance, they had to create those artificial persons we call companies; and now they stand aghast at their handiwork.

Please do not think that parliament stood idly by while "rugged individualism" brought us to grief. Parliament enacted laws and established boards concerned with the sale of companies' securities; it cannily chartered banks by ten-year periods, prescribed the conduct of their business, and inspected them in its conduct; it regulated insurance companies and trust companies as to the nature of their investments; it set up a board for the meticulous regulation of railway companies and, indeed, itself administered a huge railway system with its own ships, telegraphs, hotels, laundries, *etc.*; it largely owns the areas which miners, fishermen, and lumbermen work under licence; it conducts from thirty to fifty per cent. of the country's construction; it is mainly responsible for the conduct of power industries; and itself engages a large percentage of those gainfully employed in the services, *i.e.*, civil servants, school-teachers, *et al.*

Shall I go on? Parliament has not stood aside from agriculture: it instructed the farmers; it scolded them and regulated the grading and packing of their products; it lent money to milliners and candy-makers that they might buy land on which to grow wheat; and, when the production of wheat had increased relatively beyond other commodities, parliament provided funds (belonging to all the people) to hold the wheat over the market. No! Parliament has not practised a policy of drift. Provincial

parliaments took over the monopoly of selling alcoholic liquors, and when their monopoly had been broken by bootleggers the federal parliament created (and now begins, with stout words of promise, to regulate) monopolies of milk, tobacco, garlic, apples, and the rest of the natural products.

In the light of Canadian experience it is painfully clear that parliament (with extensive franchise, periodical elections, public debate, *etc.*) cannot manage an economic state. The evidence taken abroad clinches the argument. The insistent promise of *industrial control under democracy* (*i.e.*, with periodical elections, political parties, secret ballots, *etc.*) has nowhere been fulfilled. Recall the record of Lenin and Trotsky: they were probably quite sincere in their advocacy of a democratic economic state, but responsibility brought a change of heart; and in his recent book Trotsky laughs at the people's representatives who assembled with sandwiches and candles to administer the economic affairs of Russia.

Again, one remembers Bernard Shaw's opinion: "Of all madnesses which afflict this country I should think the worst is to expect that this instrument called parliament, made and developed for the express purpose of checkmating government, and of unrivalled efficiency for that purpose, can possibly be an instrument of socialism or Fascism, of any modern system which requires a continued governmental activity." Mr. Shaw was speaking to the Fabian Society, "in praise of Guy Fawkes." He was advising that distinguished body of socialists to carry on the plan which was interrupted when Mr. Fawkes was arrested. Mr. Shaw spoke quite plainly, warning the Fabians that the thing might have to be done in a manner that was not purely pacifist, but he told them not to delay on his account. "I do not want the catastrophe

to be deferred; I am impatient for the catastrophe. I should be jolly glad if the catastrophe occurred tomorrow." I dislike thinking what would happen if Agnes Macphail, M.P., were to say as much to a C.C.F. audience (but I would go her bail). However, that leader and others who profess stout regard for democracy ought to realize that they carry kegs of gun-powder into the parliamentary cellar whenever they throw on parliament functions which it cannot perform. Some day, with the casual lighting of a match, parliament will cease to be effective in Canada, as it became ineffective in Italy, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Germany, and Austria. When the state begins to plan for men *as classes, rather than as individuals—e.g.*, as farmers, fishermen, and manufacturers—it begins to weaken its own democracy. As Leonard Woolf puts it, "Democracy treats every man and woman politically simply as an individual and as an equal political unit; non-democratic institutions treat people not as individuals but as members of different classes and give them different political rights because they are born in different classes, pursue different occupations, or hold different political views." The politicians of a democratic state are not made of a stuff that readily resists appeals from distressed classes of producers. When the Onion-Growers' Association, or the Retail Merchants' Association, passes a resolution, politicians find it difficult to interpret in terms that are not of votes. Usually they do not try. (After all, the line between a plan and a plot is a thin one; Guy Fawkes would have indignantly denied that he was a plotter; it is only those who disagree with plans who call them plots.)

The Canadian parliament has not been alone in the endeavour to set economic things right by class-legislation. We have had a world of depressing legislation. The beet-

sugar producers of England plotted (or planned) to take millions of pounds sterling every year from consumers, through the agency of the state, and when their plot (or plan) had succeeded, the wheat-growers, dairymen, and pig-raisers planned (or plotted) to do precisely the same thing. In Australia the butter-makers devised a plan whereby they acquired £3,000,000 a year; the cane-sugar producers, £4,000,000 a year; while the producers of dried fruit took £120,000 a year. Now it has been found necessary to subsidize the Australian growers of wheat.

When assistance is granted by legislation which raises domestic prices, it is natural that consumers (who are also producers) should present offsetting claims to the state; in fact, if they would survive they are forced to pick from the common purse. When assistance is granted directly from the treasury, the expense involved may be met either by borrowing money or increasing taxation, and when those sources are exhausted the state is compelled to resort to inflationary measures, with the result that the subsidies lose a part of their power and have to be increased.

I repeat, a democratic parliament is not a suitable instrument of economic control. Its essence makes against its success. The Canadian federal parliament consists of two hundred and forty odd politicians with no one to insure them against unemployment. Even now members are anxiously studying the political mortality-tables and wondering just how they can propose something for somebody at the expense of everybody. The cabinet ministers, chosen from the House, are sometimes (strangely enough) well suited to the portfolios they administer, but more often they are misfits—although Canadian ministers are probably quite as capable as the ministers of most countries.

Now I expect someone will tell me that I have made out quite a good case for the replacement of democratic institutions by another system. But how, I ask, are we to have efficient industrial administration thrust upon us? The country's industry would probably not be better administered by the Council of Federated Labour, or the Manufacturers' Association, or by both of them put together. The fact is that industry has outgrown social control. In the days of George V there are a million separate wants and a million articles in commerce. The democratic parliament has not been alone in its failure to conduct and control industry; other forms of government have been tried and all have failed. The essence of democracy is government in the face of opposition. But the totalitarian party system has been no more effective. Italy and Russia for years have had rule by the one-party system, with agrarian and industrial compulsion; it has not brought prosperity. Nor has it been more successful in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, or in any other country; it has carried peoples to slavery and the world to depression.

Never was there a greater fallacy than to believe that producing or marketing ability superior to that of the average factory and farm, exists behind roll-top desks at Ottawa, Moscow, Rome, London, Vienna, Berlin, or any other capital. In fact, marketing ability is less in evidence under compulsion than under freedom. We may bear in mind our own marketing legislation as we read the opinion of Mr. J. Thompson, who has had years of experience in the co-operative marketing schemes of Western Australia: "It is our *experience* that compulsion leaves wide open the door for inefficiency in administration. Nothing is more disastrous than to find co-

operative concerns advocating compulsion merely because they are unsuccessful in fighting proprietary concerns."

Particularly difficult is it for the state to administer or regulate industry in a rich and extensive country with a small population. May I illustrate what I have in mind by tariff boards? The Canadian tariff board has to cover just as wide an industrial area as the American board: about the same number of commodities enter the customs ports of the two countries and each commodity ought to have as close attention in Canada as in the United States. But the volumes are different and the Canadian resources available for administration are only a tithe of the American: congress appropriates for its tariff board more than a million dollars a year while the Canadian parliament allots about a hundred thousand dollars for an equally onerous duty. The tariff board of the United States has several hundred experts covering the products of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, while the tariff board of Canada employs some twenty people, most of whom are clerks and stenographers. I realize that some people (even members of parliament) will wave this matter aside as a mere detail. But you must reckon with it when you speculate about parliament as a suitable means of controlling the industrial life of the Canadian nation. Efficient control is expensive; inefficient control is disastrous.

Of course, I have taken the tariff board only by way of illustrating the difficulties of providing service over a wide field with scant available revenue. Parliament ought to have an efficient tariff board; but when parliament spreads its resources over new activities, it follows that it will starve its existing services. Pick up the telephone-book of any one of our capital cities and determine for yourself the number of departments, boards,

and commissions already employed by parliament in its attempt to control industry. Government expenditures (federal, provincial, and municipal) absorb about one-third of the country's productive effort. When the producer has paid his taxes, he has only about sixty-six cents of his dollar left for labour and materials—and we are told that the country suffers from *laissez-faire*!

Liberty! If I were to mention that liberty is good in itself, I should at once bring down a protest that economic liberty is taken from the individual in order that the group may have liberty. Democracy! Fascists and Nazis contend that they are democratic organizations although they deny to other political parties the right of organization. A hundred years ago Sir James Macintosh complained that life's complications had outgrown language. I cannot follow the arm of the law as it proceeds to wreck our pre-war ideas of liberty in the cultural spheres of life. I have had to content myself with proving that, "right or wrong," it is ineffective. Parliament has the power to put a man in jail for selling his own tobacco, but when it begins to exercise that power it begins to lose the power to prevent men from stealing other people's tobacco. Romilly and Bentham taught us that lesson.

I would turn from industry to the other phases of life and may not. For with Seneca I have to remember, "Then comes a sub-division of each—and it is of vast extent." Therefore I shall stop at this point and "but treat the climax of the story."

When Might has become Right, will anyone argue that the doctrine is to be confined *within* the state; that it is not to be extended *between* states? When policemen become recognized as proper agents for industrial action, surely it is only a matter of time until soldiers receive the same recognition. In my opinion national socialism (or

economic nationalism) has already failed and it now remains to consider the basis for an internationalism.

When the individuals of one country were "fairly" free to trade with the individuals of other countries, the world was "fairly" prosperous and "fairly" pacific; and states were "fairly" free. That is the point I would have remembered. If you scoff at the value of your own freedom, remember that when the state has taken it from you the state has brought its own freedom within the danger-zone. You who would substitute the planned economy of the state for the competitive economy of individuals must remember that you have but substituted the competition of states for the competition of persons. Then you have released "relations of the most destructible kind between the local state entities; and the more perfect your national plan may be within each local sphere, the more terrible will be the clash."

THE DAVID DUNLAP OBSERVATORY

R. K. Young

THE David Dunlap Observatory, the gift of Mrs. Jessie Donalda Dunlap to the University of Toronto as a memorial to her husband, will be formally opened on May 31, 1935. It is very fitting that the Observatory should be opened on this date, which is the seventieth birthday of the Director, for Dr. Chant has spent the greater part of his life in fostering astronomy within the University and in encouraging its study throughout Canada. The buildings and the mounting for the large telescope have been practically complete for some time, but there lacked the large mirror, the "eye" of the instrument. This is now reported finished, and the writer is about to leave for England to make the final tests on it. The purpose of this article is to tell briefly the story of this magnificent gift and to say something of the research which will be carried on by the new observatory.

Astronomy in the University

The progress of astronomy as a department of the University is due to the continued efforts of Dr. C. A. Chant to emphasize its importance as a cultural subject in education and as a training for the advanced student. It was a part of his plan, even from a very early date, that the University should have an observatory and contribute to the knowledge of the subject, but it was hardly expected that the money for its erection would be obtained from the provincial grant to the University. In an insti-

tution striving to meet the needs of the province and expanding rapidly, chief emphasis in the field of science was likely to be placed on subjects more immediately utilitarian. Not until these had been taken care of would the claims of a pure science like astronomy be considered. The interest in the subject in recent years has been much increased by the spectacular discoveries which have greatly extended our knowledge of the universe and which have appealed to the imagination.

Astronomy owes much also to the great body of amateurs whose interest in the subject has strengthened the desire that an efficient telescope might be situated within the province. The late David Alexander Dunlap was one of these. He was a member of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada and attended the meetings of the Toronto centre. Dr. Chant in all his lectures before the society and throughout the country has emphasized the observational side of astronomy and the need of an observatory. If those who give instruction in astronomy are to possess that inspirational touch which comes only from an intimate knowledge of the subject, they must either be actively engaged in astronomical research, and thus be extending the frontiers of the science, or must be thoroughly informed regarding the work carried on in the observatories of the world. Lacking the equipment for the former, Dr. Chant followed the latter course; but he constantly emphasized the need of a first-class observatory. It was his hope that aid in this project would be received from Mr. Dunlap, but the latter's death in 1924 prevented this. When, some time later, Professor Chant suggested to Mrs. Dunlap that she should provide the observatory as a memorial to her husband, the suggestion met with a sympathetic response. Indeed, Mrs. Dunlap shared her husband's interest in astronomy.

THE DAVID DUNLAP OBSERVATORY

General Plans and Location

In 1927 Mrs. Dunlap expressed her willingness to provide the observatory, but it was not until June of 1928 that we were in a position to call for the construction of the various instruments which would be installed. The original plan, which has been closely adhered to, contemplated two buildings: one, a steel structure to house a large telescope; the other, an administration building for office work and the reduction of the observations. There was no haste about the construction of the latter building since it offered no particular difficulties, but the main telescope was ordered as soon as possible because the time required for its construction was somewhat uncertain, this being especially true of the large mirror which forms the essential optical part of the telescope.

The location of the observatory was an important point to decide. Dr. Chant and the writer spent many afternoons inspecting the maps of the neighbourhood of Toronto and visiting the possible sites. It was not thought advisable to go more than twenty or twenty-five miles away from the city, and locations north or north-west were much preferable to those east of the city. Most of our clear weather comes with west or north-west winds, and at these times the smoke from the city is blown south-east or east. A considerable amount of experimenting was carried on to determine the transparency of the air thirty, fifteen, and four miles from the city, as well as the amount of sky-illumination. In this regard the stations thirty and fifteen miles away proved far superior to that near the city, especially in the matter of the sky-illumination. The gain between thirty and fifteen miles did not seem to warrant placing the observatory at the more distant station. The site finally chosen is about twelve miles

north of the city limits and about five-eighths of a mile to the east of Yonge Street on the highest land in that immediate locality, the summit being eight hundred feet above sea-level. The land falls away in all directions, giving a remarkable view of the surrounding country. At present the land around the observatory is quite open, with a few trees and shrubs scattered here and there. From an astronomical point of view it would be better if the land were more heavily wooded. On an open plain the ground becomes hot during the day; and when, after sunset, the heat is given off again, the warm air flowing upwards creates an unsteady atmosphere which interferes with the use of the telescope. Trees and vegetation absorb a great deal of the sun's heat so that a steady state of the air is reached much more quickly. Accordingly, it is intended to make the land into an arboretum, to be known as the David Dunlap Park.

Awarding the Contracts

Comparatively few firms possess machinery large enough to handle the massive castings of a great telescope, and there are still fewer with experience in telescope-building. The tentative specifications were sent to four firms: Carl Zeiss in Germany; Sir Howard Grubb, Parsons and Company in England; Warner and Swasey Company of Cleveland; and J. W. Fecker of Pittsburgh. The Warner and Swasey Company did not submit a tender, and the design of the Carl Zeiss firm was considered less satisfactory than the one selected. There was not much difference either in the designs or prices of the other two firms, but after due consideration it was decided to accept the tender of the English company. This was a very fortunate choice because the decrease of the pound ster-

nile
hat
feet
ons,
At
oen,
ere.
er if
the
sun-
up-
eres
tion
tate
y, it
o be

arge
ope,
ope-
four
sons
any
The
der,
less
uch
two
cept
very
ster-



PLATE I.—The 74-inch Reflecting Telescope.

PLATE II.—The Disk of Glass for the 74-inch Mirror in its Mould at Corning, N.Y., June 21, 1933.



PLATE III.—The Disk in the Shops at Newcastle-on-Tyne, May, 1934. The disk has been ground approximately to shape; the hole in the centre is being bored out.



PLATE IV.—The Great Dome.

PLATE V.—Entrance Hall, Administration Building.



PLATE VI.—The Administration Building, David Dunlap Observatory.

ling made the cost very much less than it would have been if the contract had been let in the United States. It was very satisfactory, also, that the complete contract for the mounting, for the steel building to house the telescope, and also for the optical parts, could be let to one firm. This made it much easier to ensure that the finished equipment would assemble without difficulty when it arrived. Each of these three items merits some description.

The Circular Steel Building

The building to house the large telescope was ordered in November, 1931, and it was received in Toronto on July 31, 1933. (See Plate IV.) As has been already stated, the entire building is of steel construction. The circular drum and the hemispherical dome resting on it have double walls, and an open space at the base of the building admits air, which circulates to the top and goes out through openings with baffle plates at the upper part of the dome. The inside and outside of the dome are covered with "agasote," a hard paper product, and the outside is further protected by a sheeting of copper. By this means the interior of the building is kept cool during the day, and in the evening when thrown open for observations the whole building soon assumes the temperature of the outside air. Thus the "definition" of the telescope is not interfered with by heated air-currents, as would undoubtedly be the case if any quantity of heat were stored in the walls. The dome, which weighs about eighty tons, rests on twenty-four rollers, twenty-seven inches in diameter, running on a circular track. The entire dome may be rotated so that the opening, which is fifteen feet wide and extends from the bottom to seven feet beyond the zenith, may be made to face any part of the sky. Two parallel shutters run on rails at the top

and bottom of the dome and cover or uncover this opening. The building cannot be heated because of the air-currents which would be set up. In the cold weather the observer must dress for the occasion.

The Mounting of the Telescope

The telescope which the building houses is comprised essentially of the big mirror and a suitable means to hold it and direct it toward any part of the sky. The mirror, which consists of a block of glass seventy-six inches in diameter and about twelve inches thick, weighs about five thousand pounds, and consequently the mounting must be correspondingly heavy. This mounting is so constructed that the telescope can be pointed to any desired part of the sky and be continuously moved by clockwork in order to follow any object from the east to the west as it passes across the sky owing to the rotation of the earth. Although the moving parts of the mounting weigh upwards of thirty tons, this motion must be perfectly steady. It demands great perfection in the construction. The completed mounting, with the exception of the mirror, was received in Toronto on October 15, 1933. (See Plate I.)

The Great Mirror

When the telescope was ordered, in 1930, we knew that the portion which would probably take the longest to complete was the big mirror. At that time the Grubb-Parsons Company controlled the Parsons Optical Glass Works at Derby; and Sir Charles Parsons, the head of the C. A. Parsons and Company, of which these other companies were subsidiaries, was confident that they could manufacture a suitable disk of glass for the telescope mirror. (Incidentally, Sir Charles Parsons was the young-

est son of the Earl of Rosse, who completed a six-foot reflector in 1845.) But Sir Charles was in his seventy-sixth year when the order for our telescope was placed, and unfortunately he did not live to see the disk made. Had he lived I have no doubt that his active interest and ingenuity would have solved the difficulties and pushed the task to completion. But in 1932, after his death, the disk had not yet been cast, and it seemed that the project for our observatory might be unduly delayed.

However, in 1932 unexpected help arrived in connection with the manufacture of telescope mirrors, which was not available in 1930. In the latter year the only firms which would undertake the manufacture of large disks were Carl Zeiss in Germany and the Glass Works at Derby in England. On the American continent the Corning Glass Works, of Corning, N.Y., had made some small "pyrex" disks of glass which were superior in every way to any that had been previously made, but this firm was extensively engaged in the commercial manufacture of pyrex articles and was not prepared to undertake the expensive experimenting necessary to manufacture so large a disk as we required. But between 1930 and 1932 conditions changed. Plans had been put forward for the manufacture of a disk for a two-hundred-inch telescope and time and money spent in finding out the most suitable material. In the end it was decided that pyrex glass offered the best hope of success for this disk. The Corning Glass Works was prevailed upon to install the necessary furnaces and annealing ovens for the task. We were informed late in 1932 that they were prepared within six months to cast our disk. From the first we should have chosen this material for the large mirror had it been available at the time. The Grubb-Parsons Company gave the contract for the manufacture of the raw disk of glass,

which was to be shipped to England to be ground and polished into the final mirror. It was with great hope and satisfaction that our party from Toronto, including Mrs. Dunlap, Dr. Chant, and others, was present in Corning on June 21, 1933, and saw the disk poured from a special type of "pyrex" developed for telescope mirrors. Possibly with still greater satisfaction Dr. Chant and the writer inspected it on September 29 of the same year after it had come from the annealing oven, and saw a disk whose appearance met all our hopes. (See Plates II and III.)

No time was lost in shipping it to England. It was still to be ground and polished, and Mr. C. Young, the manager of the Grubb-Parsons Company, estimated that this would take eighteen months. Only those who have attempted to make a telescope mirror can really appreciate the difficulties that are encountered in such a task. The material is fragile and the disk heavy, and the surface has to be shaped true to an extraordinary degree of accuracy. The figure of the mirror, we are informed, now warrants the makers in ceasing work on it. Measures and photographs which have been received lead us to believe that the surface is in no place at fault more than one millionth of an inch.*

The Administration Building

The large telescope will be an effective instrument of research. In addition to the building containing it, it is necessary to have a suitable place where the plates taken with the telescope may be studied, where the staff can have office space, and the activities of the observatory be directed. The construction of the Administration Building was conducted by the University's Superintendent of

*Professor Young reports from England that the mirror is satisfactory.—*Editors*, April 1, 1935.

Buildings and Grounds, who also had charge of the erection of the steel building, of securing the water supply, of the electric installations, and of other essential details. Great credit is due to his management and to the architects, Mathers and Haldenby, for the fine appearance of the building, both within and without. It is a stone structure, built on classical lines, and is situated about two hundred and fifty feet from the great dome. (See Plates V and VI.)

On the roof of the building three domes were erected for the accommodation of smaller instruments. The central and north domes are at present vacant. In the south dome is a nineteen-inch telescope which was built at the University. This telescope, we hope, will prove a valuable accessory to the larger instrument and may be used on many programmes of research when the large telescope is not available.

In the Administration Building is also the library of the Observatory. Original plans for a special endowment for the library could not be carried out and this essential adjunct to research is not yet satisfactorily provided for. The Observatory and the University of Toronto are indebted to the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada for the loan of the more technical part of its library to the Observatory for a term of three years. The library is not nearly as complete as it should be and will have to be supplemented either by generous grants from the University or from funds obtained from other sources.

The Work of the Observatory

Almost the entire research programme of the Observatory will be carried on photographically. It is estimated that during a year we shall have about one hundred and twenty-five clear nights with twelve hundred observing

hours. The large telescope will be in use from sunset to sunrise, either in directly photographing regions of the sky or in the employment of auxiliary instruments such as the spectroscope with which the spectra of the stars are secured. Considerable time will have to be utilized at first in testing the accuracy of the instrument and in determining methods of work in order to make the labour of the limited staff as efficient as possible. Only after operating for a number of years can an observatory have accumulated that wealth of astronomical photographs which forms the basis of research on many astronomical problems. After this is secured there is forthcoming a steady stream of valuable work. It will probably take a number of years for us to reach this goal, and the first duty of the staff will be to accumulate the observational material. While a new observatory is thus handicapped for a time, it has compensating advantages: it can utilize all previous experience in order to obtain the material in a superior form, so that it can be used for more lines of investigation.

On account of the large size of the new telescope, the second largest in the world at the present time, we shall be able to secure much material which has never before been obtained. Astronomers throughout the world, through their organizations and publications, are well informed regarding the work which is being carried on, and the various observatories co-operate in the prosecution of researches for which their equipment is best suited. The David Dunlap Observatory will participate in the field of stellar velocities, spectral photometry, and in other co-operative labours. The major part of the observational programme will be devoted to such researches, and by contributing to the advances in astronomy it is hoped to justify the generosity of the donor in presenting the University of Toronto with this magnificent instrument.

POLONIUS

E. K. Broadus

I

THE appearance, in Saxo Grammaticus,[1] of the prototype of Shakespeare's Polonius, was brief and unpleasant. Amleth's wicked uncle, Feng, was advised by "a friend," who is described as "gifted more with assurance than judgment," of a method of catching Amleth unaware. Feng was to absent himself from the court. The "friend" was to conceal himself and listen while Amleth was closeted with his mother. Thus it was hoped to discover whether Amleth "veiled some deep purpose under a cunning feint" or was as witless and harmless as he seemed. The friend "repaired privily to the room where Amleth was shut up with his mother and lay down skulking in the straw." Amleth, suspecting his presence,

> resorted to his usual imbecile ways, and crowed like a noisy cock, beating his arms together to mimic the flapping of wings. Then he mounted the straw and began to swing his body and jump again and again, wishing to try if aught lurked there in hiding. Feeling a lump beneath his feet, he drove his sword into the spot, and impaled him who lay hid. Then he dragged him from his concealment and slew him. Then, cutting his body into morsels, he seethed it in boiling water, and flung it through the mouth of an open sewer for the swine to eat, bestrewing the stinking mire with his hapless limbs.

So in Saxo's story appears and disappears the malo-

[1]Saxo's story of Amleth in the *Historia Danica*, with Oliver Elton's translation (from which I quote); Belleforest's version of the Hamlet story in the *Histoires Tragiques*, Paris, 1582; and the English paraphrase, *The Historie of Hamblet*, London, 1608, are conveniently accessible in Sir Israel Gollancz's *The Sources of Hamlet* (Shakespeare Classics), Oxford Press, 1926.

dorous friend of Feng. When he reappears as Polonius, the raw old stuff of Saxo is still visible beneath the Elizabethan sophistication. For Feng's friend, "gifted more with assurance than judgment," we have the "prating knave" and "wretched rash intruding fool;" for the bed of rushes, the arras; for the stinking sewer, that nook of the stair at Elsinore where "if you find him not within this month, you shall nose him;" for the naked filth of Saxo's swine, the bitter irony of "a certain convocation of politic worms."

It was, of course, Shakespeare's way, thus at once to preserve and to transform; but it would appear that even before Shakespeare turned his hand to the Hamlet legend, the friend of Feng had ceased to be merely a peg to hang an episode on, and was on his way to becoming a human being. He was, to be sure, still only a peg in Belleforest. The straw under which the spy hid himself has become a bed-covering stuffed with feathers. Amleth jumps upon this, stabs the spy through it, drags him out, dismembers and boils him, and throws him in the sewer as food for the hogs—all as in Saxo. Nor does the English version of Belleforest, the *Historie of Hamblet*, add anything to the episode of the old counsellor, except the placing of him "behind the arras" instead of under the bed-covering, and Hamblet's exclamation "A rat! A rat!" when he hears a movement there. But inasmuch as the only extant text of the *Historie of Hamblet* was printed in 1608, it is assumed that these two departures from Belleforest's narrative are borrowings from Shakespeare's play.

The old Hamlet play, known to have been on the boards at least as early as 1589, took advantage, we may suppose, of the dramatic possibilities of the friend of Feng. The legend supplied also a young woman whom

the designing king used in an effort to lure Hamlet into an amour. Why not, for the sake of dramatic economy, make her the daughter of the ill-fated old counsellor? But the death of the counsellor at Amleth's hand had been purely episodic, had had no consequences, in the legend. Why not make the daughter go mad when her father died? Madness was a good card to play. The groundlings enjoyed it. Having supplied the old counsellor with a daughter to grieve for him, the playwright took the natural next step and supplied a son to avenge him: Hamlet and the counsellor's son, each avenging a murdered father, and dying at each other's hand: the wicked king knocked off at the same time: a plot complete.

So, one imagines, the old playwright, discarding a vast mass of irrelevant legendary matter (including Hamlet's spectacular doings in England and his agreement to marry the daughter of the English king) conceived a really straightforward plot.

What more did the old playwright do? The supposition that the First Quarto (1603) of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, and the early German play, *Der bestrafte Brudermord*, preserve fragments of the old play,[2] is familiar to every student of Shakespeare. If we could accept Dover Wilson's ingenious theory that the First Quarto is a

[2]It should be observed that opinion on this point is not unanimous. Sir E. K. Chambers (*William Shakespeare*, Clarendon Press, 1930) believes that both the pirated First Quarto and *Der bestrafte Brudermord* are derivatives from the play as printed in the Second Quarto, which "substantially represents the original text . . . as written once and for all by Shakespeare;" but the generally accepted view is that of Sir Sidney Lee: "The collective evidence suggests that the First Quarto presents, with much typographical disfigurement, Shakespeare's first experiment with the theme. His design of a sweeping reconstruction of the old play was not fully worked out, and a few fragments of the original material were suffered for the time to remain. . . . *Der bestrafte Brudermord* . . . seems to preserve fragments of the old *Hamlet*" (*Life*, 1916, p. 362).

confused "report" of "an abridged transcript for provincial use of the old play as partly revised by Shakespeare,"[3] and that Shakespeare's revision "had not extended much beyond the ghost scenes," Polonius (known then as Corambus or Corambis) was already fully characterized in the old play. Certainly the essence of him—his maladjusted rôles of the judicious and anxious father, the trusted counsellor, and the doddering fool—is in the First Quarto. If the First Quarto is the old play, Shakespeare had but to touch him up a little.

But this assumes too much. I do not see how anyone can read the First Quarto without finding Shakespeare's touch, if not in every line, at least on every page. Fragments of the old play are mixed in, undoubtedly. But who can honestly pick them out?

But *Der bestrafte Brudermord* is another matter. It seems to me wholly unreasonable to derive it, as Sir E. K. Chambers does, from the Second Quarto of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. With all possible allowance for abbreviation and debasement, it is unlikely that every significant attribute of Shakespeare's Hamlet could have so completely evaporated. It is no less unlikely that the comic element should differ so radically if it were a mere derivative from the Second Quarto.[4] *Der bestrafte Brudermord* points, detail by detail, to a dramatization of the Hamlet legend, earlier and cruder than even Shakespeare's first experiment with it.

The Corambus of *Der bestrafte Brudermord* is a wordy

[3]In *The Manuscript of Shakespeare's Hamlet*, 1934, which has reached me since this article was set up, Dover Wilson disclaims any further interest in discovering "what sort of wild ass perpetrated the ridiculous text of 1603," and dismisses it as "a memorial reconstruction of the play by some person or persons, whether actors or note-taking spectators, who were present at performances of it in 1603 or shortly before."

[4]See Furness's discussion, with citations from other commentators (*Variorum Hamlet*, II, pp. 114 *ff.*).

and simple-minded old fellow, verging on second childhood—a natural coinage from Feng's friend, "gifted more with assurance than judgment." He has given his consent to the request of his son, Leonhardo, for permission to set out for Paris: "Ay, with over-consent, with middle-consent, and with under-consent. Oh, your majesty, he got an extraordinary, noble, excellent, and splendid consent from me."[5] He ascribes Hamlet's madness to thwarted love for Ophelia. "Gracious lord and king, love is certainly strong enough to make a man mad. I can still remember how it plagued me when I was young: it made me as mad as a March hare. But now I do not mind it. I like better to sit by my fire and count my red pennies, and drink your majesty's health." At his suggestion, the king and he hide to watch Hamlet's meeting with Ophelia. He announces to Hamlet the arrival of the players, and to Hamlet's "O Jeptha! Jeptha! What a fair daughter hast thou!" replies, "Your highness will always be bringing in my daughter." When the king has made his sudden exit in the midst of the play, Corambus says, "The actors will get a poor reward, for their acting has sore displeased the king;" but when Hamlet has explained the importance of keeping on friendly terms with actors, Corambus is compliant: "Well, they shall have their reward, since they are such people." Just after Hamlet has found the king at prayer and spared him ("Hold, Hamlet! Why would'st thou take his sins upon thyself?"), Corambus enters the queen's chamber to tell her that Hamlet is still mad. Horatio announces that Hamlet is in the antechamber, craving a private audience. "Hide yourself, Corambus, behind the tapestry, till we call you," says the queen.

[5]Quotations are from Furness's translation in the *Variorum Hamlet.*

During the interview, "Corambus coughs behind the tapestry" and Hamlet "stabs him."

This is the sum total of the Corambus of *Der bestrafte Brudermord*. Ophelia goes mad, but displays her madness only by making gross love to Phantasmo, the court fool. There is no suggestion of the

> poison of deep grief [that] springs
> All from her father's death,

nor any foreshadowing of that most pitiful of utterances: "I would give you some violets but they wither'd all when my father died." Leonhardo demands "just vengeance" for the murder of his father, but his wrath is promptly assuaged by the king's offer to be a father to him. Corambus is left high and dry—a comic and still an almost incidental figure.

II

At some stage in his evolution into the Polonius of Shakespeare's Second Quarto, the erstwhile friend of Feng began to take on a resemblance to William Cecil, Baron Burghley, from 1572 to his death in 1598 lord high treasurer and chief minister to Queen Elizabeth.[1]

[1]The resemblance of Polonius to Burghley was first noticed, tentatively, by Joseph Hunter in his *Illustrations of Shakespeare*, 1845. After recalling the "ten admirable precepts of worldly prudence" which Burghley "left . . . to his son Robert," Hunter remarks: "That there was some individual nobleman more particularly pointed at in the character of Polonius, I can entertain no doubt, nor that some attentive observer of the men of those times will one day trace the Poet home." Twenty-four years later G. R. French in his *Shakespereana Genealogica* attempted a more comprehensive identification: Hamlet as Sir Philip Sidney; the elder Hamlet as Philip's father, Sir Henry Sidney; Polonius as Lord Burghley; Ophelia as Lord Burghley's daughter, Anne Cecil. Attempts at historical identifications of the characters in *Hamlet* have been made from time to time since—one of the most elaborate, and strained, being Lillian Winstanley's *Hamlet and the Scottish Succession*, 1921, in which Hamlet is King James and Polonius a combination of two personages grotesquely mated, Rizzio, stabbed by Darnley in Queen Mary's apartment in 1566, and Burghley, dying peacefully in

Whether Kyd (if it was he who wrote the old play) was responsible for giving the old counsellor the first slant in this direction affords at least a subject for conjecture. Certainly a playwright who had been caught in the net of Lord Burghley's efficient spy system, arrested for seditious libel, convicted of possessing "atheistical" documents, and put to the torture, would have had no affection for Elizabeth's chief minister. All this happened to Kyd in May of 1593. His first attempt at a dramatization of the Hamlet legend must have been several years earlier, for Nashe's oft-quoted reference to the "English Seneca" who produced "whole *Hamlets*, I should say handfuls of tragical speeches," was made in 1589. But if it was Kyd's *Hamlet* that was revived at the Newington Butts theatre on June 9, 1594, it is conceivable that he might have yielded to the temptation to revise the old counsellor in order to make his sententiousness, his spying and sneaking ways, and his senility, suggest Lord Burghley.

But I do not think so. Burghley was still alive and all-powerful in 1594. And Kyd was a craven fellow, who did not scruple to turn state's evidence against his old friend Marlowe, for the sake of getting out of trouble himself. There would have been scant satisfaction in caricaturing Burghley so obscurely that nobody else would have caught the likeness. And Kyd would not have dared to do it openly.

But when Shakespeare took hold of the old Hamlet play, Burghley was dead. And Shakespeare was of the anti-Burghley faction, the Essex-Southampton faction,

his bed in 1598. Dover Wilson, in *The Essential Shakespeare*, 1932, arguing that *Hamlet* is an analysis of the character of the fallen Earl of Essex, declares: "The figure of Polonius is almost without doubt intended as a caricature of Burleigh [*sic*]."

embittered by disgrace. The cat was away, the mice could play.

If we are to understand the characteristics—and the inconsistencies—of Shakespeare's final portrayal of Polonius, it will be well to remind ourselves at this point of what manner of man Burghley was.

Thanks alike to his position and to his strongly marked individuality, Burghley's qualities and idiosyncrasies stamped themselves upon the mind of his generation and became a matter of common talk. The portrait by Marc Gheeraedts in the National Portrait Gallery shows him as Shakespeare might have seen him on state occasions—a man of middle height with an abundant beard of snowy whiteness, prominent nose, high cheek bones, dark eyes flashing out from the pallor of age—a velvet cap upon his head, the face framed in a ruff of exquisite lace; a mantle of blue velvet, lined with taffeta and hung with the collar and Great George of the Order of the Garter. Of the seventy-eight years of his life, he had spent forty-eight as guiding minister of state successively to Edward VI, to Mary, and to Elizabeth. Even the Roman Catholics whom he persecuted acknowledged him to be "virtuous,"[2] and in an age of political corruption he was reckoned incorruptible.[3]

Only such things, no doubt, should have been remembered of him; but he was not without a human share of foibles and defects and had lived too long in the spotlight to hope to hide them. Rising from comparatively

[2]*E.g.*, De Feria quoted by J. H. Pollen, *English Catholics in the Reign of Elizabeth*, London, 1920, p. 13.

[3]"This judgment I have of you," said Elizabeth, in appointing him chief secretary of state on November 20, 1558, "that you will not be corrupted with any manner of gifts, and that you will be faithful to the state" (*Dictionary of National Biography*, III, p. 1317). In the ensuing forty years of his service she had no reason to change her opinion.

obscure origins to a power which he exercised ruthlessly and to a wealth of which he made an almost unparalleled display, he was hated by the older nobility as an upstart[4] and sneered at for his avarice and his vanity.[5] He took himself very seriously and apparently did not know how to play. His greatest disport, wrote one of his friends, was to ride about his garden "upon his little muile, he seldom or never plaied at anie game, for he cold plaie at none; he wold sometymes looke a while on shooters or bowlers as he rid."[6] He was given to sententious precepts. As chancellor of Cambridge, he had supplied the probably unappreciative students with maxims of conduct wherewith to improve their manners. When the Earl of Bedford, then of the mature age of thirty-seven, had been appointed governor of Berwick, Burghley, only eight years his senior, had drawn up for him a series of precepts for the ordering of his household.[7] More widely known were the "ten precepts" which Burghley drew up for his second son, Robert Cecil, on the eve of Robert's departure for France.

The compiling of formal maxims and precepts was a common practice of the time. If, as would appear, Burghley was somewhat unduly addicted to the practice, it was pardonable in one of his position and experience. But addiction to formal advice has ever been the least endearing of gifts, especially when the giver himself is not above criticism. Burghley's nervous manner, a certain "smallness of nature" particularly evinced by his anxiety to make his pedigree appear nobler than it was, his habit of descending "to the most trivial details of domestic and state arrangement," qualities which his

[4] *Shakespeare's England*, I, p. 8.
[5] J. H. Pollen, *English Catholics in the Reign of Elizabeth*, p. 15.
[6] *Shakespeare's England*, II, p. 140.
[7] Murdin's *Burghley Papers*, 1759, p. 302.

friend Sir Thomas Gresham regretfully notes in him,[8] did not tend to make his habitual maxims palatable. Moreover, with all his lavishness of good advice and his personal incorruptibility, he was notoriously circuitous in his dealings. The young blades about the court called him "the old fox,"[9] and the sobriquet was well earned. In his perennial struggle with the plotting Roman Catholics he developed an extraordinary system of espionage. From 1570, when the bull excommunicating Queen Elizabeth was published, to about 1590, his paid army of spies and informers were "used without scruple to get information when it was needed to keep watch upon the sayings and doings of suspected characters at home and abroad. They were a vile band, and employment of such instruments could not but bring some measure of dishonour upon their employer."[10] Nor was Burghley content to leave the trickery to his spies. In his personal relations he would stoop to any trick by which a bait of falsehood might catch a carp of truth.[11] Finally we may note that in 1598 Burghley, then in his seventy-eighth year, was thought to be in his dotage, and, according to his biographer, Martin Hume, was on more than one occasion told so to his face by the angry queen.

It was well known that Burghley shared the Puritan antipathy toward the stage and was restrained in his repressive measures toward the players only by his fear of running counter to the play-loving queen. Moreover,

[8]Burgon's *Life and Times of Sir Thomas Gresham*, 1889, I, pp. 225, 227.

[9]*Cambridge Modern History*, III, p. 330. *Cf.* also a letter of Anthony Bacon, then in the employ of the Earl of Essex: "Our earl hath made the old Fox to crouch and whine."

[10]*D.N.B.*, III, p. 1319.

[11]*E.g.*, the case of the Spanish merchant Antonio de Guaras whom Burghley personally befriended, falsely accused, and sent to the Tower (Hume, *The Great Lord Burghley*, pp. 283, 318).

in an age of literary patronage and at a court where Leicester, Southampton, and Essex set an example to the lesser nobility in the encouragement of letters, Burghley had stood aloof. Serious and sober works, such as Grafton's and Holinshed's *Chronicles* and Camden's *Britannia* obtained the favour of his patronage, but to poetry he was cold. "What! All this for a song!" he is said to have exclaimed when Elizabeth was minded to provide liberally for the author of the first three books of the *Faerie Queen*.[12] "That rugged forhead," as Spenser wrote six years later,

> that with grave foresight
> Welds kingdomes causes, and affaires of state,
> My looser rimes (I wote) doth sharply wite,
> For praising love, as I have done of late. . . .
> To such therefore I do not sing at all,
> But to that sacred Saint my soveraigne Queene.

But, alas, Burghley continued to hold the purse-strings for the sacred Saint, and from him the poets had lenten fare. It was not to such as Burghley, but to the youthful Southampton, that Shakespeare had turned for a patron of his *Venus and Adonis* and *Rape of Lucrece;* and though Southampton had been Burghley's ward, the two had become estranged on account of Southampton's refusal to oblige his guardian by marrying Burghley's grand-daughter, Lady Elizabeth Vere, and on account of Southampton's subsequent indiscretions.

So stood the matter when Burghley died in 1598. Had it rested there, with no actual crisis to stir Shakespeare on behalf of his patron and friend, it is possible that the counsellor of the king of Denmark would not have donned the cloak of the counsellor of Elizabeth;

[12]So Edward Phillips in *Theatrum Poetarum*. Fuller gives a slightly different version in the *Worthies*.

but just when, as it would appear, Shakespeare was meditating the revamping of the old Hamlet stuff, such a crisis came. In the year of Burghley's death, Southampton had angered the queen by a secret marriage to his mistress, Elizabeth Vernon. Elizabeth Vernon was one of the queen's attendants and a first cousin of the Earl of Essex. The queen sent Southampton to the Fleet and upon his release denied him her presence. He joined Essex on that expedition to Ireland, for which Shakespeare so mistakenly foretold success in *Henry V*,[13] and returned to share Essex's disgrace. And then the two of them, smarting under that disgrace, engineered together the inconceivable folly of armed rebellion. Shakespeare became involved in their design. His *Richard II* was revived at the request of the conspirators, on the assumption that the deposition scene would influence public opinion. The queen afterwards complained that the play was acted with seditious intent "forty times in open streets and houses."[14] But the populace failed to respond. Thomas Cecil, eldest son of the great Lord Burghley and heir to the title, "took a leading part in suppressing the foolish riot and in proclaiming Essex a traitor with due formalities."[15] Essex was executed and Southampton sent to the Tower. Shakespeare, too obscurely involved to share the fate of the conspirators, but aggrieved at his patron's disgrace, found his chance for retaliation in Polonius.

[13] "Were now the general of our gracious Empress,
As in good time he may, from Ireland coming,
Bringing rebellion broached on his sword,
How many would the peaceful city quit
To welcome him!" (*Henry V*, Prologue to Act V).

[14] Nichols, *Progresses of Queen Elizabeth*, III, p. 552.

[15] *D.N.B.*, III, p. 1314.

III

Casual reminders of Burghley are scattered through the play: Burghley's association with Cambridge first as student then as chancellor; Polonius, insisting that he was "at a University;" Burghley's sensitiveness about his origin and Hamlet's gibe at Polonius: "You are a fishmonger;" Burghley's insistence that his son Thomas should pursue his music while in Paris and Polonius' sharp injunction to Reynaldo concerning Laertes, "And let him ply his music;" Burghley's antipathy to the players and Hamlet's warning to Polonius of the danger of offending them; Burghley's reputation as the "other sovereign" of England and the king's description of Polonius as "the chiefest pillar of our state"—such little touches as these, individually insignificant, become significant by accumulation.

In addition to these casual references, two scenes are definitely indicative. One of these—the one generally cited in this connection—is the precept scene.[1] Worldly-wise precepts were a favourite exercise in Elizabethan literature. Lyly's Euphues had addressed such maxims to Philautus. The "English Seneca," Thomas Kyd, may have provided his old counsellor with a set of precepts. All but two of the precepts appear in the First Quarto. Shakespeare may have inherited them. Had Polonius resembled Burghley in no other respect, Polonius' precepts might have passed unnoticed. It is the cumulative effect of the many suggestions of Burghley in Shakespeare's play that makes the precepts significant. I am inclined to think that it was Shakespeare, not Kyd,

[1] "It has often been thought that Polonius may glance at Lord Burghley who wrote *Certaine Preceptes, or Directions* for the use of his son Robert Cecil. These were printed (1618) 'from a more perfect copie, than ordinarily those pocket manuscripts goe warranted by'" (Sir E. K. Chambers, *William Shakespeare*, I, p. 418).

who introduced them. With the gossip about Burghley consequent upon his death in 1598, it must follow, as the night the day, that precepts would be provided for Polonius.

The precepts indicate Burghley; but it is the scene in which Polonius sets Reynaldo to dog the heels of Laertes in Paris that really identifies the portrait.

It is not likely that Shakespeare found this scene in the old play. If *Der bestrafte Brudermord* preserves fragments of the old play, this scene, with its raw trickery, would have been just the sort of fragment which the crude taste of the compiler of *Der bestrafte Brudermord* would have inclined him to preserve. But it will be remembered that the Leonhardo of the German play has left for Paris before the play begins, and nothing more is said about Leonhardo till he reappears after his father's death.

If we are right in assuming that Shakespeare did not find the materials for the Polonius-Reynaldo scene in the old *Hamlet*, we are, I think, equally justified in finding in the events of the closing months of the year 1600 the *raison d'être* of the scene. Attention has already been called to the fact that just at that time, Thomas Cecil, the late Lord Burghley's son, had been chiefly instrumental in breaking up Essex's rebellion and sending him to the block and Shakespeare's patron, Southampton, to the Tower. In his earlier years Thomas had been a notorious scape-grace, the bane of his father's life. He had gone to Paris (Burghley, by the way, had provided him also with a formal set of precepts but these have not been preserved), had entered into a round of dissipation, and had eloped with a nun. In his letters to Thomas, Burghley complains that his son neglects to send home any account of his expenditures; that travel-

lers returning from Paris characterize him as "a dissolute, slothful, negligent and careless young man;" and that when he returns to England he will be nothing but "a spending sot, meet only to keep a tennis court." One of these letters is signed "your father of an unworthy son." To Windebank, under whose charge Thomas Cecil had been sent, Burghley expresses himself with even greater feeling. Thomas is apparently disregarding his father's repeated injunctions. Thomas is not leading a Christian life. Thomas is not saying his prayers. "Windebank," Burghley exclaims, "I am here used to pains and troubles, but none creep so near to my heart as does this of my lewd son." And again: "If ye shall come with him, to cover the shame, let it appear to be by reason of the troubles there."

It is not necessary to assume that these private letters of the Cecil family ever came under Shakespeare's eye; but with Essex or Southampton to inform him, the scandal would lose nothing in the telling. It is a supposition not easily avoided that in the play Reynaldo is Windebank, just being sent to investigate the stories that have come home about the "dissolute, slothful, negligent and careless young man;" and that, in Polonius, we see the elder Burghley, apt in spying and in entrapping through spies, given to indirections and assays of bias, anxious to get at the whole truth about his son, and not above employing a Reynaldo to "put on him what forgeries you please." "As gaming, my lord?" asks Reynaldo. "Ay," replies Polonius,

> Ay, or drinking, fencing, swearing, quarrelling,
> Drabbing; you may go so far.

It is easy to see in this scene a double shot at the late Lord Burghley and his son; but it is not easy to see it as

a dramatically justifiable part of the play. It is true that, alike by tradition and by the exigence of the plot as Shakespeare conceived it, Polonius' rôle is to spy upon Hamlet. The scene might conceivably have been introduced to exemplify Polonius' *penchant* for spying. But dramatically it is superfluous, unfruitful, and wrong in emphasis. It is certainly not needed to prepare the way for his suggestion to the king that the two of them should watch Hamlet's encounter with Ophelia. That suggestion develops with entire naturalness out of the immediate circumstances. It may be argued that Shakespeare purposed, by showing Laertes here suspected of "gaming . . . drinking, fencing, swearing, quarrelling, drabbing," to prepare us for the readiness with which Laertes quarrels with Hamlet in the grave scene, and the readiness with which Laertes falls in with the king's suggestion to engage in the fencing match with Hamlet. But I do not think that that is the effect of the scene. I think that anyone who had not read *Hamlet* and who happened to see the play performed on one of those rare—very rare—occasions on which this scene is retained in the acting versions, would get from this scene only two impressions—first, an impression of Polonius as a foolish old man with a pretty distinct blackguardly streak in him; and second, a vague curiosity as to when this Reynaldo, who has just, with so much dramatic emphasis, been sent on a mission, will come back to report the result of all these assays of bias. But Reynaldo doesn't come back. His investigation is left hanging in the air. And when Laertes himself reappears in the play, it is in such circumstances as to render any preliminary exposition of his wanton ways and fiery mind wholly unnecessary. Here is no occasion for a Tybalt, given to unprovoked assault. A father slain, a sister driven mad,

were occasion enough for a son's and brother's wild words and thirst for vengeance.

I have said that an onlooker, on the rare occasions when the Polonius-Reynaldo scene is actually performed on the stage, would gain from it little more than a prejudice against Polonius. But the fact is that the scene is almost never played. The practical judgment of the theatre is against it. Of the various published "arrangements" of *Hamlet* for the stage which I have been able to examine, most omit the Reynaldo episode altogether, beginning the second act with the entrance of Polonius and Ophelia, and Polonius' exclamation, "How now, Ophelia! what's the matter?" When any of the Reynaldo episode is retained, only the first six lines, in which Polonius instructs Reynaldo to give Laertes money and "to make inquire of his behaviour," and the last five, beginning, "Observe his inclination in yourself," are included. In other words, the bulk of the scene, comprehending all the rambling injunctions of Polonius as to the devices by which Laertes' possible iniquities may be disclosed, is generally omitted.[2]

IV

The precepts are a possible insertion, stressing a resemblance, which elsewhere in the play is variously hinted at. The Reynaldo scene is, *in toto*, a direct caricature of Burghley, with a side-thrust at Thomas, and serves no other purpose. Even when the Reynaldo scene is omitted, the rôle of Polonius is difficult enough to play convincingly. At the outset he is the dignified, gray-bearded adviser, respected and trusted:

[2]William Winter (*Shakespeare on the Stage*) notes occasional inclusions of the scene, but for no better reason than that it provides "a little more of the tedious senility of Polonius."

> The head is not more native to the heart,
> The hand more instrumental to the mouth,
> Than is the throne of Denmark to thy father.

He is so still, in the scene with Laertes and Ophelia—the dignified, the kind, the careful, the wise (if somewhat platitudinous) father. Thereafter, abruptly, with no transition, he becomes, and remains to the end, the doddering fool, sharply reproved by the queen for his rambling wordiness; to Hamlet the object of scorn and the butt of jest. The actor who tries to do justice to either rôle must do justice to the one at the expense of the other. Either the trusted counsellor and loved and honoured father is made ridiculous by anticipation and so unworthy of royal confidence and filial devotion, or the later plaything of Hamlet's wit retains too much of his pristine state to be so chronically silly. But when the Reynaldo scene is included, a further difficulty presents itself. It was bad enough to have the trusted counsellor proved a fool. Now the good father also has feet of clay. His assays of bias have made him contemptible. We can no longer share Ophelia's grief, Laertes' vindictiveness. We harbour an uncomfortable suspicion that they were well rid of him. No wonder that the efforts of critics to reconcile the several Poloniuses are strewn with casuistries. Dr. Johnson (ignoring the fact that a counsellor subject to sudden dereliction of the faculties could not have had the complete confidence and reliance of the king and queen) averred that while Polonius "depends upon his memory and can draw from his repositories of knowledge, he utters weighty sentences and gives useful counsel; but as the mind in its enfeebled state cannot be kept long busy and intent, the old man is subject to sudden dereliction of his faculties, and suffers from dotage encroaching upon

wisdom." Hazlitt actually insisted that Polonius *meant* to make a fool of himself. "Polonius is not a fool, but he makes himself so. His folly . . . comes under the head of impropriety of intention."

But why tax our ingenuity? The plain fact is that Shakespeare attempted too much. The malodorous friend of Feng; the counsellor of the old play with his mad daughter and vengeful son; the incorruptible, but (to Shakespeare) contemptible, Lord Burghley; the traditional butt of Hamlet's jests, combine but they do not coalesce. Like so much else in *Hamlet*, Polonius is an imperfect composite of what Shakespeare inherited, what he happened to have on his mind at the moment, and what his art dictated.

A CHRISTIAN HUMANIST: THORNTON WILDER

E. K. Brown

FOUR years ago last October there appeared in the *New Republic* a review-article the tone of which shows itself in the title—*Wilder, Prophet of the Genteel Christ.* In it Mr. Michael Gold, with that blend of pontifical authority and street-urchin's abuse which the Marxist critics affect, charged Mr. Thornton Wilder with being "the Emily Post of culture," the preacher of "a new parlor Christianity," and the author of "little lavender tragedies." Mr. Wilder resembled Henry James, he resembled Proust, he was "the diluted and veritable Anatole France"—this last an achievement which suggests black magic. Mr. Wilder was at home in Paris and Rome; he liked museums and culture. He did not appreciate the interest of writing about "Babbitt . . . and Anita Loos's blonde." There was no mention in his novels of "coal-miners," "the child-slaves of the beet fields," or "the murder of Ella May and her songs." In short, Mr. Wilder was a fugitive from the American scene, executing a "masterly retreat in time and space." He began by writing a novel about a little cosmopolitan group in Rome, all of whom were nostalgic for the past. He then retreated to an imaginary world given a local habitation in eighteenth-century Peru; and thence took a longer swoop to one of the isles of Greece as it was before the birth of Christ.

Such a choice of subjects seemed to Mr. Gold cowardly and irresponsible. The function of an American novelist in the twentieth century was to mirror the class-struggle and to do so in such a way as cleverly to reflect a nimbus over the heads of the proletariat and the Communist

party. Mr. Wilder's unconcern with this function was so complete that Mr. Gold despaired of his case; still he would utter a closing challenge: "Let Mr. Wilder write a book about modern America. We predict it will reveal all his fundamental silliness and superficiality, now hidden under a Greek chlamys."

The book has been written. Mr. Wilder kept his counsel for four years and then, in *Heaven's My Destination*,* he produced his image of contemporary America. This would be a significant novel even if it did not reveal a development in method. The accuracy of its realism, the pungency of its social criticism, have startled the editors of the *New Republic*. Still, the book takes on its full richness of meaning only when it is seen in relation to Mr. Wilder's earlier novels, a relation as surprising indeed as it would be to find an unpublished novel on the Jameson Raid or the life of Barnum among the manuscripts of Henry James.

It is impossible to read certain pages of Mr. Wilder's first novel *The Cabala* (1926) without thinking of Henry James. Mr. Wilder is not, however, an authentic disciple of James (or of Proust). Between Mr. Wilder and the authentic disciples of James there is a radical difference. Mrs. Wharton and Miss Sedgwick and even so modern a novelist as Mr. Louis Bromfield write as aristocrats, with sharp social as well as aesthetic sensibilities, who have found in Europe a society and an atmosphere which is a congenial refuge from the rising tide of American vulgarity; but Mr. Wilder writes not as an aristocrat, but as an artist and scholar, appreciating aristocratic society, delighting in the atmosphere of exquisite civilization, but always aware that he must look farther to satisfy his desire for moral force and fineness, humane learning,

*Thornton Wilder, *Heaven's My Destination*, Musson Book Company.

profound but cautious religious feeling. The erudition and the devoutness which his books disclose place him far from the psychological and mundane tradition of Henry James.

In *The Cabala*, Mr. Wilder has revealed himself most explicitly. Amid the grayness of contemporary life the five principal members of the group whose intrigues have earned for it in Rome the name of *cabala*, represent five ages of high and intense civilization. In Miss Grier the New York of the brown-stone age lived on in its delicate refinement; in the Princess Alix d'Espoli "we felt ourselves permitted to glimpse into the seventeenth century and to reconstruct for ourselves what the aristocratic system must have been like in its flower;" to the Duchess of Aquilanera, a "relic" of the Italian Renaissance, "heralds of the European courts bowed with a particular distinction realizing that by some accident many diverse and lofty lines converged in her odd person;" Astrée-Luce de Morfontaine revived after the passing of seventeen hundred years the innocence and grace of second-century Christianity; above them all towered the strange figure of Cardinal Vaini on whose scholastic Catholicism a lifetime spent in China had left marks of doubt and fatigue.

Such are the characters who dominate the first world of Mr. Wilder's invention. The unnamed narrator, whom we shall not be very wrong in identifying with the author, is not blind to their futility. It is in a tone of affectionate mockery that he mentions Astrée-Luce's monomania to have the divine right of kings promulgated as a dogma of the church at "an oecumenical council called for that purpose;" or the worldly diversions of Alix "who lost a comb in defence of reality at the stormy opening of Pirandello's *Sei Personaggi in cerca d'autore*;" or the thesis of the Cardinal on "the forty-two cases in which

suicide is permissible and the twelve occasions on which a priest may take up arms without danger of homicide." The charm of the Cardinal's thesis and of Alix's diversions lies in their implied contrast with theses on the function of a janitor in a high-school and with the loss of compacts and electric cigarette-lighters in mêlées at wrestling-matches. It is precisely because Mr. Wilder is an American, and not a Greek or a Frenchman, that in the presence of the *cabala*, as the Princess exclaims, "he's like an eager dog with his tongue out of his mouth . . . and simply loves us in a disinterested new-world sort of way." In the very completeness of his repudiation of the national standards and ways, in the very intensity of his curiosity about the traditional and distinctive, his nationality may be detected. As Professor Joseph Warren Beach remarked of James's devotion to Europe, "his genius is not the less American for presenting us, before all things this vision of a bride rushing into the arms of her bridegroom—vision of the mystic marriage (shall we say?) of new-world faith and old-world culture."

Aesthetic pleasure, intellectual curiosity, these are not the only reasons for Mr. Wilder's devotion to the Roman group. Much as he delights in the superficial *differentiae* of their exquisite civilization, he is yet more interested in what is perhaps the fundamental superiority of these people to the common run of North Americans. Each is a strongly-marked individual. The least distinguished, the least noble, of the group is certainly the Duchess of Aquilanera, "a short black-faced woman with two aristocratic warts on the left slope of her nose, yellow dirty hands, covered with paste emeralds (an allusion to her Portuguese claims; she was Archduchess of Brazil, if Brazil had only remained Portuguese), lame with the limp that pursues the Della Quercia, just as her aunt had been

epileptic with the epilepsy of the true Vani." What a strongly-marked individual appears before us here, how anaemic in comparison are the active old ladies of Main Street with their golf clubs and rejuvenated complexions. There is similar intensity in the Princess's agonized love, in Miss Grier's eager manipulations of society, in Mlle. de Morfontaine's boundless faith. We are in a world of notable force as well as of notable fineness. A reflection of Kate Clephane, the central character in Mrs. Wharton's *The Mother's Recompense*, comes to mind. Disappointed by the emptiness of New York society, she recalls her European friends and reflects: "*They* had been worn down by emotions and passions, however selfish, however sordid, and not merely by ice-water and dyspepsia."

It may be that Europe is dying, that, in the phrase of the season, it was not a success. "Europe is dying," Mlle. de Morfontaine laments; and her companion the narrator does not contradict her. "He comes," says the Duchess of Aquilanera, "from the rich new country that will grow more and more splendid while our countries decline to ruins and rubbish-heaps." As the *cabala* itself disperses we seem to assist at the disintegration of Europe; and when, the first night out on his voyage to New York, "towards the new world and the last and greatest of all cities," the young American evokes the shade of Virgil, the novel ends on the poet's admonition, "Seek out some city that is young. The secret is to make a city, not to rest in it." That may be the secret, but Mr. Wilder seems also to imply that the new world is always much less alive, as well as less charming, than the old, that the young American speeding towards New York is so much more desolate a figure than Cardinal Vaini dying at eighty on the Bengal Sea.

The first novel was a gallery of portraits; the second,

The Bridge of San Luis Rey (1927), seems at first reading to have an intricate plot. Such an impression is illusory. In the first sentence, we learn that "On Friday noon, July the twentieth, 1714, the finest bridge in all Peru broke and precipitated five travellers into the gulf below." This disaster dominates the novel, but it does not supply a genuine bond of union between the lives of the characters whose moral development is Mr. Wilder's theme; it is a symbol which has a distinctive significance in the development of each of the five who fell to their death on that hot July noon. Again, Mr. Wilder has given us a gallery of portraits: the difference between *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* and *The Cabala*, the advance which the second novel marks over the first, lies in the ease with which the material is shaped to express an idea. And this superior ease is the product of a superior intensity of emotion: *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* is written in the warmth of Mr. Wilder's hope that in an interpretation of Christianity may be found the key to reality, aesthetic and moral, as well as religious.

The fall of the five was witnessed by the Franciscan friar Juniper, to whom the event suggested a theological inquiry: "This collapse of the bridge of San Luis Rey was a sheer Act of God. It afforded a perfect laboratory. Here at last one could surprise His intentions in a pure state." To scrutinize the lives of those who had perished, to demonstrate that their deaths were not accidents but expressions of the Divine recognition that they had realized all their moral possibilities and therefore had no more to do on earth—this was the undertaking of Juniper. "Some say," Mr. Wilder observes, setting in contrast the Christian doctrine which he accepts and the naturalistic doctrine which he repudiates, "that we shall never know and that to the gods we are like the flies that the boys kill

on a summer day, and some say, on the contrary, that the very sparrows do not lose a feather that has not been brushed away by the finger of God." *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* is an imaginative expression of Christian belief in the provident determination of life. In essence it is an inquiry into the varied forms of love. For in Mr. Wilder's view the morally perfect person, the person who has arrived at the point where he has no more to do on earth, is the person who loves rightly. The process of moral regeneration in each of the characters who fell with the bridge is a passage from a mistaken or inadequate form of love to that kind of love which constitutes moral perfection.

And first he turns to the Marquesa de Montemayor whose entire life is moulded by her tyrannical love of her daughter. So imperious was this love that when she and her daughter were together "there were hysterical recriminations, screams and the slamming of doors," and that her very letters were so charged with passion that her daughter rarely could endure reading them. Upon learning that the daughter is about to bear a child, the Marquesa, attended by her young companion, Pepita, sets out for the shrine of Santa María de Cluxambuqua; and it is in the sacred town that she undergoes moral regeneration.

This, like all other moral advances in the novel, is, indirectly at least, attributable to the abbess of the convent of Santa María Rosa de las Rosas, the holy mother María del Pilar. The abbess had long fixed upon the orphan postulant, Pepita, as her successor; and, among other disciplines, had directed her, as a form of worldly experience, to wait upon the Marquesa de Montemayor. In the inn at Cluxambuqua the Marquesa reads a letter in which Pepita expresses her love for the abbess; and in

its phrases of utter renunciation, of complete trust in the person beloved, she perceives what her own exacting, melodramatic love lacks. Even this letter, Pepita decides against sending: it is not, she says, "brave," by which she means that it is a covert protest against the discipline which the abbess has set her, and thus a deviation from the complete trust love supposes. The atmosphere of the sacred town of Cluxambuqua had already induced in the Marquesa a mood in which the discovery of so elevated a love might act powerfully. "If anything turned out for disappointment in the town of Cluxambuqua the grief was somehow assimilated by the overwhelming imminence of the Andes and by the weather of quiet joy that flowed in and about the side streets." "To-morrow I begin a new life!" the Marquesa cried out when she was again alone, and she wrote the last of her letters to her daughter, "known to the Encyclopedists as her Second Corinthians because of its immortal paragraph about love." Next day at noon she was one of the five upon the bridge of San Luis Rey.

No less striking was the moral regeneration of Uncle Pio. Since he had been a mere boy his life had been shaped by three pre-occupations: "his passion for overseeing the lives of others, his worship of beautiful women, and his admiration for the treasures of Spanish literature." It had been his incredible luck to find, in his association with La Perichole, the happy realization of each: for she was a woman of great beauty, it was he who educated and sustained her histrionic powers, and in her acting she did nightly homage to "the lordly conversation of Calderón," Tirso de Molina, or Lope. She became "the great secret and reason of his life." If his love was superficially a selfless devotion, at root, like the Marquesa's for her daughter, it was tyrannically possessive.

When La Perichole, her beauty ruined by small-pox, retired and refused even to see him, when, taken unawares by him, she drove him away with oaths and crockery, he was inconsolable, aggrieved, and, like the Marquesa, assailed by maudlin self-pity. Ultimately, however, Uncle Pio found in himself the fortitude to transfer his devotion from La Perichole to her epileptic child, to repeat on him—with genuine selflessness—the efforts he had expended on his mother. And one evening, accompanied by the child, he left the little watering-place in the Andes where La Perichole waited for death. The following noon he, too, fell with the bridge of San Luis Rey.

The regeneration of the other travellers is similar, if less impressive.

It is not the reflections of Friar Juniper which matter: when they are not jejune, they are incoherent. Throughout the book Juniper is a shadowy figure, a literary device and no more. The reflections which matter are those of the abbess, Mother María del Pilar. To her came the bereaved and ashamed actress, at last appreciating the devotion of Uncle Pio, and the daughter of the Marquesa, full of self-reproach. From her insight they hoped for relief from the intolerable burden of remorse and for explanation of the spiritual significance of the event. And she, mourning for Pepita, saw to the heart of things. The travellers who fell with the bridge had left their lives incomplete, it is true, in the sense that Uncle Pio had not exercised his unique educative faculty upon the epileptic child or the Marquesa established a new relation with her daughter. This was true, but it was negligible. Pepitas do not exist, she saw, merely or mainly to administer convents or comfort holy women in their old age. The objective life of the travellers was

incomplete; but they themselves were not—they had scaled the highest peaks of love. And, as the novel ends, the abbess offers the key to the meaning of the disaster: "Love will have been enough; all those impulses of love return to the love that made them. Even memory is not necessary for love. There is a land of the living and a land of the dead and the bridge is love, the only survival, the only meaning." It is a bridge which the abbess has not yet been permitted to cross: she has been, as she says, too busy, she has been too much the general, the shepherd, too little the individual person. And in recognizing her error—an error so fruitful for good in the moral and spiritual life of Peru—she tore an idol from her heart and set out to achieve the mood of the travellers.

The Woman of Andros (1930) is a much slighter work, without the richness of matter which distinguishes *The Cabala* or the intellectual vigour and spiritual refinement of *The Bridge of San Luis Rey*. To this latter novel, it is, philosophically, a postscript, or, more accurately, a preface: a less profound inquiry into the nature of moral perfection. In *The Woman of Andros* it is Pamphilus, son of Simo, who proceeds by way of love to moral perfection. At the opening of the novel Pamphilus is a melancholy, aspiring adolescent, the most silent and the least sociable of the group who dine with the Andrian hetaira who brings civilization to the rough-spoken, rough-living men of Brynos. As the Andrian woman remarks: "He thinks he is failing. He thinks he is inadequate to life at every turn . . . such people are unconscious of their goodness. They strike their foreheads with their hands because of their failure, and yet the rest of us are made glad when we remember their faces." The moral gloom of Pamphilus, his *accidie*, is dispelled partly by the impression made upon him by the wisdom and tranquil

death of the Andrian, partly by his bungling but not unheroic love for her sister. The counsel of the Andrian, at first so impossible for him to understand, he at last accepts and applies: he becomes able "to praise all living, the bright and the dark." He attains to a mood which is best described as "a sad love that was half hope often rebuked and waiting to be re-assured of its truth." It is a mood far inferior to that of the travellers over the bridge of San Luis Rey, inferior, to adopt Pater's phrase, as "the highest Platonic dream is lower than any Christian vision." The inferiority has doubtless been carefully calculated by Mr. Wilder, in order to emphasize the chasm between the pre-Christian and the Christian worlds. Pamphilus could not transcend doubt—even his love stood in need of some reassurance anticipated but not defined, and in this was far below that of the travellers. In the last sentence Mr. Wilder casts his glance forward to the Divine event which was to make possible the mood of Saint Louis himself and of the travellers over the bridge named in his honour.

The intimate connection between *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* and *The Woman of Andros* is readily perceived and needs no further clarification; but what intimate connection can there be between studies in religious and moral distinction and a somewhat Proustian image of a contemporary social group such as we find in *The Cabala*? *The Cabala* is essentially a novel in praise of civilization; and it is perceptible to any reader of *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* that, although that novel is dominated by religious moods and moral ideas, nevertheless, Mr. Wilder finds as deep a joy in the refinement, culture, and splendour of his imaginary Peru as he had found in the expression of the same qualities in contemporary Roman society. When the Archbishop of Lima returned from

Spain the question on everyone's lips was: "What *autos*, what masses, has he brought?" It is doubtful whether such a question would come to many lips to-day when the Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago returns from Rome. But, says Mr. Wilder, "Peru had passed within fifty years from a frontier state to a state in renaissance." The North American West has in the same, or a longer, period passed from a frontier state to a state of Gopher Prairies. Even the populace of Lima brought gifts to the choirs and actors of the day. The conversations held in the viceroy's palace late at night were not about horses and agriculture and scandal but "about wars and kings, about poets and scholars, and about strange countries. . . . All night they talked, secretly comforting their hearts that longed always for Spain and telling themselves that such a symposium was after the manner of the high Spanish soul." Cardinal Vaini and the Princess d'Espoli —as well as the Andrian—would have found the nucleus of a *cabala* in such a company and would have expanded in its atmosphere as fully as in their own time and place. In a word it may be said that *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* includes and transcends *The Cabala* and *The Woman of Andros*—that it is Mr. Wilder's central book.

Such is the world of Mr. Wilder, the world which leads Mr. Gold to remarks as bewildering as any criticism written in our time. Mr. Gold calls its piety Victorian; but its piety is Catholic. He calls it a junkshop; but its every nuance and relation has been carefully selected. He calls it chambermaid literature; he should be challenged to produce the chambermaids.

It is the creator of this world, the lover of mellow civilizations and intricate characters, of "faint implications," who has now in *Heaven's My Destination* given us the portrait of George M. Brush, A.B. (Shiloh Baptist

College, Walling, South Dakota), salesman for Caulkins' Educational Textbooks in the Mississippi Valley, and reader of the nickel pamphlets of Mr. Haldeman-Julius. Not only has Mr. Wilder written about America: he has written about the most American part of America, Mark Twain's America, the middle classes and the poor of the south-central and south-western states. He has not permitted himself to introduce one really cultivated person—and he has sharpened and tightened his style to harmonize with his personages. He has shown that he can present a despairing realtor, a crooked bank president, and a waitress in a Chinese café, as successfully as he had presented a cardinal or a viceroy, that he can describe a scene in a Kansas City brothel as vividly as a Platonic banquet or a fashionable dinner in Tivoli. An artist, not an aristocrat, he can draw the lives of those from whom Henry James and Edith Wharton shrink—the vulgar, the stupid, and the blind. He knows their clothes and their drinks and why they choose them, their oaths and jests, even their reticences and their muddled aspirations. His picture of life in Queenie Craven's boarding-house has the veracity of Dreiser's representation in *An American Tragedy* of the Griffithses' lives in the same district of Kansas City. A challenge was hurled at Mr Wilder: he has met it on the most difficult terms.

His new novel is much more, however, than the triumphant acceptance of a challenge. The characters, the setting, the style are new: the point of view has not changed. The attitude taken up towards George Brush by the world in which he lives, an attitude ranging from the amused scorn of the sister-in-law who says "He's crazy in a sort of nice way," to the savage anger of the man who tells him "You've no brains, that's all, God didn't give you any brains!" is an attitude present in the

background of *The Cabala* and *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* and a determining force in the development of *The Woman of Andros*. In Mr. Wilder's view excellence of a rare sort always excites hatred and mistrust. As Judge Carberry says to George Brush: "Well, boy . . . I'm an old fool, you know . . . in the routine, in the routine. . . . Go slow, go slow. See what I mean? I don't like to think of you getting into any unnecessary trouble. . . . The human race is pretty stupid. . . . Doesn't do any good to insult 'm. Go gradual. See what I mean?. . . . Most people don't like ideas." For Mr. Wilder the malevolence of the Mississippi Valley is not an iniquity peculiar to it, but merely the local form of that universal baseness which Flaubert assailed in M. Homais and George Eliot in St. Oggs.

Similarly George's attitude to his world is close to the attitude of the earlier heroes and heroines, although less enlightened. On the title-page Mr. Wilder reproduces a sentence from *The Woman of Andros*. "Of all forms of genius, goodness has the longest awkward age." No sentence could bring into sharper relief the likeness between the ancient Greek Pamphilus and the contemporary American George Brush, who, upon reading the article "Napoleon" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, scribbled along the margin: "I am a great man too, but for good, G.M.B." His awkwardness is never greater than when he sets out to minimize his own powers: he declines to be proud of his beautiful tenor voice, and describes it as merely one of nature's gifts to the world, along with Niagara Falls and John McCormack. When he is cornered in argument he falls back upon a source of assurance impregnable to reason: "Everybody's crazy except me; that's what's the matter. The whole world's nuts!" Small wonder that as many as ten people call George crazy in the course of the novel!

George is vulnerable at but one point: he requires a conviction that there is one other mind that understands and appreciates him as he understands and appreciates himself. One mind suffices but it is indispensable. In swift succession he is beaten and thrown out by his oldest friends, told by his wife that she can no longer bear to live with him, and robbed of his faith in God. In a small Texas town, George has a complete moral and physical collapse: he is at the point of death and he wishes to die. A very little reassurance is all that he requires to right himself; and the reassurance comes as the culmination of the most imaginative element in the novel.

Kansas City was the hub of George's travels; and his nearest approach to a home was in a boarding-house there. The keeper of the boarding-house often spoke of George to a Polish priest of distinguished sanctity, Father Pasziewski; and as often she spoke of Father Pasziewski to George. The two never met; but through their illiterate medium they carried on a communication which became an important fact in the life of each. And when, in his crisis of isolation and self-depreciation, George learns that on his death-bed one of Father Pasziewski's most urgent thoughts had been of him, he begins to recover. The novel ends with George, thus reassured, reverting to all the acts which had marked him out as the eccentric, quixotic personage whom the world misunderstands and mistrusts, and who draws an inexhaustible satisfaction from his certainty that he is the perfectly logical man, the perfectly good man, whose logic and goodness are, to be sure, merely gifts of nature like Niagara Falls and John McCormack. We have no doubt that heaven's his destination but the awkward age of his goodness will be a long one—and the bridge is far away.

A FLIGHT THROUGH AESTHETIC SPACE-TIME

A. F. B. Clark

THE wish has been expressed that there should be a world-conference to end world-conferences. An equally deep if unuttered prayer of humanity must be that speculation regarding the essence of beauty or art should—at least temporarily—cease, that an aesthetic "holiday" should be declared. For no department of research seems to be so hopelessly bogged. Since the beginning of this century some of the world's most brilliant minds have devoted their energies to this elusive quest; yet what common denominator can be found for Croce's "Expressionism," Babbitt's "Humanism," Clive Bell's "Significant Form," and Richards's neurological theory, to mention only a few of the more salient solutions that have been offered us? It has been calculated that at least sixteen different definitions of "art" have been given by serious and influential thinkers in the course of the last century.[1] The worst of it is that, far from abdicating in favour of the Relative, our old friend the Absolute takes advantage of chaos to increase his tyranny; he multiplies himself. Every school turns out to be an incarnation of the Absolute; among conservatives he is called Tradition, among radicals the New Truth. The former believe that the "truth" about art was discovered long ago, the latter that it was discovered this morning. But both are equally in the grip of a "finality complex" which obscures from them the possibility that beauty, instead of being a mysterious and unique essence waiting to be discovered, may be simply a convenient linguistic

[1]See Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (3rd edition), London, 1930.

symbol used by men of different lands and different ages to cover an intricate nexus of disturbances produced in their nervous systems by such objects as statues, paintings, buildings, poems, *etc.* It may be that much of the trouble comes from the fact that the single word "beauty" has to do service for extremely disparate nervous disturbances.

Philosophical disquisition does not, however, seem to be getting us very far towards that mutual toleration that should result from a realization of the relative nature of the concept "beauty." Why not try another method? Why not be thoroughly modern and, taking a plunge into the flux of taste, come to the surface again with our minds made more supple and sensitive by immersion in that mercurial stream? Why not—to change slightly the figure—take a rapid aeroplane flight through aesthetic space-time, watching the forms and colours change before our very eyes, the Greek Venus stiffen into the Byzantine Mother of God and the latter melt again into the Madonna of Raphael, and return from our journey convinced that he who would imprison beauty in a final formula must learn the secret of severing one from another the iridescent hues on the neck of the dove?

In still plainer words, what I propose to undertake here is a "history of beauty," an outline, not of aesthetic theory, but of aesthetics in action, a survey of what men (since the beginning of our European civilization) have shown, *by their art-creations*, *not by their speculations*, that they *meant* at various periods by the word "beauty." This survey must include architecture, sculpture, painting, literature, and music. Yet a history of literature *plus* a history of painting, *plus* a history of music, would be no substitute for what we are attempting. The historian of each of these arts would become immersed in the special

technique of his given art; whereas what we are seeking is that mode of beauty common to every art-product of a given time and people. That such a common factor exists there can be but little doubt; the architecture of the "Century of Progress," the atonalities of Schönberg, the "abstractions" of Picasso, the structure of *Ulysses*, are surely not unrelated phenomena. Moreover it will be our business to inquire how the common "mode" of beauty peculiar to a given sector of "space-time" is related to the social, political, economic, and religious features of the sector.

To the objection that this enterprise—if feasible at all—would occupy several volumes, perhaps a whole library, I can only reply that it was not at random that I chose for my attempt the symbol of an aeroplane-flight. The traveller across the continent by aeroplane does not get as intimate a knowledge of geographical details as a pedestrian; nevertheless, he gets another kind of knowledge obtainable in no other way, a sense of the *Ineinander* as the Germans say, of "the One and the Many," of Past, Present, and Future grasped in one eagle glance. Our review of "beauty" must be at once comprehensive and rapid; comprehensive so that we may realize how many the faces of beauty are, rapid so that the sense of their eternal fading and re-blossoming may be made vivid to us.

Starting our flight, then, we look down upon the first sector of space-time, the Graeco-Roman era. The concept of "beauty" which we associate with this age is so familiar that we need not dwell long on it. Our conclusions are necessarily drawn mainly from the only two arts that have survived from that period in more than fragmentary form—sculpture and literature. The Greeks evidently conceived art as having primarily a "represen-

tative" purpose; but this "representativeness" is severely restricted to certain aspects of nature and life. The ugly, the grotesque, and the emotional are (in the great period) avoided; the graceful, the healthy, the serene, the "noble" are sought out. Greek sculpture is the art of a rational, sensuous, anthropomorphic, and unmystical race. Wilenski's[2] exaggerations about the "sexual" aspect of Greek beauty rest on a foundation of truth, and in the decadence this element becomes dominant. In its best days, however, Greek sculpture observed an exquisite balance between realism and idealization. Yet, if it is compared with Egyptian or any Asiatic sculpture, realism is seen to be its core; it is never (after the Archaic period) purely "significant form." Similarly in Greek literature, real human beings and human life form the subject-matter, but they are carefully selected, slightly idealized and ennobled human beings; Greek drama is not, in a modern sense, "realistic." Aristotle's *Poetics* is a perfect statement in generalized form of this literary ideal and has been of immense importance in propagating that ideal ever since the Renaissance.

An accident of history made this local art the art of Europe. The Romans—a people without original art-impulse—conquered Greece, adopted Greek art as their own, and extended it (in a degenerate form) all over Europe with their Empire.[3] It took such strong hold there that, even after the long eclipse we have to recount, its roots still had life in them and were able to send up a second classical growth. But note carefully that it was an accident of history that perpetuated "the glory that was Greece" by identifying it with "the grandeur that

[2]R. H. Wilenski, *The Meaning of Modern Sculpture*, London, 1932.

[3]Compare the manner in which America has spread the art of Europe over a continent to which it is not native.

was Rome." Suppose that Egypt or Persia—peoples with a powerful and original art-impetus of far more ancient prestige than the Greek—had conquered Greece and Europe, instead of Rome. Should we be hearing to-day about the universal and absolute quality of Greek beauty as a norm for all succeeding Europeans? On the contrary, we should be accepting the principle of "significant form" as the ultimate truth about all art.

At least we are justified in thinking so, when we consider what actually happened towards the end of the third century. For over that ancient world

> a deep disgust
> And secret loathing lay,

and gradually its whole system of life, including its art, crumbled into dust. The new world that arose on its ruins brought its art, like its religion, from Asia—and for a thousand years Asiatic, not Greek, art-ideals reigned in Europe. Only recently has it been realized how deep this influence went. The old historians used to pass contemptuously over those "Dark Ages" in order to reach, if not the classical Renaissance, at least the Gothic Middle Ages. But the study of Byzantine history and art has made gigantic strides of late years, and finally Spengler's[4] isolation of "the Magian culture" (which he would boldly centre in Bagdad rather than in Constantinople) has made us realize that a whole cycle of history, a whole sector of space-time, during which even European culture centred in Asia, has been coolly ignored by historians.

Asia is everything that Greece is not. Asia is mystical, other-worldly, non-anthropomorphic, obsessed by the

[4]Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (English translation), New York, 1926.

supernatural. Her religions are never mere deifications of the powers of nature like Greek religion. Asia Minor in particular tended towards the purest of all forms of religion, monotheism. How was such a religion, such a view of life, to find expression in art? Representation in any literal sense would not suit its purpose; and, indeed, all Asiatic art has been anti-representational, and, where the human figure has been imitated, it has been deliberately conventionalized so as to bring out, not its external lineaments but its inner "significance;" so arises that type of art which is sometimes called "symbolic" but which (since Clive Bell introduced the term) it is fashionable to call "significant form," and which aims, not at *representing* or *imitating* any object in the external world, but at *creating* (as, for example, Beethoven creates out of musical tones the Ninth Symphony) something that has never existed in the external world but which is at once felt to have, nevertheless, a spiritual "significance." This has always been the art of Egypt, Assyria, India, China, and Japan, and it became the art of the first thousand years of Christian culture (and of Russia for a longer period).

It is all to the good that the naïve belief that the Byzantine artists conventionalized the human form because of defective technique has been dispelled and that this great and noble art of pristine Christianity (whose masterpieces, such as the Church of St. Sophia and the mosaics of Monreale and Ravenna, are surely the unrivalled symbols of religious awe) has been restored to its rightful place. But, as usual, the reaction is going too far. "Significant form" is now being set up on the pedestal from which Greek "classical beauty" has been cast down; it embodies, we are told, the "true" conception of beauty, and critics like Clive Bell and Roger Fry have

rearranged the hierarchy of the world's great artists to meet the requirements of this "discovery." It would seem, on the contrary, to require very special conditions in the Western world to make a purely symbolic art prevail, perhaps a temporary alienation from the objects of sense such as early Christianity saw and such as a collectivist and anti-individualistic world might possibly see again.[5]

The Gothic era which followed the Byzantine is far from having the simple unity of its predecessors. That overlapping and entanglement of tendencies that marks our own age was even then beginning, and it is difficult to symbolize the time-spirit in one phrase. The Byzantine ideal of "pure form" was very strong to the end of the period (particularly in the Sienese school of painting, *e.g.*, Duccio and Simone Martini, and even later in the Russian art of ikons); on the other hand, the revival of the Greek ideal of sensuous beauty was under way (in Italy, at least) early in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, the Gothic Age contributes a new kind of beauty all its own, a beauty that we may call Faustian or dynamic (though the favourite modern adjective is "expressive"). The Gothic Age is Christian, but its Christianity is different from the Magian variety; its centre is not in the supra-mundane world but in the individual human soul; spiritual struggle, aspiration, ecstasy, despair, love—all the tumultuous emotions, sweet and bitter, long held in check by the Greek μηδὲν ἄγαν and the Magian other-worldliness, come effervescing to the surface of stone, pigment, and parchment.[6] It is usual to recognize this new spirit in the frescoes of Giotto, in which "expressiveness" throws

[5]Compare on this point George Saiko, "The Tragic Position of Abstract Art" (*The Studio*, January, 1933, CV, no. 478).

[6]Even the ugly and grotesque are admitted as being "expressive:" gargoyles, *etc.*

"symbolism" into the background; but recently it has been shown that the new spirit was in the air even in the citadel of Byzantinism, for the mosaics in the dome of what is now the Kairiyeh mosque in Constantinople exhibit the same tendency to the representational and the expressive. The tendency had, indeed, shown itself at least a century earlier in the sculpture of the Gothic cathedrals of northern France, where the "bon Dieu" of Amiens and the virgin of Chartres inaugurate the modern sentimental iconography of Christianity; the expression of suffering and despair reaches heights of considerable power in the representations of Hell and the Last Judgment on the portal of Bourges. In architecture, the Gothic cathedral, with its soaring lines, its nervous curvatures, its mantle of living figures, human and animal, its flaming windows, is surely an apotheosis in stone of life and feelings, as compared with the static and impersonal dignity of the Greek temple or the transcendental awe of the Byzantine church. As for literature, is there any single work in the world so packed as Dante's *Divine Comedy* with emotional intensity, with the fierce etching of every passion known to man?[7] I think it is not difficult to justify the view that Gothic art introduces a new concept of "beauty" as "expression."

Originally this search for the expressive confined itself within the religious field, but it tended to overstep these bounds and thereby (as it were accidentally) to create a new world for art. At first the artist was interested only in the religious emotions of the individual human soul; but it was only a step from this to getting interested in the other emotions, to becoming, in other words, psychological. This new interest in the individual human soul,

[7]Yet the "formalist" ideal is also present in the perfect symmetry of Dante's great poem.

this psychological curiosity, when clothed in artistic expression, marks the first emancipation of art from its religious shackles—its secularization. This revolutionary step (not realized as such at the time, of course) takes place first in literature. Francesco de Sanctis has pointed out that the great figures in Dante's *Divine Comedy* (Francesca, Ulysses, Ugolino, Brunetto) are like a gallery of portrait-statues on their pedestals only awaiting the dramatic touch of Shakespeare to set them in action. But why wait for Shakespeare? Chaucer had already set them in motion and thereby made "the individual portrait" one of the goals of literary art. Soon after, the Flemish and other northern artists introduce the "portrait" into painting.[8] Thus the Gothic "expressiveness" contributes to art one of its most modern and persistent aspects, and perhaps the one whose satisfactions the average man still demands more insistently than any others in what he calls "art." They are satisfactions he could never find in the "impersonality" of Greek art or the "formalism" of the Byzantine.

Three great art-concepts, three different aspects of "beauty," had now been established in the Western world—the Apollonian beauty of the Greeks, the "formal" or "symbolic" beauty of the Magian world, the "expressive" or Faustian beauty of the Middle Ages, and these three exhaust the fundamental art-types that the Western world has to offer. Nevertheless, that singular phenomenon, the Renaissance, comes to nip in the bud the straightforward development of the third type; and the complex social and economic currents of the Modern Age that succeeds it cause so many blends and crossings of this type with the others and so many subdivisions within the type itself that the varieties of "beauty" since the Middle

[8]It is true that portraiture in sculpture had been anticipated by the Romans.

Ages cannot in practice be limited to three. It will be our business to trace the social causes of the rise of these new species and carefully to distinguish them.

The school-book version of the Renaissance has spread the notion that this movement signified a complete about-face of art, an abandonment of the Middle Ages and a return to Greece. That is an over-simplification of the facts. If our definition of the Greek art-spirit be correct, can we call the sculpture of Donatello or of Michelangelo (except, perhaps, in his youth), the latter's Judgment Day in painting, the fiction of Rabelais, and the drama of Shakespeare, Greek? Yet are not these all characteristic works of the Renaissance? One might say that the Renaissance signifies the triumph of the conception of art as "expression," set free at last from the religious inhibitions of the Middle Ages, at least as much as it signifies an exaltation of the Greek ideal of serene "beauty" (I should incline to say much more so). Nor is the third great art-concept of "significant form" absent from the Renaissance. It is observable in what one can only call the graceful distortions in the attitudes of head and limbs of Botticelli's figures, in Paolo Uccello's strange studies in perspective, in the violent foreshortenings in which Mantegna and Michelangelo revelled, in the enormously thickened limbs and shoulders and necks of the latter's prophets and sibyls in the Sistine Chapel, and in all the works of El Greco. All the geometrical problems raised by representation in three dimensions fascinated the men of the fifteenth century, and they often experimented with these as pure problems of form rather than of realistic representation. With Leonardo da Vinci another problem of "pure painting" arises, one of colour, not of line this time—the problem of light and shade, in which he surely revelled for its own sake and not because it added

to the realism of his pictures and which became, from that time to the close of the nineteenth century, one of the ever-recurrent problems of painting. If we push on into the seventeenth century, the cavernous canvases of Rembrandt are another striking example of a great master revelling in a problem of pure technique. Nor is it difficult to find examples of the pursuit of pure form in Renaissance literature. The experiments in style that we call Euphuism, Marinism, Gongorism, and Preciosity, and the group of "Metaphysical Poets" in seventeenth-century England spring to our minds at once. Indeed, is it not clear, on reflection, that the whole vast theory of neo-classical criticism (supposedly based on Aristotle), and its application to the epic and the drama, is a superb example of absorption in problems of pure form in literature?

"Renaissance," then, turns out to be a blanket-term covering a vigorous efflorescence of the three great art-concepts of Greek beauty, expressiveness, and "significant form." Why, then, is the first of these so persistently associated with this term in popular historic retrospect? Here we come to the feature that distinguishes art since 1400 from art before that date. In the Middle Ages and —mainly—in ancient times art and the prevailing religion are inseparable. After 1400 art becomes free of the church, and the secular patron appears. The question is, to what class will the secular patron belong? The answer to that question will in considerable degree determine which of the great art-concepts will prevail. And here opens up the little-explored question of the relation between historic conceptions of "beauty" and the corresponding social and economic conditions.[9] From

[9]Levin L. Schücking, in *Die Soziologie der literarischen Geschmacksbildung*, Leipzig, 1931, is a pioneer in this line of investigation.

this point on in our study it must be one of our main concerns.

Neo-classicism—the exaltation in modern times of ancient beauty—is undoubtedly wrapped up with the rise of the capitalistic and monarchical systems. In fifteenth-century Florence and Venice appear the wealthy amateur and the powerful dictator, demanding secular architecture, sculpture, and painting, for private and public use. The desire to emulate the grandeur of imperial Rome made them prefer the classical to the Gothic in architecture; the elegant and sensuous forms of Greek sculpture appealed to their taste, so the painters transferred the nude mythological deities to their canvas, rendering them even more alluring with the golden flesh-tints of Titian and Giorgione. The familiar type of Renaissance picture (Titian, Giorgione, Raphael), even when it contains religious figures, is obviously intended to appeal to the sensuous eye of the wealthy aristocratic connoisseur and to present nothing offensive to him. With the coming of absolute monarchy in France and its elaborate ceremonial, this worship of "classical" beauty reached its climax, literature as well as the plastic arts marching under the banner of pomp and decorum. The genius of Racine alone in this age achieved a perfect fusion of all three art-concepts; his tragedies are equally perfect examples of classical beauty, expressiveness, and "significant form."

If, then, we still think of classical beauty as the dominant ideal of the post-Renaissance age, that is only our way of making our *coup de chapeau* to the ideals of capitalism, aristocracy, and monarchy. For in those parts of Europe where these ideals did not dominate or dominated less, "classicism" was not the prevailing art-concept. In northern Europe the middle classes were growing in power and wealth and demanding an art that

would express (as already Chaucer and the Flemish painters had expressed) the experiences and emotions of their own lives. In England the Elizabethan dramatists conceded a good deal to them, and we get the scenes of realistic city and country life in the Elizabethan drama, the first invasion of consciously literary drama by the common people; how incomprehensible this new "beauty" of "realism" was to Frenchmen brought up on Racinian "beauty" is shown by Voltaire's amazement, on reading Shakespeare, at "the flashes of terrible beauty in these monstrous farces that the English call tragedies." In France itself, the Le Nain brothers actually attempted to portray on canvas the life of the peasants, but found they were ahead of their time. It was in the democratic Dutch states that social conditions permitted the final success of the attempt to see "beauty" in the commonplace and the vulgar; and the new "beauty" extends even to landscape, which the realistic Ruysdael looks upon with other eyes than the classical Claude. The works of the Dutch artists were as tough morsels to swallow for the traditionalists of that age as Picasso and Matisse are for our conservatives; when some tavern scenes of Teniers and Brouwer were shown to Louis XIV, he lost his usual composure and cried angrily: "Otez-moi ces magots-là." But in the eighteenth century middle-class art made gigantic strides. In painting it produced Hogarth with his satirical realism, Chardin with his homely interiors, and Greuze with his truly bourgeois sentimentality. In literature it annexed for itself that wide virgin tract of art—fortunately unappropriated by the ancients—the novel, which has remained to our day the great invention and triumph of bourgeois art. But the secure status which the novel attained in recent times should not be allowed to hide the historic fact that for a long time the

novel was regarded as an interloper in art and that, by the critics brought up on Aristotle and the classical tradition, it was treated as a contemptible genre unworthy to share the honours with epic and tragedy. Sophocles had never written one, and Aristotle did not mention it.

The development of that side of the "expressionistic" art-concept which we may call "realism" resulted, then, largely from social and economic conditions, as did also the gradual decline of "classicism." Its further evolution was complicated by the much-discussed but still little-understood movement called "Romanticism." The question arises—did this movement create a new art-concept of its own? Is there besides classicism, expressionism, and "significant form," a fourth kind, "romantic beauty"? To answer briefly, I think it best to regard both "romanticism" and "realism" as the two modern offsprings of Gothic "expressionism." Even before the close of the Middle Ages the cleavage is obvious—Chaucer and the Flemish painters representing "realism," Michelangelo foreshadowing "romanticism." It was, I suppose, the instinctive recognition of the Middle Ages as the source of expressionistic art that made the Romantics so keen about archæological mediaevalism, which is one of the more superficial though picturesque aspects of the movement. Gothic cathedrals and turreted castles—after having been regarded for centuries as disfiguring the rural and urban landscape—suddenly became objects of "beauty," presumably because they symbolized or suggested an era of supposedly adventurous emotionalism and individualism. This repetition of the curious act of the Renaissance—the imposing upon the modern world, after the imitation of the antique, the imitation of the mediaeval—is responsible for the clutter of bric-a-brac and *pastiches* in the art of the nineteenth century (the

sculptors specializing in classical, and the painters in mediaeval, re-hashes), and the disharmony of its street-facades, where the Gothic church, dear to the religious romantic, stands cheek by jowl with the Corinthian portico of the bank whose directors remain faithful to the classicism of their great progenitor, Cosimo dei Medici.

The manuals of literary and art history have familiarized everybody with many real or alleged "causes" of Romanticism. I shall not rehearse them here, but shall refer to two influences, one of a social-economic, the other of an aesthetic character, which have perhaps received insufficient attention. By insisting first on the importance of the individual, and then by destroying the whole system of aristocratic art-patronage and substituting entirely new methods for the marketing of artistic wares (for example, by presenting them in art-galleries and expositions to the miscellaneous buyer recruited from all classes), the political and social revolution heightened at one stroke the opportunity for extreme individualism in art. The buyer who patronized only one art-concept, the "classical," was gone. All the art-concepts could now go into the market on an equal footing.

Far more important was the entry into the general concert of a new art. No, of a very ancient art, but one which was developing its latent possibilities at such tremendous tempo and relating itself to its sister arts in such novel ways in the eighteenth century that it could almost be called a new art. I refer to the art of music, which up to the present has had no place in our story. It is true that choral music had existed in the church since early Christian days; nevertheless, music as a secular art (and above all as instrumental art), on a scale comparable with painting or literature, may be said to date only from the seventeenth century and to begin its

astounding career with the works of J. S. Bach. Someone has said that "the calculus and music are the greatest inventions of modern man," and certainly the degree of variety and perfection to which this art was carried in the hundred years after Bach's death is unparalleled in the history of any other art. Most of our musical classics were composed within one life-span. Is it an accident that the flourishing-time of this art, more perfectly adapted than any other to the expression of the most evanescent emotions, coincided with the Romantic movement in literature and painting? It would seem that, apart from all superficial and tangible "causes" of Romanticism, there must have been a spontaneous welling-up of the desire for emotional expression in the human spirit at that moment, which boiled over into all the arts but which sent up its great central jet in the form of Romantic music. However that may be, the direct influence of this new art on its elder sisters has been growing from that day to the present.[10] At first this influence merely reinforced the prestige of the "expressionistic" art-concept, but later it was exerted in a very different direction and helped, as I shall show, to bring back in our own day the concept of "significant form."

The history of music since Bach, by the way, compressing as it does into such brief space of time so complex a development, offers an unusual opportunity for observing the difficulty most human beings have in adapting themselves to changing concepts of "beauty." An art which was in 1750 still almost confined to the church, which between that date and the Revolution became the favourite delight of the aristocratic salon, then during the

[10]Here is an almost virgin field for the investigator. The earlier aspects of the influence in France have been sketched by M. Fernand Baldensperger in his *Sensibilité musicale et romantisme*, Paris, 1925.

Romantic period became the art of the people in concert-hall and opera-house, would necessarily have to go through such rapid and violent changes of method as to call forth the repeated protests of the conservative. And such was the case. Mozart—of all people!—was attacked for his audacities—and, save the mark, his violent discords! Beethoven, of course, was often regarded as quite incomprehensible, and his sublime last Quartets—perhaps the Mount Everest of modern art—were hooted down as "patch-work by a madman."[11] As for the difficulties that Wagner (now often attacked as too "popular" a musician) had in getting his work accepted, they are a familiar story to many still living.

"Romantic beauty" prevailed for about half a century, then by a natural reaction reinforced by a variety of causes—the disillusionment following the great humanitarian hopes of the revolutionary era, the development of science and the desire of artists to imitate its probing into all the facts of life, the multiplication by the Industrial Revolution of the aspects of "ugliness," but most of all, perhaps, the growing autonomy of the artist and his increasing willingness to attempt audacious and unpopular things—the other aspect of expressionism, "realistic beauty," pressed momentarily into the background, thrusts herself forward and consolidates her position as the leading nineteenth-century art-concept of "beauty." And nineteenth-century "realism" includes within the scope of art, not merely (like the Dutch school) the commonplace, but also the ugly, the sordid, and the diseased. If we add that "realism" aimed to study these aspects of life, not in a subjective and emotional but in

[11]Even Weber remarked, on hearing the last movement of the Seventh Symphony, that it was now evident that Beethoven was well on the way to the madhouse.

an objective and scientific manner, and that, in the more extreme exponents of the school, the result was not merely to include these hitherto banned aspects but to exclude almost all others, we have a fair idea of the representative writers and painters of the time. Perhaps, to be complete, we should add that a clandestine marriage between "realism" and "romanticism" produced what some would call an entirely new art-concept, "sadistic beauty," a peculiarly nineteenth-century product, and probably the strangest and most sinister of her faces that "beauty" has ever let man glimpse. That it is the offspring of the romantic yearning for the strange coupled with the realistic determination to explore the arcana of the human consciousness, I have no doubt. In Poe, Baudelaire, Swinburne, Wilde, and D'Annunzio (as in parts of the music of Wagner and Strauss) it has produced effects unknown to art in any other age. Whether they are "admissible" effects or not is the kind of question I deliberately side-step throughout this article.[12]

"Realistic beauty" brings us to our own times. It is still to the average person who "looks at" art (along with relics of "classical" and "romantic" beauty) the concept that one takes for granted. But it no longer holds the ground undisputed. Since the close of the nineteenth century the long quiescent concept of art as "significant form" has again been raising its head higher and higher.

Several causes have conspired to bring about this unexpected development.

The first is the sudden expansion of the little Gothic-classic horizon of the year 1800 to the world-wide artistic horizon of the year 1935. First the great and varied arts

[12]The history of "sadistic beauty" has recently been studied by Mario Praz in his book *The Romantic Agony*, London, 1933. Professor Praz finds its origin purely in romanticism.

of Asia—India, China, and Japan—and of Egypt, were thrown open to the study of artists and their influence quickly made itself felt. Now the notable feature in the art of all these countries is that it aims not at realistic representation but at "significant form," and has never thought of aiming at anything else. The story is told of a Chinese artist who, early in the last century, travelled to Europe and on his return to China was questioned as to the kind of painting they had in Western parts. "Oh," he replied, "they have developed a most ingenious technique by which they give you the illusion that you are looking at a real object in the external world; but, of course," he added with a superior smile, "it isn't art." As long as the white man retained unshaken his sense of superiority, it was all very well to treat this formal art of the East as mere primitivism; but by the twentieth century it was coming to be realized that the peculiar qualities of these arts did not proceed from technical immaturity but from deliberate choice; and they began to be studied more sympathetically. At the same time the Byzantine art of our own early Christian Europe was studied more attentively, and the same characteristics were discovered in it. Finally, since the beginning of this century the arts of really primitive peoples—the Negroes, the Indians, the Mayas, and the South Sea Islanders—have been studied by artists and have aroused the enthusiastic admiration of many of them.

The second cause to be observed is the dominant position of music as the most enterprising, freshest, and youngest art of the nineteenth century. Now music is the typical art of "significant form," and the fact that the greater part of nineteenth-century music is emotionally expressive does not contradict this statement; for certainly music can only express emotion by patterns of sounds;

it cannot be representative in the literal sense of the term (except in trivial instances where it mimics the song of the cuckoo or the patter of rain). Walter Pater's saying, "All the arts aspire to the condition of music," expresses very succinctly this secret envy that every artist feels for the liberty that the musician has to express himself in "significant form." Architecture, aesthetically as free (compare the expression "frozen music" for architecture), is yet tied down by the demands of utility. As a matter of historic fact, the first art to show itself influenced by music was poetry. The Symbolist poets of France (in the 1880's and '90's) aimed to use words solely for their suggestive powers like tones in music and to introduce into their poems *leitmotivs* in the form of arbitrarily recurring phrases. Later, even painting and sculpture were influenced by the example of music.[13]

The third cause is the further increase in the artist's independent attitude towards the public. It is during the Romantic age that the artist is promoted from the rank of purveyor of aristocratic entertainment to that of prophet and seer. He must at all costs speak forth the truth as he sees it, whether he is understood or not. It is during the Romantic era also that the more sophomoric manifestations of this independence—the velvet coat and aesthetic tie, the long hair, and the very Latin Quarter itself—make their appearance. The fastidiousness of artists and their contempt for the opinion of the public increase rapidly as the century goes on (*cf.* Flaubert, Whistler, Wagner). In the latter part of the century comes the "Art for Art's sake" school, which detaches art entirely from the purposes both of moral edification and of popular entertainment.

Two causes remain to be listed: the perfecting of

[13]It has been maintained that Delacroix already showed this influence.

mechanical processes for reproducing the material appearances of things, like photography and the movie, which have made artists feel that the old business of transcribing literally those appearances on canvas or in stone had no longer any excuse for continuing; and the revival—especially by the Russian ballets—of the art of "classical dancing," which approaches music in being almost entirely an art of "significant form."

Thus there arose in the first decade of this century what is comprehensively called "Modern Art." It is most completely realized in the arts of painting and sculpture. Architecture has remained relatively conservative (except in certain localities), while music has merely continued to evolve at the same rapid tempo she had kept up since the time of Beethoven. As for literature, poetry and the novel have shown some very radical tendencies, but, on the whole, these have concerned subject-matter (study of the sub-conscious, the flow of consciousness, *etc.*) and tone (disillusionment, irony) rather than form. In the gigantic *Ulysses* of Joyce, however, we have an entirely new form of literature (nameless as yet) which seems to owe many suggestions to the technique of music. There is the same use of words, as in the Symbolist poets, for their suggestive effect rather than in their literal meaning; there is the use of *leitmotivs*; there is the weaving together of different aspects of twenty-four hours in a man's life into a complex polyphony; there is the curious division of the book into sections which have a closer analogy to contrasted movements in a sonata or symphony than to what we call "chapters;" above all there is the juxtaposition of different styles in the same book by the same author which recalls the change of rhythm in a musical composition. In a word, the book shows a tendency to experiment with

abstract forms and to present experience in the form of symbols instead of literally, that is reminiscent to some extent of the favourite methods of modern painting and sculpture. The influence of this book has been more perceptible on the continent than in England, especially in Germany, where Döblin in his *Berlin: Alexanderplatz* and Broch in his *The Sleepwalkers* have adopted and extended the technique of Joyce.

When we come to the plastic arts, there is no longer any doubt at all that we have entered a new world; and these are the arts which had, relatively speaking, been marking time for over two hundred years. No plain citizen, entering an exhibition of painting or sculpture in any large world-centre within the last twenty-five years, but has been troubled in soul by what he has seen. Why? Because modern artists have renounced the idea—still held by nine-tenths of the public—that their business is to act as a human camera and to colour-photograph the external world while sculptors have similarly renounced representation. Taking as their great exemplars the Byzantine mosaicists, the Japanese masters of the colour-print, Giotto, Leonardo, Michelangelo, Raphael, and El Greco (and avoiding most of the later "masters") for painting, and the Egyptian, Assyrian, Chinese, Mayan, and even Negro masters for sculpture, they aim at the creation of "significant form." In their view they are not so much innovating as restoring art to its true function, forgotten in the past three centuries of pseudo-classicism, realism, and romanticism.

At this point, where modern art seems to be coming full circle to meet the most ancient aesthetic conceptions, we step out of our space-time aeroplane after completing our three-thousand-year journey. What have we learned on the way?

Surely we must at least have rid our minds of the "finality complex." Can a belief in "absolute beauty" survive this rapid review of the various manifestations that men, in various times and places, have *called* "beauty"? They have always believed that their particular "beauty" was the final one, and they have always been deceived. Conservatives and radicals are equally deluded in this respect; the distinction between them is that the former embrace the "finality complex" of their immediate ancestors, while the latter construct their own. "Realism" or "representation" is not the last word of art; but neither is "significant form," as the Wilenskis and the Clive Bells would fain have us believe. We may be in for a long era of symbolic art; but in fifty years, or a hundred, it will give way to a new "realism" or "romanticism" or "classicism," which will be the pet Absolute of our great-grandchildren. Let the ardent young "modernists" in our midst, therefore, moderate a little their contempt for Burne-Jones and Sir Joshua Reynolds at the same time as they rightly ask for a fairer judgment on Picasso and Epstein.

But I hope our journey has taught us something else—that in every sector of space-time the artists of the greatest vitality have espoused with enthusiasm and without casting "one longing, lingering look behind," the dominant art-concept of their time. Relative and transient as these concepts may be, they are the soil whence spring the masterworks of the age. Just why this should be so I have never seen explained; is it because the very act of revolt against the past engenders a spiritual tension and heightened "awareness" which produces work full of energy and insight, whereas the safe following of tradition dulls the faculties? Certain it is, at all events, that in our own time, too, the most vital artists (in literature, paint-

ing, sculpture, and music) are also the ones who rank as "modernists," and I make this judgment quite independently of the question whether I prefer "significant form" *as a theory* to "representation" or not. Now, if our best creative talents are committed to Modern Art, would it not be as well for us—the spectators—to set to work to adjust our vision to theirs, to focus our aesthetic lenses so that they may take in not merely the familiar foreground of traditional "beauty" but also the dimly apprehended "horizon of experience,"[14] above which may be dawning a new "beauty" destined, like the old ones, to become "a joy forever"?

[14]See C. Delisle Burns, *The Horizon of Experience*, London, 1933.

REVIEWS

PURITANISM AND LIBERTY[1]

A. S. P. Woodhouse

I

PROFESSOR HALLER'S collection of *Tracts on Liberty* represents an important and valuable effort to open to the student of seventeenth-century literature, politics, and thought, some of the treasures of the Thomason Collection (British Museum), in whose then uncharted waters Masson had uncritically but fruitfully adventured, and of the McAlpin Collection (Union Theological Seminary, New York). Both were exhaustively catalogued some years ago, but, except to students who have worked in these or other great libraries, their contents have remained unknown or been known only at second hand. Professor Haller has selected nineteen of the more important from the several hundred tracts bearing on liberty in the ten years between 1638 and 1647, and has presented them in facsimile. Hereafter the student working in any reasonably well-equipped library will at least be able to turn from the Thomason and McAlpin catalogues to Professor Haller's volumes for representative examples of the tracts with which the presses of London teemed—London "the mansion house of liberty" (as Milton called it), "the sink of the ill humours of the kingdom" (in Clarendon's phrase). And the student will find in Professor Haller's learned and lucid commentary a welcome guide through the tangled undergrowths of controversy.

The selection is undeniably representative. Many of the major forces in the period are clearly illustrated: the fanning of discontent by the exploitation of personal sufferings (in Lilburne's complaints); the inspiring power of Puritanism in the war (John Goodwin's *Anti-Cavalierism*); the emergence in the attack on episcopacy of principles destined to prove fatal to presbytery as well (Lord Brooke's *Nature of Episcopacy*); most fully and satisfactorily, the evolution and the significance of the plea for liberty of conscience (the *Apologetical Narration*, Goodwin's Θεομαχία, Robinson's *Liberty of Conscience*, Overton's *Arraignment of Mr. Persecution*,

[1] *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638-1647*, edited by William Haller, 3 vols., Columbia University Press. In the following pages where no reference to Haller is given, the tract is not included by him.

Walwyn's *Compassionate Samaritan*, and other tracts); much less satisfactorily, the transition from the plea for religious to the plea for political freedom, from Christian liberty to natural rights (of which more below). No two students of the period would select precisely the same documents. To go no further than the pamphlets on toleration, one is grateful for the reprint of Henry Robinson's important *Liberty of Conscience*, which is not unworthy of a place beside the *Areopagitica* and *The Bloody Tenent*, and for the exceedingly interesting *Power of Love*, which Professor Haller attributes, with much show of probability, to William Walwyn. But one looks in vain for other documents of equal importance: *A Paraenetic for* (*not loose but*) *Christian Liberty*, which illustrates the importance of a theological concept that Haller completely ignores, *The Ancient Bounds or Liberty of Conscience*, perhaps the weightiest utterance on toleration in the whole period if one excludes those of Roger Williams, that writer's own *Queries of Highest Consideration*, which, unlike *The Bloody Tenent*, is not readily available, and Samuel Richardson's *Necessity of Toleration*, which offers in epitome the whole range of argument covered in the battle for liberty of conscience.

The exigence of space is, of course, a valid plea; so too is the not-unrelated fact of a method to which Professor Haller stands committed: the method of presenting the works selected in their entirety and in an exact reproduction of their original form. Choice of passages within a pamphlet is even more obviously open to objection than the choice of a given pamphlet from the writings of an author or of a period. Haller's method has the certain merit of allowing the reader to follow one pamphlet's argument in all its ramifications, and the far from certain merit of presenting him with an image of the actual page—for some of the pamphlets exhibit the worst printing of which even the seventeenth century was capable! Facsimile appears to be quite out of place in a collection of this kind: we do not read Milton in facsimile, why should we wish to read Robinson in this form?[2] One sees no real gain for the special student of the period and an all-too-obvious loss for the general

[2]Robinson's *Liberty of Conscience* is one of the worst printed pamphlets, though the McAlpin copy used is a good deal clearer than the British Museum's single copy. The Leveller pamphlets which conclude volume III are uniformly bad and difficult to read, *The Commoners' Complaint* approaching very close to illegibility.

reader interested primarily in ideas. And one sighs for the additional pamphlets which a small clear type would have permitted and which a rigorous excision of redundancies, duly indicated of course, would further have facilitated. It might then have been possible to bring the collection down to 1652 or even to 1660; for one must strongly dissent from Professor Haller's claim that the years between 1638 and 1647 were more "critical years for the development of the doctrine of liberty"[3] than the half decade that followed. For it is only in and after 1647, when the Army dominates the situation and commences political thinking on its own account, that the full implications of the doctrines developed in 1638-47 appear, and that the problem of the transition from Christian liberty to natural rights can be fully investigated, especially if the plan adopted involves the omission of Roger Williams from the texts and the omission of any adequate discussion of his ideas from the Commentary.

The Commentary is within its limits an admirable piece of work. Professor Haller shows a general sense of the importance of religious ideology in shaping Puritan modes of thought and avoids the errors of the historians who lose sight of this fact in their pursuit of constitutional or of (hidden) economic motives; but he deals rather with biography and bibliography than with the history of ideas—though he succeeds, it is true, in throwing a good deal of light on the thought of some individuals, notably Walwyn. Professor Haller is a modest showman: he selects his rarities with care and pilots the reader among them with great learning and much skill, but he leaves them to make their own impression on the reader. The specialist will not be dissatisfied, but the general reader will perhaps crave a somewhat bolder and more generalized handling of the period's thought: Milton and Williams, reasonably excluded from the texts, might have figured far more largely in the Commentary; the contribution of the Renaissance to the idea of liberty might have been clarified by some reference to the Anglican liberals and the Cambridge Platonists, and here Milton could also have been used to good purpose; the relation of Puritanism to democracy might have been dealt with more specifically—the problems which the subject involves might at least have been clearly formulated, and here Roger Williams and Milton would both have found their places in the picture; while to the excellent account of the immediate

[3] I, pp. 2-3.

circumstances in which the pamphlets reprinted (and many others) were written, might have been added a summary of the forces which brought into relief the questions they discuss.

What follows will at most suggest a few of these forces and something of their interplay.

II

Milton speaks for Puritanism as in its origin and essence a religious movement when in word and deed he asserts the priority of the struggle for religious liberty. In reviewing, far on in the battle, the nation's efforts and his own, he talks of "the principles of religion which were the first objects of our care" and of their establishment as opening the way to "real liberty" by delivering the mind from "the yoke of slavery and superstition;" and on the very eve of defeat he still asserts this priority: "the best part of our liberty which is our religion."[1] In Milton, Roger Williams, Henry Vane, even in Cromwell himself, zeal for religious liberty is the impulse which sets them forth on their voyage of political thought or action; and the Levellers (however much their religious may finally have been subordinated to their political and social interests) never cease to regard freedom of conscience as one of the most important of natural rights.[2] By 1647 the question is being asked: "Whether this kingdom have any sufficient ground to believe they shall enjoy their outward rights and liberties so long as any one religion is set up and men forced under great penalties to be subject to it?"[3]

[1] *Cf.* Henry Robinson, *Liberty of Conscience*, 1644 (Haller, III, p. 116): "the best of all liberties, liberty of conscience."

[2] The so-called "Large Petition" of the Levellers, 1647 (Haller, III, p. 403); *The Agreement of the People*, 1647 (*Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, ed. Gardiner, 1906, pp. xlix, 334). *Cf. The Leveller*, 1659 (*Harleian Miscellany*, 1810, VII, 36 *ff.*).

[3] Samuel Richardson, *The Necessity of Toleration*, 1647, p. 12. Nor did the opponents of toleration suppose that its effects would stop short at anarchy in the church. Publish liberty of conscience as one of the people's rights, said the Presbyterian Thomas Case, "and see . . . how long your civil peace will secure you when religion is destroyed . . . for no doubt if this once be granted them . . . they may in good time come to know also . . . that it is their birthright to be freed from the power of parliaments and . . . kings. . . . Liberty of conscience (falsely so-called) may in good time improve itself into liberty of estates and . . . houses and . . . wives, and in a word liberty of perdition of souls and bodies" (sermon before the House of Commons, May 26, 1647, in *Toleration Disapproved and Condemned*, 1670, pp. 28-9).

Indeed in the seventeenth century the two issues of religious and civil liberty are inextricably connected, as Harrington, the keen observer, saw: "Where civil liberty is entire it includes liberty of conscience; where liberty of conscience is entire it includes civil liberty."[4]

The quest for religious reform and liberty led the more advanced Puritan to repudiate historical precedent (as Parliament was also being forced to do on political grounds) and fostered a spirit of radicalism. As early as 1641 Milton decides that change cannot be too "swift and sudden provided still it be from worse to better," and that custom is "a natural tyrant in religion and in state," a tyrant which finds (as he later comes to see) an ally in man's fallen nature—"a double tyranny of custom from without and blind affections from within." He sums it all up in his allegory of Custom and Error:

> Though virtue be commended for the most persuasive in her theory . . . yet whether it be some secret of the divine will or the original blindness we are born in, so it happens for the most part that custom still is silently accepted for the best instructor. . . . Custom, being but a mere face, as echo is a mere voice, rests not in her unaccomplishment, until by secret inclination she accorporate herself with error, who, being a blind and serpentine body without a head, willingly accepts what he wants and supplies what her incompleteness went seeking. Hence it is that error supports custom, custom countenances error, and these two between them would persecute and chase away all truth and solid wisdom out of human life, were it not that God, rather than man, once in many ages calls together the prudent and religious counsels of men, deputed to repress the encroachments and to work off the inveterate blots and obscurities wrought upon our minds by the subtle insinuating of error and custom. . . .[5]

The passage implies what was necessarily the more extreme Puritan view of history as a revolutionary process: deterioration from the Fall onward was its constant note, but this deterioration was relieved by sudden interventions of God on behalf of his chosen, seen in the prophets of old, pre-eminently in the earthly ministry of Christ, and recently (after twelve hundred years of increasing darkness) in the Reformation, whose work England was called on to complete. It is significant that Milton discovers the necessity for a revolutionary attitude as soon as he seeks to advance the

[4]James Harrington's *Political Aphorisms*, nos. 23-4.

[5]*The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, 1644 (*Prose Works*, Bohn ed., III, pp. 171-2).

cause of church reform (or of religious liberty) and that he makes so early an application from the religious to the political sphere. An essential difference between the two opposed attitudes to life and in politics—call them the conservative and the radical or what you will—turns on the view of history which they take, and more fundamentally on the question whether one is willing to seek what is natural (or ideal) through the actual, and through history which is the record of the actual, or whether one insists on an appeal *from* the actual and from history; whether, like Burke, one can accept history as "the known march of the ordinary providence of God," or whether, like Milton, one thinks of it as a protracted wandering from the way relieved by the sudden interventions of extraordinary providence. The terminology sounds strange to modern ears, but the attitudes indicated are permanent.

When the Puritan appeals from history to what does he appeal? In the sphere of religion and of ecclesiastical organization to a primitive model of excellence recorded in the New Testament. In the sphere of politics an appeal to a primitive model of excellence in the Old Testament is not without attraction for the Presbyterians. But for the more extreme Puritan this appeal is negatived by a tendency to segregate the secular from the religious, reinforced in this instance by the doctrine of Christian liberty with the implied idea that the Kingdom of Israel is merely "typical" and no model for a state "under the Gospel." Some of the Puritan sectaries, who adopt the idea of Christian liberty but do not wish to segregate the secular from the religious, turn from the scriptural record to what they take to be the scriptural promise and adopt as their political ideal the "Fifth Monarchy," the rule of Christ and his Saints. In the cloudy depths of Vane's mind the doctrine took a not unpleasing form with some colouring of political philosophy: Christ would restore magistracy to its primal brightness, its unfallen state, for, unlike Milton, Vane refused to regard magistracy as instituted after the Fall.[6] Carrying to its logical conclusion the segregation of the spiritual and the secular (which is a frequent though not constant feature of advanced Puritan thought), others—Roger Williams and the Levellers—turn boldly to reason and the law of nature and talk in 1649 a language which bears recognizable affinities with the language of 1789. In the Levellers with their

[6]Henry Vane, *The Retired Man's Meditations*, 1655, pp. 383 *ff.*

appeal to the law of nature one seems to have travelled far from the Puritan appeal to a primitive model of ecclesiastical excellence laid up in the New Testament, but the analogy is operating, be it remembered, across the barrier of a conscious separation between the spiritual and the secular, a marked feature of Independent-Leveller thought; Roger Williams and Milton, each in his own way, exemplifies the appeal to scripture in the spiritual, and the appeal to reason in the political, sphere; and Milton, almost beyond expectation, points the connection for us. Those who would reform the state, he declares, are

> not bound by any statute of preceding parliaments but by the law of nature only, which is the only law of laws truly and properly to all mankind fundamental, the beginning and end of all government, to which no parliament or people that will thoroughly reform but may and must have recourse, *as they had* (*and must yet have*) *in church reformation . . . to evangelic rules, not to ecclesiastical canons though never so ancient, so ratified and established in the land* by statutes which for the most part are mere positive laws, neither natural nor moral. . . .[7]

Even in the field of theology the more extreme Puritan is in some measure experimental in spirit. A complete and perfect revelation is presented in the Bible, but there may be progressive comprehension, progressive interpretation. The authors of the *Apologetical Narration*[8] make this point, which is true to the spirit of an even earlier Independency,[9] and resolve in consequence not to be bound by their present judgment if they see good reason to alter it. The Christian should grow not only from grace to grace but from knowledge to knowledge.[10] "To be still searching what we know not by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it . . . this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic."[11] Light indeed may come from the least expected quarter. The Independents "count not themselves perfect but stand ready to receive further light, yea from the meanest of the brethren," as one of their pamphleteers explains, and he adds, much in the spirit of the *Areopagitica*: "*Tandem vincet veritas;* truth shall overcome I verily believe and expect. The little stone cut out of the mountain with-

[7] *Ready and Easy Way* (*Prose Works*, II, p. 111, italics mine).

[8] Pp. 9-11 (Haller, II, pp. 317-9).

[9] See the words of farewell to the Pilgrim Fathers, attributed to John Robinson, in Neal, *History of the Puritans*, 1822, II, pp. 110-1.

[10] Henry Robinson, *Liberty of Conscience*, p. 50 (Haller, III, p. 166).

[11] *Areopagitica*, 1644 (*Prose Works*, II, p. 90).

out hands shall irresistibly grow and fill the whole earth . . . . Men may root out themselves by persecution . . . but they shall never root up the truth."[12] This attitude, confident but tentative and expectant, issued in the contending doctrines of the sects (whose uproar Milton took for the sound of carpentry on the temple of the Lord), and in Roger Williams's hope of a "new light of scripture yet to shine,"[13] which develops into the Seekers' repudiation of all existing ordinances. The resolve not to be bound by present judgments was not without its counterparts in the moral and political spheres.[14] The tentative and expectant attitude was further fostered by the rapid movement of events, and resulted in a widespread utopianism.[15] The break in the ordered procession of the traditional in church and state seemed, to the more visionary, to put the ideal within one's reach, and that by God's special permission and design, who (as Vane phrased it in his *Meditations*) "hath not emptied us from vessel to vessel without some teachings thereby." "God's people," said Henry Robinson, "as well as worldlings, have their times to fish in troubled waters."[16] Under these conditions there developed the various plans of the Puritans for the reform of church and state, and for the guaranteeing first of religious, then of civil, liberty.

For a time the two ideals work in fair harmony, and Milton can commence the battle for liberty of conscience under the banner of

[12] *A Paraenetic . . . for (not loose but) Christian Liberty*, 1644, pp. 12-3. This confidence that truth, unhampered and unaided, will prevail, could be further illustrated from Williams, Robinson, and others.

[13] *Queries of Highest Consideration*, 1644 (*Publications of the Narragansett Club*, ser. 1, II, p. 35).

[14] There is an obscure current of opinion in Puritanism to the effect that covenants and engagements are not binding if they no longer serve their original purpose—especially to the children of grace. A refined example is seen in Milton's attitude to the marriage contract. Cruder instances occur. Cromwell and Ireton debate the issue with the representatives of the Army: Buffcoat says, "Whatsoever . . . obligations I should be bound unto, if God should reveal himself, I would break it speedily if it were a hundred a day" (*The Clarke Papers*, ed. C. H. Firth, I, pp. 240 *ff.*, 273). Hugh Peters (if we can believe the unfriendly Thomas Edwards) took the Covenant itself equally lightly, had had it administered to him, "as he thought, twenty times, and saw nothing in it that men should make such a stir about it" (*Gangraena*, 1646, pt. iii, p. 123).

[15] Fully represented in the pamphlet literature of the period, but not in Haller's volumes.

[16] *Liberty of Conscience* (Haller, III, p. 108).

reform. But with the Presbyterians' effort to impose on the unwilling their constructive scheme of reform, the possibility of conflict between the two ideals becomes fully apparent. In *The Arraignment of Mr. Persecution* (1645) Present-Reformation is declared to be the new name of one long-known as Persecution;[17] and *The Necessity of Toleration* (1647) indicts the new reformation as one, sinful, foolish, carnal, cruel, and deceitful.[18] The conflict is deep-rooted in Puritanism itself: no group is thoroughly indifferent to the claims of liberty, and no group is quite free from the impulse to dragoon men into righteousness.

It is quite observable that by 1644 the Independents begin to protest against all compulsion in religion as a violation of "Christian liberty," an argument already used by Milton against the prelatists, and that by 1647 the Presbyterians address themselves to meet this argument, in Edwards's *Casting Down the Last and Strongest Hold of Satan* and in the chapter on "Christian Liberty" in the *Confession of Faith*. Milton remains the chief exponent of Christian liberty, turning it to many uses and responding to its influence in his whole ethical and political thought; but the doctrine, or its variants, also appears in Robinson, Walwyn, Roger Williams, and the anonymous authors of the *Paraenetic* and *The Ancient Bounds*.[19] It offers indeed a very striking example of the influence of Puritan dogma on Puritan thought first in relation to the church and later in relation to the state: it is a part of Protestant theology, the heritage of the Reformation; it is essentially individualistic, connoting the freedom of the believer achieved through personal faith in Christ; its place in the groundwork of the Puritan conception of liberty emphasizes one of the chief obstacles in the road from Puritanism to democracy, for liberty is assumed to be the special prerogative of the regenerate. A large number of the Puritans, and Milton among them, never pass securely beyond this assumption. A certain number, and Williams among them, avoid the obstacle and proceed to a completely democratic view of the state, adding equality to liberty in the political sphere, while perhaps retaining, as Williams certainly retains, the rigorous Puritan discrimination between saint and sinner in the religious sphere. Overton can write:

[17]p. 34 (Haller, II, p. 244; attributed to Richard Overton).

[18]Samuel Richardson, *Necessity of Toleration*, pp. 17-8.

[19]Professor Haller, like other commentators, says nothing of "Christian liberty" in considering the sources of the Puritan conception of liberty.

> For by natural birth all men are equally . . . born to like propriety, liberty and freedom, and as we are delivered of God by the hand of nature into this world everyone with a natural innate freedom and propriety . . . even so we are to live, everyone equally . . . to enjoy his birthright and privilege, even all whereof God by nature hath made him free. . . . Every man by nature being a king, priest, prophet, in his own natural circuit and compass, whereof no second may partake but by deputation, commission, and free consent from him whose right and freedom it is.[20]

This is a statement of the doctrine of Christian liberty with *nature* written over the word "grace" and *man* written over the word "believer."

In order that the transition from Puritanism to democracy should be effected, it was necessary either that Puritan theology should be abandoned once it had taught the lessons it had to teach and offered the analogies which it had to offer, or—and if Puritan theology was to be retained this was the *sine qua non*—a clear-cut distinction must be established, somewhat in the manner of the Baconians, between the spiritual and the secular. That distinction was already made, in the name of Christian liberty, in the Independents' demand for the absolute separation of church and state, a separation which secularized the state and necessitated a new account of its origin and functions, and of the sanctions on which its authority rested. The secularizing of the state was democracy's opportunity.

[20]Richard Overton, *An Arrow against all Tyrants*, 1646, pp. 3-4; quoted by Haller, I, p. 113.

RAILWAYS AND THE NATION*

A. Brady

Of special and timely interest is *Railway Nationalization in Canada* by Professor Fournier, an economist of Canadian extraction and American training, for it deals with what is admittedly a cardinal problem confronting the Dominion government. The first seven chapters are lucid, well organized, and in every respect an excellent introduction to the problems of railway economics in contemporary Canada. On some points there is room for a

**Railway Nationalization in Canada*, by Leslie T. Fournier, Macmillan Company of Canada.

slightly different emphasis, but most students of Canadian economic development will accept the accuracy of the general interpretation. What now seem clearly to have been the crucial mistakes in public policy are duly examined and acutely explained. But in the subsequent part of the volume, while the treatment loses nothing in lucidity, Professor Fournier enters more controversial territory. In chapter viii he undertakes an elaborate analysis of Canadian railway operation in the decade 1923-33, wherein he uses the performance of the Canadian Pacific as a yardstick to measure the shortcomings of the Canadian National. He is not ignorant that this type of comparison must necessarily be unfair to the Canadian National. He admits that the national railway suffered from serious disadvantages in competing with the private company: it had a larger mileage of light traffic lines; its equipment and property were at the outset in poor physical condition; it had throughout extensive territories the task of creating goodwill among shippers and the travelling public; as a government-owned railway it was subject to embarrassing pressures from various organized groups, which hampered effective management; and, finally, in 1922 it was simply a collection of different lines, built for competition, which had to be welded into a unity.

While recognizing these facts, Professor Fournier nevertheless proceeds relentlessly with his comparative analysis, reducing with each comparative table the Canadian National to a sorrier and sorrier plight. And, in truth, if judged rigidly by the test of profitable returns on investment, the picture is alarming. Thanks to the test which he employs, Professor Fournier can proceed logically to most of his general conclusions, culminating in the necessity of railway unification. In the light of this test it is easy to agree with his thesis that there is "an excess of railway mileage and facilities, and insufficient traffic to support a competitive railway structure," and hence that a complete monopoly with its possible economies is the only rational solution of the railway problem.

This argument cannot be answered by silence. It is substantially the argument of Mr. Beatty in his speeches of recent years—a fact which may lead some readers to regard the book as a brief for the Canadian Pacific. To be entertained at all such a charge must be purified of all taint. Professor Fournier arrives at his general conclusions by a strictly objective method of analysis

resting on the assumption that the criterion of profitable return, tangibly measured, is applicable to railway enterprise in Canada. Now the only real answer to his argument, if an answer is to be offered, is that profit, although an eminently appropriate criterion in more industrialized countries like Great Britain and the United States, cannot without modification be applied in Canada. From the outset railways in this country were an instrument of nation-making, designed in most cases, with the aid of the tariff, to draw together scattered and extensive territories without natural cohesion. Hence governments were ready to subsidize bountifully railway enterprise, and without their aid the most important railways in modern Canada would not have been established; nor indeed would there have been a Dominion of Canada at all. The process of nation-building is not complete. Railways subsidized in some fashion have probably still a part to play in making Canada a unity. Any serious weakening of railway connections with outlying regions consequent upon applying sharply the test of immediate profitable return, would in these regions strengthen local sentiment and prejudice Canadian unity.

It is this fact which explains why areas on the frontier, or close to it, are apt to be impressively loyal to the Canadian National Railways and why they are peculiarly suspicious of the Canadian Pacific and of any unification of management. They fear that they would have little to gain and everything to lose from a monopoly which might rigidly apply the test of profit. A reading of the editorials in the *Winnipeg Free Press* leaves one in no doubt as to the existence of such an attitude, and it is an attitude which Professor Fournier does not perhaps adequately appreciate.

Yet readers should go to Professor Fournier's book for a wholesome corrective to the optimistic method of extending railways into every scrap of frontier which can raise its voice in a sufficiently insistent manner. The day-to-day decisions of such a democracy as the Canadian are usually made under the pressure of the regional interests momentarily most active and vocal, and the result in the construction of railway equipment, or in other costly fixed capital, may not be conducive to long-range national advantage. A profit-and-loss balance, however rough, must ultimately be struck, and even the sparse frontier will suffer from expenditure on needlessly elaborate railway equipment because it will probably have to pay for railway deficits through the tariff duties on its

consumable goods. Recognition of the fact that railways in Canada have political purposes to serve does not, therefore, necessarily justify all the capital expenditures in the near past or the maintenance of like expenditures in the present. We need not, and must not, ignore entirely consideration of profitable return on railway capital, although we should avoid making it the sole and crucial test. As a community, moreover, we should now, however difficult the task, explore the possibility of discovering less costly means of consolidating the outlying regions; and in an era of rapidly changing transport mechanisms such exploration may not be fruitless. We have to agree with Professor Fournier's sober castigation of the excessive subsidizing of railways in the past, and equally agree that the maintenance of the existing system of competition without modification may be a singularly short-sighted policy.

What should a government at present do with the railways? Professor Fournier's ideal policy is the unification of management. Such unification will probably come in time, but the Duff Commission was reading Canadian public opinion aright when, in 1932, it held that the time was not yet. If we reject unification as impracticable at the present, we should also reject the policy of maintaining the *status quo*—although that is obviously the easiest policy for governments to accept. Maintenance of competition upon the present basis is expensive, and must become more so as the competition of automobiles and motor trucks, unregulated by the federal government, and indeed adequately regulated by no government, cuts deeper into the earnings of the railways. An obvious policy for a courageous government at Ottawa is one to which Professor Fournier in his analysis does less than justice: *viz.*, the encouragement and sanctioning of co-operative reductions of competition—the policy recommended by the Duff Commission. There are evident difficulties in quickly achieving major economies by this policy, but much could be done if the federal government gave vigorous and consistent encouragement, which, for reasons not too clear, it has failed to give. There is nothing spectacular about such a policy, but, after all, no swift and dramatic solution of the railway problem is feasible. The stubborn facts which constitute that problem can better be proceeded against by the piecemeal tactics of attrition, in which experience gathered in every detailed step will help in determining the next advance.

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND WORLD PEACE*

ESCOTT REID

In 1919 President Wilson explained to his countrymen the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations:

> Suppose somebody does not abide by these engagements, then what happens? An absolute isolation, a boycott! The boycott is automatic. There is no "if" or "but" about that in the Covenant. . . . The boycott will mean . . . [that] there shall be no communication of any kind between the people of the other nations and the people of [the aggressor] nation. . . . It is the most complete boycott ever conceived in a public document; and I want to say with confident prediction that there will be no more fighting after that. There is not a nation that can stand that for six months.

Reading the speech in 1935 one would certainly be justified in thinking that it must have been made in the heat of an election campaign. It has all the characteristics of an election speech—mis-statements, exaggerations, unfounded predictions. "Ifs" and "buts" are rampant in the Covenant. The economic boycott is not automatic. Even if it were it would probably not stop war.

It is possible, however, to argue that most of what Woodrow Wilson said of the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 was true in 1919, though it is untrue to-day. Certainly the wording of the relevant articles of the Covenant seems to support his interpretation. Thus Article 10 binds the members of the League to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Article 16 declares that a member of the League which resorts "to war in disregard of its covenant under Articles 12, 13, or 15 . . .

**Boycotts and Peace*, edited by Evans Clark, Harper and Brothers.

Sanctions and Treaty Enforcement, by P. S. Wild, Harvard University Press.

Force in Peace, by A. E. Hindmarsh, Harvard University Press.

Economic Sanctions, by O. S. Franks and others, Queen's College, Oxford.

Economic Sanctions (League of Nations Union, pamphlet no. 371, August, 1934).

A Policy of Peace, by the Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King (Speech before the annual meeting of the National Liberal Federation, December 12, 1934).

"The Place of Peaceful Pressure," by A. S. Millward (*New Commonwealth*, August, 1934, pp. 158-9).

"The Fallacy of Economic Sanctions," by Francis Delaisi (*New Commonwealth*, November, 1934, pp. 208-9).

"Canada and a Foreign Policy," by H. F. Angus (*Dalhousie Review*, October, 1934, pp. 265-75).

shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to . . . [prevent] all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."

These articles, as part of the Covenant, were declared by Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson not to be "subject to a narrow or technical construction." What they have received, however, is the most narrow, the most technical construction possible. The monkey-wrench which the United States Senate threw into the machinery of the League by its refusal to ratify the Covenant, was not so destructive in its effects as the sabotage indulged in by those states which were supposed to be the guardians of the machinery. They declare, of course, that their sabotage was necessary, once the United States had refused to join the League. A lurid reflection on the good faith of this declaration is, however, cast by the refusal of France and Great Britain to make any serious attempt to secure the co-operation of the United States in the enforcement of sanctions against Japan in 1931 and 1932.

Instead, therefore, of League sanctions being definite, certain, and automatic, as President Wilson apparently thought they would be, they became, as early as 1921, indefinite, uncertain, and voluntary. In that year the international committee of jurists, reporting to the second assembly of the League, declared: "There can be no doubt that the Council, under the terms of Article 10, can only advise as to the means to be employed; it cannot impose them." Nor has the Council any greater powers under Article 16. Even if it is unanimous in deciding which belligerent is the aggressor and declares that the members of the League should put economic sanctions into effect against it, the members of the League are not bound to follow the Council's recommendation. On the contrary, according to a resolution of the League Council in 1921, "it is the duty of each member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been committed."

The fact that each member of the League was not obliged automatically to enforce sanctions against a state declared by the Council to be an aggressor, made the clauses of the Covenant dealing with sanctions of very doubtful value as a deterrent to war. It made little difference, therefore, that, in addition to not being

automatic, the sanctions were uncertain because a unanimous decision on which state was the aggressor was required from a Council which was not agreed on a definition of aggression, and many of whose members were bound by treaties of alliance to states which might well be aggressors. The sanctions were also indefinite because the Assembly had stated in 1921 that it was impossible to decide beforehand upon "the various measures of an economic, commercial and financial nature to be taken in each case where economic pressure is to be applied."

In 1919 there had been some hope that the League might gradually assume increasing legislative power, in addition to its police and judicial powers. By 1921 the League had, as we have seen, given up most of its pretensions to police powers, and one of the first and most promising attempts which certain of its members made to develop its legislative powers was vetoed by Canada when she insisted that the League should not investigate the question of access to raw materials. As a result, by 1931 the League had become so ineffective either as a police force to protect the rights of nations or as a legislature to remedy injustices and inequalities between nations, that there were few obstacles in the way either of the United States' joining the League or of Japan's seizing Manchuria.

When in 1931 Japan did seize Manchuria she exploded the myth that the League by the application of sanctions could protect its members from aggression. That myth had served a very useful purpose as long as nations had remained uncertain as to whether it was a myth or no. Now that it has been exploded we have to invent some new myth if we want to prevent war. Thus, while some rush into Air Pacts and Eastern Locarnos, others urge that the only effective means of preventing war is to strengthen the sanctions of the League.

Sanctions are the means by which the observance of law is induced or enforced. Sanctions may be moral, diplomatic, economic, or military. Americans usually like to talk about moral and diplomatic sanctions, the French about military sanctions. Canada compromises by talking about economic sanctions. The last statement is, of course, an exaggeration, but it might not be an exaggeration to say that Canada is rapidly being persuaded to favour participation in some international scheme for applying economic sanctions against an aggressor. Mr. Mackenzie King stated last

December that Canada "should definitely declare . . . that it will provide neither arms nor foodstuffs nor credits" to an aggressor nation, and Mr. Mackenzie King is never very far ahead of public opinion.

Suppose Canada does this, suppose, as Mr. King suggests, her example were followed by the other members of the British Commonwealth, by the United States, France, Italy, and Japan, should we, in his words, "soon witness the end of war propaganda and the certain dawn of a world peace"? Most authorities on economic sanctions would unhesitatingly say, No. A complete economic boycott would be effective against most small powers and some great powers. But the British Commonwealth, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. could fight hard and long even if subjected to boycott, and it would probably not be effective against France or Japan. That is to say, a complete economic boycott could not, by itself, prevent most great powers from waging a victorious war. As a recent British League of Nations Union pamphlet put it, "In cases of aggression by a great power, alone or in alliance, it is very questionable whether economic pressure, without reinforcement of the military resistance of the state victim of aggression, would often suffice."

This is obviously a very important exception since the real problem of maintaining peace is to provide, first, guarantees for the weaker powers against the stronger, and secondly, sanctions strong enough to prevent armed conflict among the great powers themselves. Not only, the critics say, would economic pressure be of doubtful value against most great powers, but its use would inevitably lead to war. The general conclusion of students of the subject is that the only effective economic sanction is complete non-intercourse, which is technically a very difficult measure to put into effect. But, says Francis Delaisi, suppose these technical difficulties were overcome, and an effective blockade were established:

> The first effect of any announcement of a blockade would be a huge increase in the price of goods imported by the law-breaker, and at the same time a corresponding fall in their price on the open market. The greater the difference between these prices, the more intensively some form of smuggling would set in. In order to repress contraband activities of this kind, the Customs officials would have to be supplemented by troops, and torpedo-boats; submarines and aeroplanes would be required to patrol the seas outside the ports and along the coasts and to challenge all vessels. That would mean

> setting in motion the whole military apparatus; a single incident, and gunfire would start. . . . In short, as the world is at present, there is no distinction to be drawn between *economic* sanctions, supposed to be pacific, and *military* sanctions, decried as dangerous. Actually the former imply the latter.

Nor as far as our humanitarian feelings are concerned is there much to choose between war and complete non-intercourse which means an embargo on foodstuffs. The savage punishment inflicted by a boycott would fall most heavily, not upon those directly responsible for the act of aggression, but upon the mass of the population and especially upon children. Indeed, a hunger blockade is similar in its effects to dropping gas-bombs on the enemy's capital city. Both cause not only deaths but prolonged agony, and entail permanent ill effects on those who survive. Post-war Germany, surveying the generation of rickety children which the English blockade had caused, must have considered the German for rickets peculiarly appropriate—*englische Krankheit.*

Another weakness of economic sanctions is that they cannot prevent an aggressor nation from making an unprovoked, smashing attack by bombing planes. As A. S. Millward has put it:

> The military aspects of such a *coup* concern us less than the fact that whole populations believe in its possibility and will clamour for protection. They will certainly not be reassured by being told that if State A sends its bombing planes to enforce submission on State B, the entire world will cease to trade and have intercourse with State A; they will want some more immediate protection than that.

There is at least a partial reply to these criticisms. Granted that economic sanctions cannot prevent most great powers from waging a successful military campaign, they can, nevertheless, serve two useful purposes. They can make the cost of victory much greater, for the refusal to supply the aggressor with munitions, raw materials, and foodstuffs, will increase economic dislocation in his country; and the supply of financial and economic assistance to the victim will stiffen his powers of resistance. Economic sanctions can also turn the fruits of victory into ashes if they are maintained in effect against an aggressor so long as it remains in possession of its ill-gotten gains. If this were done the victorious aggressor state would lose its export trade, and its outside supplies of raw materials, capital goods, and other manufactured imports, though it might still be allowed to receive food.

> One cannot conceive [writes F. G. Tryon in *Boycotts and Peace*] any future war in which the probable economic gains would be worth permanent ex-

> clusion from international trade. If it was certain that the blockade would be maintained indefinitely until the aggressor made restitution, he would know that the money losses would certainly outweigh the gains. The knowledge that [economic] sanctions would be applied would, therefore, be a very powerful deterrent, its actual effectiveness depending on how clearly people understood the realities of economic life and how fully the interest of the majority prevailed over that of the active minority who might expect to profit from the war.

All this assumes that the plan of non-intercourse can be enforced. That is a very large assumption.

In the first place, it assumes that the Council of the League will always be able to determine the aggressor. To be able to do so the Council would, it seems, have to adopt in advance an iron-clad definition of aggression such as the Litvinoff Convention. The unanimity rule must also be changed or otherwise some one member of the Council, who openly or secretly favours the aggressor, can by acting in bad faith prevent the Council from arriving at a decision, no matter how flagrant the aggression. Two-thirds of the Council should be given power to fix the terms of an armistice the refusal or violation of which would constitute aggression. Failing a two-thirds' majority, the Council should be bound to demand that the belligerents withdraw their armed forces a certain distance behind their respective frontiers. The state refusing to comply would become the aggressor.

Not only must the process of determining the aggressor be as automatic as possible; the application of sanctions must also be automatic. Sanctions must become operative as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory states to apply them. This means that the members of the League must pledge themselves to take "definite action in indefinite circumstances"—the very thing about the Geneva Protocol which caused the loudest protests from *The Times* and other defenders of national sovereignty. The governments of the member states must also be given power to enforce sanctions without having recourse to parliament. The proposed act by which such power would be given to the executive has been called in England, a Peace Act. This Peace Act would make it mandatory upon the government, once the Council had declared that economic sanctions should be enforced, to take immediately all the economic, financial, and other measures required to fulfil its obligations.

The certainty of the application of sanctions must be further

increased by international agreement to share equitably among all the covenant-enforcing states the cost of enforcing sanctions. This cost may, in certain circumstances, be very high, for an economic boycott is a boomerang, the reaction upon the outside world being equal to the action upon the blockaded power. This reaction will be unequally distributed among the outside powers, for some states might benefit from a blockade while others would be sure to suffer. Each national Peace Act will therefore have to authorize the government to pay a certain proportion of the cost of every League boycott. The proportion to be borne by each country will have to be fixed in advance on a scale similar to that used for meeting the ordinary expenses of the League. The effect of this would be, that if Japan, for example, were boycotted, Canada would probably have to pay part of the reparations due to the United States, since a boycott against Japan would probably inflict relatively greater loss upon the United States than upon Canada. In order to make the effects of the boycott equitable internally as well as internationally, the Peace Act will have to give each government power to compensate the interests in the country which suffer loss from its imposition as well as to expropriate the gains of citizens who profit therefrom. If, to take the usual example, Japan were boycotted, the government of the United States would compensate persons interested in the cotton and silk industries and expropriate the excess profits of the rayon industry. It is not because of respect for any abstract principles of natural justice that the effects of boycotts must be made equitable internally and internationally. The reason is that if the effects are not equitable, sanctions will probably not be enforced. A state upon which the cost of enforcing sanctions would fall especially heavily will naturally be reluctant to see sanctions made operative. An industry within a state which would suffer huge losses from a boycott which deprived it of its raw materials or its markets, will bring all possible pressure to bear on its national government to persuade it to vote against the imposition of a boycott, or to sabotage the boycott if it is decreed.

One further step which should be taken is to make sanctions definite by the establishment of a Permanent Sanctions Commission of the League. This Commission would act as an international general staff and would draw up plans for the enforcement of sanctions especially in cases of aggression of major importance.

Since an economic boycott, no matter how effective, cannot

possibly prevent an aggressor state from making a successful, sudden, smashing attack upon another state, it will be necessary, in order to allay the apprehensions of the public, to take measures which will render unlikely the success of such an attack. This can be done by the destruction by all nations of offensive armaments. Offensive armaments are not difficult to define. They were defined satisfactorily enough in those sections of the Treaty of Versailles which prohibited certain types of armaments to Germany, among them, aeroplanes, heavy artillery, tanks, submarines, aircraft-carriers, and warships above ten thousand tons. In order to make it impossible for a nation to create a strong civil air fleet which could be converted into bombing planes, civil aviation would have to be internationalized. There would still remain the danger that a nation contemplating aggression would seize, for use as bombers, the international civil aircraft within its borders. An international air force of swift fighting planes must therefore be created and put under the direct control of the League.

We have made the usual Geneva jump from sanctions to disarmament. But another jump must be made if this discussion is to be kept on a plane of intellectual honesty and not of propaganda. A League, composed of disarmed states protected against aggression by effective international sanctions, appears an ideal institution to most citizens of the great democratic powers, France, the British Commonwealth, the United States. It appears far from ideal to the subjects of autocratic powers like Japan and Germany. Unless Canadians understand the Japanese and German objection to such a League, Canada is in grave danger of allowing her desire for peace to lead her into active support of a League which may become a menace to peace. The reason that France, the British Commonwealth, and the United States may be persuaded to support effective League sanctions is that these democratic powers have great possessions which effective international sanctions would defend. (Has Professor A. E. Zimmern, with his classification of the world into democratic or welfare states which control the essential raw materials *versus* autocratic or power states which are poor in essential raw materials, ever stopped to consider the possibility that in the modern world autocracy may be a natural result of national poverty?) On the other hand, as Mr. H. F. Angus has pointed out, the autocratic "nations whose natural resources and whose accumulations of capital are inadequate for their populations" would,

under a system of effective international sanctions, renounce "any possibility of establishing their claims to consideration from the possessing nations otherwise than by universal consent."

An effective international organization for the maintenance of peace cannot be founded upon respect for national sovereignty in everything but the enforcement of sanctions and disarmament. It must, if it is to maintain peace and not simply postpone war, pay respect also to the principle of international justice, and that principle can be carried into effect only if the League assumes legislative powers. "Talk of treaty enforcement," writes Mr. Wild, "is not very practical until treaty relationships become more flexible through international legislative developments."

The reason for this is that an increase in the effectiveness of international sanctions, which is not accompanied by an equivalent increase in the effectiveness of international legislation, would make treaty relationships even more inflexible than they are at present, with the result that the fairly innocuous League of to-day would become a positive menace to world peace to-morrow. For the League would become an effective defender of the vested interests of the wealthy states against the poor states. It would be as if within a state where great economic inequality exists between different classes, there were an efficient and loyal police force and no effective legislature, and the poor were told that, even if they were starving, all that they as loyal citizens should do, was to petition the rich for charity. To subject the rich to the temptations of autocratic power, untempered by the fear of successful revolution, would be to put their consciences to too severe a strain, and the poor would probably get in return for their petitions little more than a few kind words of advice. The inevitable result would be a revolt of the proletariat. They would, indeed, have nothing to lose but their chains. To subject the French, the British, the Americans, the Canadians, the Russians, to the temptations of possessing unchallengeable sovereignty over their own comparatively rich natural resources—a sovereignty untempered by the fear that the discontented powers might defeat them in war—would be most certainly to put their elastic national consciences to too severe a strain. Japan, Germany, and other proletarian powers would probably get in return for their petitions for the redress of grievances little more than a few kind words of advice on the

necessity of lowering their standards of living, and establishing government birth-control clinics.

They might be kept from revolt for a time by an overwhelming show of force but the ultimate effect on proletarian powers of such a system of international government would be similar to the effect on "curious and carnal persons" of a realization that they were predestined to eternal damnation. They would, in the language of the Thirty-nine Articles, be thrust "either into desperation, or into wretchlessness of most unclean living no less perilous than desperation." That is to say, they would either embark on a desperate war of revenge, or else sink into the wretchlessness of brutal dictatorship. Probably they would do both. The League sanction of starvation would then be enforced by the pious, satiated, democratic, and welfare states against the impious, proletarian, autocratic, and power states.

In order to escape this nauseating spectacle the world can either refuse to disarm, and refuse to strengthen the sanctions of the League, in which event it will get a good old-fashioned war as soon as Germany, Japan, and other dissatisfied powers are ready; or it can, by making a simultaneous and rapid advance along the three fronts of sanctions, disarmament, and international legislation, establish an effective League which can maintain peace on the secure foundation of international justice.

ENGLAND UNDER CHARLES II*

D. J. McDougall

The reign of Charles II has been, until the past few years, one of the comparatively neglected periods of English history. To the historians of the nineteenth century, most of them steeped in the Whig tradition, it was but a black patch between the glories of Oliver Cromwell and those of William III, and they had no desire to linger over its details. A political compromise is at best an uninspiring topic, and as their ideas of history seldom carried them beyond the narrow range of politics, they

*_England in the Reign of Charles II_, by David Ogg, Oxford University Press.
The England of Charles II, by Arthur Bryant, Longmans, Green and Co.
The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714, by G. N. Clark, Oxford University Press.

found little here to invite study on a scale in any way comparable with that applied to the periods preceding and following it. The tradition is changing, and the historians of our own day, extending their investigation to spheres of human activity other than those recorded in state papers and parliamentary debates, are finding in this reign material to warrant the judgment that it was, in fact, "one of the great formative periods in the growth of English civilization."

Mr. Ogg's book is the most ambitious effort yet made to write the history of the reign according to this more comprehensive method. It is a solid, scholarly achievement, based on a wide collection of sources, some of them here utilized for the first time; and while it will probably not be accepted as the definitive history of the reign of Charles II, there can be no doubt about its winning high place among the standard authorities on the period. It is a book for the specialist. Mr. Ogg does not wear his learning lightly, and his vast array of material, coupled with his uninspiring style, will greatly limit his public. At the outset he disavows any intention of writing a biography of Charles II, and for that there will be no regrets; for he shows no sign of that insight into the subtleties of character and motive, without which the attempt would be vain to analyse and reveal the enigmatic character of the wily Stuart who could hold, and more than hold, his own with the most astute politicians of his time. In his judgment on the king and his policy, on the Duke of York, and, indeed, on all the political and constitutional questions of the period, he is content to accept the orthodox Whig view, with little variation or criticism. The shadow cast backward from 1688 is somewhat too evident, and Mr. Ogg's preconceptions occasionally lead to conclusions strangely at variance with the evidence which he presents. His description, for example, of the Cavalier parliament beginning its career by "striking the shackles from the monarchy," is hardly consistent with his detailed account of the manner in which this parliament forced upon the reluctant king the ecclesiastical settlement of the Clarendon Code, frustrated his attempts to suspend the Act of Uniformity, and made it quite plain that on this vital question, the determining factor was the deliberation of a "free parliament," and not the prerogative of an unshackled monarch. Nor does the manner in which the Cavalier parliament used the financial power established by the Convention suggest that the

members of this assembly had any intention of freeing the monarchy from the restrictions imposed on it by earlier parliaments of the century.

Of the politics of the period, Professor Clark gives a less detailed, but, on the whole, a more satisfying account. His chapters on the Restoration, on the relations of Charles II with France, on the fierce conflicts between Whigs and Tories, on the Revolution of 1688 and the settlement worked out during the two following reigns, are models of clear, precise scholarship, entirely free from the partisanship which has marred so much previous writing on these subjects.

It is in their analysis of the less generally recorded achievements of that generation of Englishmen that the two authors reach more common ground, and ground not before so thoroughly explored by our general historians. It was an age of eager expansion, material and intellectual, an age when, for the first time, the work of the scientist was being utilized by the man of affairs, with results not less profound in determining the character of later English civilization than were those flowing from the political changes of the period. England was, more completely than at any time since the Reformation, brought into direct contact with the intellectual and artistic life of the continent, and her borrowing from France, from the Netherlands, from Italy, and elsewhere, was extensive and important. Professor Clark, who has already shown his wide knowledge of the intellectual life of Europe during the century, makes some interesting judgments on the nature and extent of English indebtedness to foreign models. France and Holland were the chief contributors, and wars with both countries during the period did not stop this intercourse. Fortunately such matters were beyond the scope of navigation acts and prohibitive tariffs. English art, music, and architecture, commercial and financial organization, and industrial and agricultural processes, all benefited from the importation of ideas. But it is clear from the evidence of both writers that there was little of mere imitation. "A national distinctiveness was preserved," and out of the varied elements to hand, domestic and foreign, that generation laid the foundations of a civilization that was characteristically English.

To the story of this many-sided growth Mr. Bryant's attractive little book adds much interesting detail. His picture of English life seems somewhat idyllic. In particular, some of Mr. Ogg's

evidence on economic conditions, especially among the peasantry, makes it doubtful whether the England of Charles II was quite so merry as is here suggested.

An additional interest attaches to Professor Clark's volume. It is the first which has yet appeared, of the new *Oxford History of England*, now in course of preparation by a group of distinguished scholars, and eventually to be published in fourteen volumes. The list of contributors, including such names as those of Professors Powicke, Stenton, Jacob, and Godfrey Davies, gives assurance that the high standard of scholarship here set by the editor, will be maintained throughout the series. Professor Clark has undertaken one of the most difficult of the periods into which the history of England is for this purpose divided, and if his work may be taken as a specimen of the series, there can be no doubt as to the success of the project.